Armenia’s shifting foreign policy towards the European Union. Perspectives and challenges

Delegation of the European Union in Yerevan. Photo: Alexander Gafarro / Shutterstock

The South Caucasus is a strategic region for the EU, and Armenia has become a key partner in this tough neighbourhood. It is the only country in the region that is simultaneously exercising democratic reforms and facing external threats, hybrid pressure and structural economic dependence. Armenia and the European Union have recently become partners of strategic nature, with shared interests regarding democracy, security diversification and economic development. This shift emerged amid changing geopolitical dynamics and security alliances. In particular, this happened against the background of Yerevan’s growing disappointment with Russia and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). In response, the EU has gradually deepened its involvement. This has been done specifically by deploying a civil observation mission (EUMA) after Russia did not fulfill its security obligations, and the CSTO did not respond to Azerbaijan’s military operations.

In 2024, negotiations on the new EU-Armenia Partnership Agenda launched, replacing the partnership priorities adopted within the framework of the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) in 2018. Although Armenia has not officially submitted an application for EU membership, two key events have paved the way for membership aspirations. The first was the speech made by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in the European Parliament in 2023, when he announced that Armenia is ready to move closer to the European Union as much as Brussels considers it possible. The second involved the bill concerning the launch of the process for Armenia’s accession to the European Union, which was submitted to the National Assembly in January and approved the following month. The EU’s initiation of a Visa Liberalization Dialogue is also a signal that relations are moving towards a more strategic partnership. The EU-Armenia dialogue on visa liberalization was officially launched on September 9th 2024. Margaritis Schinas, former vice president of the European Commission, arrived in Yerevan for this purpose. Already by November 5th an EU delegation was in Yerevan to work out the programme of negotiations for visa liberalization with the Armenian side. Currently, discussions on the Visa Liberalization Dialogue Action Plan are in an active phase, which will define the necessary reforms, including security, border management, biometric documentation, and personal data protection.

In this context, the visit of the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas to Armenia on June 30th was also important. During her visit, she noted that the EU and Armenia have never been as close as they are now, and that the European Union is ready to further deepen the partnership in all directions. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen also made a similar assessment on July 14th after Nikol Pashinyan’s working visit to Brussels. She wrote on her microblog that European Union-Armenia ties are growing closer than ever.

This year, the Council of the European Union extended the mandate of the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) for a further two years. Brussels has also expressed its willingness to direct funds from the European Peace Fund to Armenia’s defence sector. In addition, Brussels has allocated 33 million euros of humanitarian aid to Yerevan to support those displaced from Nagorno-Karabakh.

Nevertheless, the process of EU-Armenia rapprochement is not going all smoothly, as there are conflicts of geopolitical interests and challenges in this region. Traditionally, Yerevan has been more dependent on Russia than the other two countries in the region: Georgia and Azerbaijan. Russia has a military base in Armenia, which is economically dependent on Moscow. Membership in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) also hinders rapprochement with the European Union. It should be noted that Yerevan is not keen on leaving Moscow behind per se, but on diversifying its economic and security policies. For example, India has become Armenia’s biggest partner in military-technical matters. Yerevan signed arms supply contracts worth about one billion US dollars with New Delhi over just one year. Paris has also taken a serious step to move closer to Yerevan. In October 2023, Armenia and France signed agreements on cooperation in the military-technical sphere. Overall, it is hard to say that Armenia is turning away from Russia towards the European Union, as it is not in Yerevan’s interest to become another battlefield between Russia and the West. The fact that Armenia is trying to maintain a balance between the West and Russia seems to be also evidenced by the steps of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. In October 2023, he missed the CIS summit and did not participate in the CSTO session in November. However, in late December he travelled to St Petersburg, where he met with Putin at a meeting of the Eurasian Economic Council.

According to the Institute of International Finance (IIF), Armenia consciously or not helps Russia to bypass European sanctions. According to the Institute’s figures, the supply of goods from European Union countries to Armenia has increased four to five times since March 2022, and Armenia’s trade with Russia has more than tripled.

Opposition, government and public thoughts on European integration

Armenia-EU relations have been showing an unprecedented intensity in recent times. Nevertheless, there has been a preponderance of security concerns among expert and political circles, especially on the part of the domestic opposition. This circumstance is conditioned by the fact that the former authorities of Armenia, which currently constitute the main opposition, have a predominantly pro-Russian orientation. They believe that the West has no vital interests in the Caucasus and their support for Armenia may not be consistent. The most radical wing of the opposition believes that Turkey is serving the interests of the European Union and the collective West in this region. As a result, it is unrealistic for Armenia to become a member of the EU in the near future, as Ankara is not in the club either. The Armenian opposition is also sceptical about the dialogue on visa liberalization. They believe that, given high European standards in many areas, specifically national and pan-European policies related to migration, the current Armenian regime, with its functional and institutional incapacity, will not be able to implement the provisions of the programme in a timely manner. At the same time, pro-western forces in the Armenian political arena see the country’s future as guaranteed exclusively within the European family. The actual process of visa liberalization, according to government figures, may take several years, and the challenges may be related not to political, but to technical issues. They believe that the most important stage in the visa liberalization dialogue process to be the launch of the dialogue per se, and that has already taken place.

How has Armenian society reacted to the policy of rapprochement with the European Union and the visa liberalization process?

According to the results of the 2024 annual survey in Armenia conducted by the “EU NEIGHBOURS east” programme, 62 per cent of the country’s citizens trust the European Union. This index is the highest among all other international institutions and is 19 per cent higher than the index two years ago. Furthermore, almost four out of five respondents (78 per cent) evaluate EU-Armenia relations positively. Recent polls also showcase that the majority of the population, especially in the capital, is in favour of liberalizing the visa regime between Armenia and the EU and considers this process a positive and necessary development for the country. At the same time, there is common concern with many youngsters that this process may lead to the emigration of the young labour force. In order to prevent this, they believe that the improvement of living conditions in the country should be the key priority on the authorities’ agenda.

Conclusion

Looking at the topic of Armenia’s rapprochement with the European Union, for now it is possible to speak only about limited possibilities. The main challenge in the relations between Yerevan and Brussels is ultimately the EU’s ties with Baku. This is especially clear regarding the bloc’s gas contract with Azerbaijan. In order to effectively ensure the security of Armenia, the West must respond more harshly to Baku’s threats and actions against the country.

One of the most essential questions is whether Armenia is ready and capable to implement all the reforms outlined by the EU, and with what road map will this process move forward? In the coming years, Armenia is unlikely to be ready to submit an application for membership in the European Union, not wanting to provoke the Kremlin. However, this option cannot be ruled out in the future.

Anna Vardanyan is an independent journalist, political analyst and researcher based in Armenia.

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Armenia, Armenian foreign policy, EU-Armenia relations, Nikol Pashinyan, South Caucasus