The Russo-Ukrainian War. Is a “Dayton-2” possible?

Pidgeons up in the air over the old town in Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Photo: Shutterstock

Today, we can affirmatively say that we are entering a new stage of the Russo-Ukrainian War. This is a time in which western support for Ukraine is beginning to weaken, and Ukraine’s main ally, the United States, is pursuing a policy of unpredictability regarding further support for Kyiv. We are also entering a period of global geopolitical unpredictability and attempts at isolationism from the world’s largest democracy. Instead of the words “Ukraine’s Victory”, “Victory Plan” and “President Zelenskyy Peace Formula”, we hear the words “Peace Negotiations” and “Concessions” in global public debate. On the other hand, we can observe how, against the backdrop of these talks, Putin is intensifying missile attacks on Ukrainian cities and killing civilians, including many children, both in eastern and western Ukraine. This all clearly resonates with experiences during the Yugoslav Wars (1991-2001). The leader of Yugoslavia at the time, Slobodan Milosevic, acted on the same principles as Putin does today. He responded to any apparent weakness and requests for negotiations with more and more brutal attacks, killing innocent Croats, Bosniaks, and others. Before the start of the war in Croatia, and later in Bosnia, Milosevic justified the outbreak of war by claiming to protect Serbs in Croatia and emphasizing that Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks were one nation. All attempts at future peace negotiations with Milosevic without the use of force were defeated. Only force, in particular American military power, compelled Milosevic to stop committing war crimes and enter into peace negotiations, which subsequently led to the end of the war. Today, the Americans are the world’s only superpower, and just like thirty years ago, they are playing the main role of the world’s main peacekeeper. But will the Americans this time be able to end the war using their power and achieve a just peace through force?

The United States in the Yugoslav campaign. The road to Dayton.

At the beginning of the Yugoslav conflict, the United States distanced itself from it quite a bit. Washington considered it an internal matter of Yugoslavia itself or the leading European countries. The EU in its present form did not yet exist. The bloc was created in the early 1990s and then began to expand into the institution we know today. Negotiations with the countries of a dying Yugoslavia were conducted by the United Kingdom, France, Portugal and Germany as separate states. Russia was also going through difficult times, and was too weak to play a role on the Yugoslav chessboard (although the Serbs hoped for its help to the very last). In such geopolitical scenarios, the United States at that time remained the only country that could extinguish the Yugoslav powder keg.

The initial attitude of the US to the situation in Yugoslavia was very cautious and expectant, based primarily on the position of “doing no harm” to itself. Perhaps the first diplomatic step was taken by the US embassy in relation to the Yugoslav leadership. The Americans talked about preventing the use of weapons against the Croats, saying those who did so would receive a retaliatory response (fragments of these conversations can be seen in the BBC documentary “The Death of Yugoslavia”). We could hear some similar statements from the Joe Biden administration in late 2021 and early 2022 before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

At the beginning of the Yugoslav conflict, the Americans took many diplomatic steps, realizing that they should do everything possible to prevent the outbreak of war. Diplomacy and the power of argument failed in 1995, in fact, after the Srebrenica massacre. A month after these tragic massacres, NATO began bombing Serbian forces in Bosnia, which subsequently forced the Serbs to retreat from their military positions and eventually agree to the Dayton negotiations.

One of the main roles in American diplomacy during the Yugoslav Wars was played by the former US Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmermann. It was he who tried to persuade the administration of George H. W. Bush and then Bill Clinton to intervene militarily to prevent civilian casualties. Cyrus Vance (Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for the Yugoslav conflict) also played an important diplomatic role in the Yugoslav conflicts. He proposed the “Vance Plan” to resolve the Serbian-Croatian conflict. The two nations agreed to this plan, but it was blocked by the leaders of the so-called separatist “Serbian Krajina”. Vance continued his work on developing other peace plans to resolve the situation between Croats and Serbs. The plan that he and other diplomats came up with was called the “Z-4 Plan”. However, it was not implemented because Croatian troops recaptured the “Serbian Krajina region” through Operation Storm in 1995.

It is also worth emphasizing that American diplomacy was not so much involved in the “Croatian campaign” as in the “Bosnian War”. One of the most difficult years for American diplomacy was 1994. This was the time when the situation escalated due to the fighting between Croats and Bosniaks for Mostar. The UN, and later the Americans themselves, were forced to intervene again to end this new military theatre on the Yugoslav chessboard. The path to a final peace lay, on the one hand, in American diplomacy placing pressure on the Serbs, backed by its allies from France, the UK and Germany.

Dayton was unavoidable for many reasons. Firstly, the Americans no longer wanted to lose the role of the main peacemaker in this war. Secondly, Clinton understood that the war had to be ended, and that the United States had already spent a lot of money on a campaign he was hesitant to engage with the initial stage of his presidency. Thirdly, the signing of a peace agreement between the warring countries on US territory, under the watchful eye of the president, showed and made the United States a superpower in this new era. The “Dayton Agreements” were ultimately signed in November 1995 in Dayton, Ohio. According to this agreement, Bosnia and Herzegovina remained a united state consisting of two subjects: a Bosniak-Croat federation and Republika Srpska, with unified federal institutions of government.

