Putin won Alaska

Volodymyr Dubovyk during a lecture at the United States Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. Photo: Kristopher Burris / United States Navy

VAZHA TAVBERIDZE: Let’s start with your impressions and takeaways from the Alaska Summit – what conclusions can be made?

VOLODYMYR DUBOVYK: What we saw was essentially a laser show that Trump staged to flatter Putin. And for me, as a Ukrainian, it was pretty disgusting. All the red carpet, the clapping, the smiles, being chummy, the ride in “The Beast” — this is not how you receive a man directly responsible for the deaths of so many people — in my country, in his own country, and elsewhere around the world. The optics were awful, horrendous, and, I’m sure, upsetting for many people worldwide.

The first impression was that the meeting produced no real results. No statement, no agreements. Putin even said that they actually reached some agreements, only for Trump to immediately contradict him and say there was no deal. So, as the summit ended, it looked like an abject failure — just as many expected. It seemed like a “nothingburger”. But by the next morning, that nothingburger had acquired quite a sour aftertaste. Now it looks like, in fact, there were things agreed on.

The biggest change in tone was Trump’s post-summit Truth Social post, where he said the aim is no longer a ceasefire but a “comprehensive peace”. That’s quite a change.

That is exactly what Putin wanted. And it completely contradicts — 100 per cent — what Trump himself was saying, even on his way to Alaska. He said: “I’m going there to get the deal, to get the ceasefire. If there’s no ceasefire, then there’s no deal.” Then suddenly he flips the script completely.

This is dangerous in so many ways. First, who makes a 180-degree U-turn in the middle of such a charged and complicated situation — a full-scale invasion — without consulting anyone? Trump said it was agreed “by all”. Who is “all”? Zelenskyy? European leaders? We don’t know.

Second, instead of a ceasefire, now we’re supposedly working toward a comprehensive peace treaty. But they couldn’t even manage a temporary ceasefire. If that was impossible, how are they going to pull off something so much more complicated? Good luck with that.

I suspect Trump doesn’t understand what such a treaty would require, what it would entail, or why it is so much harder to achieve than a simple ceasefire. For him, it’s: “I want this war to end. I want a Nobel Peace Prize. Whatever gets me the prize.”

How close have we come to a great-power bargain made over the heads of Europeans and Ukrainians — given Putin’s remark at the summit, when he said he hoped Europeans would not throw a wrench into the plans, and Trump saying in an interview with Fox News that “Ukraine has to agree to a deal”?

I don’t know. The question is: which Trump will we see? The early Trump, in his first months as president, when he was pressuring Ukraine and portraying Zelenskyy as the obstacle to peace while casting Russia as the one seeking to end the war? Or the more recent Trump, who said Ukraine must be supported and that it’s Putin who wants to prolong the war? Or maybe we’ll see Trump number three — we just don’t know.

I don’t think there’s any sort of fleshed out deal already. At best, there’s a basic orientation on how to proceed. But then again, Trump did also say Ukraine’s interests must be taken into account. So the real question is: will he go back to pressuring Zelenskyy to concede?

How much room does Zelenskyy have to manoeuvre? Especially given Trump’s call with European leaders, where he said Putin hasn’t changed his demand for control over the entire Donbas — meaning Ukraine must cede the part it controls? How difficult will it be for Zelenskyy to say no if both Trump and Putin agree, especially given Trump’s earlier remarks that “some land swap is bound to happen”?

It’s very difficult. Zelenskyy is staring at a menu of bad options.

There is already an understanding that Ukraine may have to accept de facto occupation, since we cannot liberate those lands anytime soon. But recognition? That’s a hard no. Withdrawal from Donbas? That’s a no as well. That’s where Zelenskyy has to manoeuvre.

And Trump might well say: “Okay, Volodymyr, why not withdraw? It’s the path to peace. It will stop the killing of millions.”

“And Vlad here is a man of his word. He won’t go further than that. He wouldn’t attack Ukraine because I’m the President.”

Yes, that’s his mantra. But Trump is someone you can work with — if you know how. Putin had his moment in Alaska. Now it will be Zelenskyy’s turn. I don’t think it’s hopeless. But my fear is that Trump could revert to his old line that “Zelenskyy is the main problem, that’s why we don’t have peace.” That would be a disaster.

Which didn’t seem to happen in Washington, when Zelenskyy, accompanied by a host of European leaders, arrived to meet Trump, fresh off the Alaska Summit.

The meeting between Trump and the European leaders in Washington on Monday projected a completely different vibe. For the guests, the main objective was to offset the damage done in Anchorage and to mitigate the dangerous, unpleasant aftertaste it left. Judging by the public portion of the talks, that goal was largely achieved.

The Europeans pushed back on the territorial issue, insisting that dialogue must begin with a ceasefire before moving forward. The notion of Ukraine’s “demilitarization” was also rejected. Most importantly, the discussion on possible security guarantees for Ukraine was launched in earnest. There is, as yet, no clarity on this. Key questions remain: What exactly does Washington mean when it says it is committed? Can Moscow’s obstructionist stance be altered, and what can be done if it cannot? Are the Europeans prepared to shoulder their share of the burden?

To sum it all up: if it were a boxing match, who won the Alaska round?

Putin won, clearly. He gained legitimacy. He broke out of isolation. Even without mentioning a deal, he secured a win. Sanctions that had been threatened now look dead in the water. He appeared strong, while Trump looked pale in comparison.

Trump got outplayed by Putin and now Trump wants to get the most of the situation. But Putin is the better manipulator. He knows how to deliver his message and his ultimatums while still flattering Trump — praising his “energetic efforts”, saying the war wouldn’t have happened if Trump had been president, and so on. He got to say: “Now we’re going to do this, we’re going to get things done.” And if it doesn’t work, he can always blame others.

I suspect he still wants some sort of strategic partnership with Russia. He wanted it in his first term. He still wants it now.

But then, on Monday, we saw a different picture – if Anchorage made it seem as though Putin had recaptured the initiative, it wasn’t that obvious after the Washington meeting. The so-called “peace process” has rebalanced somewhat. An integrated European-Ukrainian position has emerged as a factor neither Washington nor Moscow can easily dismiss or ignore.

Vazha Tavberidze is a Georgian journalist based in Tbilisi and regularly contributes to New Eastern Europe.

Volodymyr Dubovyk is a professor of International Relations at Odesa’s Mechnikov National University and Senior Fellow at CEPA.

Donald Trump, peace process, Russian invasion of Ukraine, Trump-Putin, US-Russia relations, Vladimir Putin, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, West-Russia relations