Western diplomacy towards Russia and the Logic of Failure: why territorial concessions will not end Russia’s war

Five Air Force F-22 Raptors taxi after arrival at Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska, on Tuesday May 23, 2006. Raptors from the 27th Fighter Squadron at Langley AFB, Va., are supporting Exercise Northern Edge 2006. The Air Force has selected Elmendorf as the home for the next operational F-22 squadron. The base will receive 36 Raptors, with the first jet expected in fall 2007. (U.S. Air Force photo/Staff Sgt. Dave Donovan)

Alaska talks and the “Logic of Failure”

Since Donald Trump’s inauguration, hardly a month has passed without Putin publicly calling for addressing the “root causes” of his war in Ukraine. Trump’s upcoming meeting with Vladimir Putin in Alaska brings “peace” negotiations regarding the war in Ukraine to another level. Both Moscow and Kyiv have reasons to explore a temporary halt: Russia faces a weakening economy and at the same time the most Russia-friendly US president ever. At the same time, Ukraine is uncertain of continued western support. Regardless of the outcome of the Alaska talks, it is therefore plausible that under a Trump presidency the fighting could come to a temporary end. Yet enthusiasm about this is misplaced. Going for a Trump-styled “quick fix” to Russia’s war in Ukraine most likely falls into what Dietrich Dörner calls the “Logic of Failure”: reducing a complex, systemic problem to a small fraction of manageable aspects, and making decisions that ultimately worsen the situation.

This analysis takes Putin’s call at face value and examines the “root causes” of Russia’s war through two complementary lenses: neorealist systemic theory, which sees the war as a response to shifts in the balance of power; and liberal theories of domestic preferences and identity, which explain it as the product of Russia’s autocratic political system and imperial national identity. As different as both perspectives are, they both point to the same message: the war in Ukraine has structural problems, and territorial concessions will not solve them. Neither of the following two explanations make a durable peace with Russia seem likely any time soon.

Perspective One: systemic pressures, power-balancing and security fears

This view follows the neorealist school of international relations. Neorealism explains state behaviour from a systemic perspective, largely ignoring domestic political structures. In this theory, the international system is anarchic – meaning there is no overarching authority. States, thus, operate in a sort of self-help system, in which each “spends a portion of its effort […] in providing the means of protecting itself against others”, according to Kenneth Waltz.

In this framework, all states – regardless of internal politics – pursue the same goals at the international level: the protection of their security. Accordingly, states are concerned about relative gains compared with any losses in their power. If a state perceives a decline in its relative position, it may consider war as a means of preventing rivals from becoming too powerful. From this perspective, the Russian attack on Ukraine could be seen as an example of “power-balancing” – a concept often invoked in political debate to explain Russia’s response to NATO’s expansion into Eastern Europe, which increased the relative capabilities of the United States and its allies. As Moscow perceived this as a security threat, Russia opted for military action against Ukraine to restore its position.

Yet a key flaw in this perspective is the war’s trajectory: In the course of the war, Russia significantly lost influence in the South Caucasus and Syria, started to face contested influence in Central Asia, extended its border with NATO through Finland, and faced a weakening economy – This suggests either that Russia severely miscalculated the war’s potential consequences – or that power-balancing was never the main driver. This makes the second perspective more persuasive.

Perspective Two: the Russian system…

This perspective looks more at the domestic constitution of a state to explain its foreign policy behaviour. Andrew Moravcsik’s liberal theory, particularly “Taking Preferences Seriously”, remains one of the most influential works in this tradition. Its central insight is:

“Societal ideas, interests, and institutions influence state behavior by shaping state preferences, that is, the fundamental social purposes underlying the strategic calculations of government.”

Moravcsik identifies three variants of liberalism, with two particularly relevant to Russia’s war in Ukraine.

…is autocratic

The idea of “Republican Liberalism” emphasizes that since not all social interests can be represented in the state’s external behaviour, what matters is “whose social preferences are institutionally privileged”. Moravcsik states that “the more unbiased the range of domestic groups [are] represented, the less likely they will support policies that impose high net costs or risks on a broad range of social actors. Thus, […] costly or risky foreign policy—is most likely in undemocratic or inegalitarian polities,” where only a very small fraction of domestic groups gains representation.

As Russia’s political system has become increasingly centralized since 2012, power has shifted away from domestic actors toward a personalist authoritarian regime, where major policy decisions are concentrated in the hands of the autocrat. Moscow’s Security Council meeting three days before the invasion illustrates this: most members appeared unaware of the war plans.