However, it should be clearly understood that the Dayton Agreement would not have happened if American diplomacy had not been backed by military force. In the Bosnian campaign of 1995, which was called “Deliberate Force”, the United States carried out 2,318 airstrikes, which amounted to 65.9 per cent of NATO operations. Other airstrikes were carried out by France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Spain and Turkey. According to various sources, NATO forces conducted 3,515 sorties and dropped 1,026 bombs on Serbian positions during the 15 days of bombing. This military operation was key to diplomacy, and in fact led to Dayton. In this case, diplomacy became co-dependent with military force. Peace was achieved through force. This is exactly what Ukraine is seeking and expecting today in its war with the military superiority of Russia.

The United States in the Russo-Ukrainian War. Are we on the way to Dayton-2?

In light of the arrival of a new government in the United States, and corresponding reform regarding a possible settlement of the war in Ukraine, it is extremely difficult to determine potential scenarios for the end of the Russo-Ukrainian War. This is largely due to the very lack of predictability of President Trump and his administration. At the moment, there is a clearly expressed approach focused on international issues that differ from the priorities of the Biden team.

Against the background of American distancing in the Ukrainian issue, today there is an increase in activity from countries such as Germany, Britain, Poland and Lithuania. A number of non-European countries are also striving to take over the initiative previously led by Washington, which is now stressing the responsibility of other NATO states. The United States actively intervened in the Yugoslav campaign as an integral part of NATO, and Alliance air strikes on Serbian forces were a decisive blow in stopping hostilities in the region. It is noteworthy that most of the “actors” in the Russo-Ukrainian War do not act under the auspices of NATO, but only individually.

It does not seem possible to assume a possible repetition of the US role in suppressing the war, as was the case in the Yugoslav campaign. As a result, one should not expect a similar conclusion to the war, at least in the near future. Of course, both wars involve issues of ethnic identity, alongside territory and its integrity. These conflicts are accompanied by numerous war crimes by the aggressor, as well as the documentation of such crimes. However, there are also a number of differences. In particular, Serbia was a regional power, a regional player, while the Russian Federation is a global power with a veto in the UN Security Council. This greatly complicates any tough diplomatic pressure.

Also, Russia’s war against Ukraine is an attempt to destroy Ukrainian statehood. In addition, one of the main deterrents working against direct western intervention is the Russian nuclear arsenal. Of course, the Bryansk and Kursk operations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, as well as Operation Spiderweb and the regular shelling of territory in the Russian Federation, make one doubt the quantity and quality of Russian nuclear weapons, as well as Moscow’s ability to use them. However, any such precedent cannot be allowed.

Of course, it is necessary to work on an attempt at a diplomatic resolution to the war. And in this case, the United States can play one of many key roles in a “Dayton-2” format. However, this requires extremely favourable circumstances, the probability of which can currently be assessed as low. These include significant territorial successes made by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, internal instability in the Russian Federation, visible fatigue of the Russian Federation regarding the war, and decisive actions taken by the United States.

Conclusions

A comparison of the Yugoslav and Russo-Ukrainian wars reveals a number of important parallels. However, it also emphasizes significant differences that prevent the Dayton Agreement experience from being considered a direct inspiration for resolving the war in Ukraine. There are striking similarities when it comes to war crimes, aggressive rhetoric, and an unwillingness to compromise on the part of the aggressor. In contrast, the scale of the war, as well as Russia’s geopolitical weight and nuclear weapons, all fundamentally change the conditions for negotiations and warfare.

The United States is still a potential global referee in the conflict, capable of significantly influencing the course of the war and negotiations. Despite this, its current position is less decisive and less active than in the 1990s. Without a comprehensive strategy that combines diplomacy with real military and economic support, achieving a just peace seems unlikely. Unlike the Yugoslav case, the conflict in Ukraine may drag on due to limited international influence, the fragmentation of western support, and the high risk of escalation.

The lessons of Yugoslavia should be studied as an example of an effective combination of force and diplomacy, but we should not try to transfer them literally to the largest war of the 21st century. The realities of today’s world require new approaches, broad international consolidation, and a long-term strategic vision to deter Russian aggression and ensure security in Europe.

Andrii Kutsyk holds a PhD in Philosophy of Media (Lesya Ukrainka Volyn National University) and a Master’s Degree in Eastern European Studies (University of Warsaw). He is currently a Research Fellow at the Institute of Political Science at the University of Gdańsk, a member of the Research Institute for European Policy, and secretary of the European Journal of Transformation Studies. In 2024, he also received the Ivan Vyhovsky Prize.

Aleksander Kazak is a member of the research and teaching staff at the Institute of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Gdańsk, in the Department of Public Policy and Administration. His work focuses on issues of security as well as the domestic and international politics of Belarus, Ukraine and Russia. He regularly publishes analytical materials and provides commentary on current events in these areas in the media.

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Bosnia and Herzegovina, peace deal, Russia, Russian invasion of Ukraine, Ukraine, US foreign policy, War, Yugoslav wars