This concentration of power helps explain why the enormous costs of the war did not deter the Kremlin: diverse societal interests had little influence over the decision. However, while domestic institutions can create conditions for war, they are not a sufficient cause in and of themselves. Just because power is concentrated does not mean that war is the most obvious foreign policy tool.

…is Ukraine-centred

The underlying reasons for war are taken up by “Ideational Liberalism”. This outlook focuses on how national identity shapes foreign policy preferences: “Where national conceptions of legitimate borders, political institutions, and socioeconomic equality are compatible, thus generating positive or negligible externalities, harmony is likely.” If these national conceptions are not compatible, then conflict is likely.

Post-Soviet Russia could not define itself against Moscow, as other former Soviet states did. Instead, it built a self-image as a transnational superpower, linking its legitimacy to both the tsarist and Soviet past. Unlike European nation states, Russia does not see itself as a standard nation state, but attempts to extend its legitimacy beyond the ethnic Russian nation. This becomes evident when looking at the translation of the word “Russian” into Russian: Russkiy (русский) refers to ethnic Russians, while Rossiyskiy (Российский) refers to all citizens of the Russian state regardless of their nationality, as in the official state’s name of Rossiyskaya Federatsiya (Российская Федерация). This conception reinforces a transnational self-understanding following the tradition of the Soviet Union in which Ukraine is central. We already saw this early on with Putin’s predecessor Yeltsin: “It is impossible to tear from our hearts the fact that Ukrainians are our own people.” Putin’s 2021 essay “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians” formalized this stance in policy terms and laid the ideological ground for Russia’s later invasion of Ukraine.

…is imperial

Ukraine’s centrality should not be mistaken for a limit to Russia’s ambitions. The Russian system is imperial at its core – and its expansion has no natural endpoint. Vladislav Surkov, Putin’s closest adviser until 2020, frames it this way:

“For Russia, constant expansion is not just one idea among many, but the existential condition of our historical existence.”

The Russian political theorist Alexander Dugin takes it further:

“The rejection of the imperial-building function means the end of the existence of the Russian people as a historical reality, as a civilizational phenomenon. Such a refusal is national suicide.”

Such statements are not rhetorical excesses; they capture the perceived existential nature of Russia’s imperialism. This worldview is openly endorsed by Putin himself, who recently declared at this year’s St Petersburg International Economic Forum that:

“There’s an old rule that wherever a Russian soldier sets foot, that’s ours.”

Why territorial concessions will fail

Neorealism interprets Russia’s invasion as a power-balancing move against NATO expansion, while liberal theories reveal how Russia’s autocratic institutions and imperial identity make expansionism a domestic imperative. Whether viewed as a reaction to systemic pressures or as the outgrowth of a deeply rooted worldview, the consequences are the same: Russia’s goals disregard Ukrainian sovereignty and seek to re-order the post-Cold War international system.

At the moment, neither Trump nor the EU seem to have the willingness to assess and address the causes of the war properly. As a result, they fall into Dörner’s aforementioned “Logic of Failure”: a tendency of decision-makers to simplify, narrowing their focus to immediate, linear solutions – and thereby choosing the wrong course.

Territorial concessions to Russia might pause the fighting, but they will not change the structural and ideational drivers of the war: With receiving land from Ukraine, Russia will neither stop being autocratic, nor stop constructing its identity with a Ukrainian core, nor stop being imperial. Thus, treating Russia’s war as a mere dispute over land is a category error, and need to be read as a success of Russia’s imperial endeavours.

Like that, Russia’s imperialism will not fade away – it will most likely be reinforced and could legitimize further, later aggression against both Ukraine and Europe.

Escaping the logic of failure requires recognising the war’s complexity, anticipating second- and third-order effects, and avoiding the lure of quick fixes. Europe must prepare for a long-term contest with Russian imperialism and recognise: If territorial concessions are not simultaneously backed by credible security guarantees and Kyiv’s consequent integration with the EU, then the war’s outcome must be read as a one-sided victory for Putin. Hopes for readjusting such a strategy must not be placed on Trump. Instead, Europe must take decisive action: analytically, diplomatically and militarily.

Alexander Sicheneder is a half-Ukrainian political analyst and researcher based in Germany. He studied International Relations and Energy Economics, spent a year in Russia, and has professional experience in European institutions.

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diplomacy, geopolitics, NATO, Russia-West relations, Russian foreign policy, US-Russia relations