Swinging the deceptive pendulum: why Azerbaijan and Russia are not heading toward a radical drift

Embassy of the Russian Federation in Baku. Photo: Shutterstock

Tensions between Baku and Moscow flared in late June when Russian police arrested dozens of ethnic Azerbaijanis in Yekaterinburg. This group were linked to a series of unsolved murders from over a decade ago. Among them were Huseyn and Ziyaddin Safarov, who were declared dead while in custody. Russian authorities said that one died of a heart attack and offered no explanation for the other. But when the two brothers’ bodies were returned to Baku, an Azerbaijani autopsy concluded both died from severe blood loss and shock caused by extensive physical trauma.

This event set off a chain reaction, especially with fresh memories of the December 2024 crash involving Azerbaijani Airlines flight 8243, which was reportedly shot down by a Russian missile. The arrest of both Sputnik journalists and ordinary Russians working in the IT sector in Baku, followed by the Kremlin’s retaliation with the detention of the leader of the Azerbaijani diaspora in Yekaterinburg, has fuelled a simmering confrontation between the two governments. Azerbaijani government-aligned media groups are now running uncharacteristically sharp anti-Russian propaganda pieces, while rumours circulate that more than 300 Russian-language schools across Azerbaijan may soon be shut down.

Most international commentary has interpreted these tensions as a serious rift, potentially provoking a pro-West geopolitical realignment in Azerbaijan. For example, there has been speculation that “Putin is also losing Azerbaijan” and “Is Moscow losing Azerbaijan as an ally?”. International observers are hinting that this rift could end up triggering a “massive realignment in global power balances” – possibly in favour of the West. Even Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy appeared to embrace this interpretation, and in turn expressed support for Baku against Russia’s “threatening” of the country. Much of this speculation is also connected to Armenia-Azerbaijan developments in the South Caucasus. Many observers have connected the rift to a USA proposal to manage the contentious Zangezur corridor – a route linking mainland Azerbaijan to its Nakhichevan exclave through southern Armenia – which would sideline Russia, and to progress toward a long-awaited peace treaty between Yerevan and Baku. According to some analysts, these developments would “push out” Moscow from the South Caucasus and “cost” Putin his grip over a region he has traditionally regarded as his “backyard”.

How deep is the rift really?

Although a reassessment of Baku-Moscow ties is certainly warranted, we argue that recent commentary has often veered into sensationalism mixed with wishful thinking. We believe that the rift between Azerbaijan and Russia is far less severe than portrayed. In fact, rumours about the closure of Russian schools have for the moment proven unsubstantiated, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has called for restraint between the two sides, and both the Armenian and Azerbaijani governments have expressed issues over the USA proposal of managing the Zangezur corridor. Moreover, Moscow has welcomed dialogue between Yerevan and Baku, expressing support for a swift peace deal. In reality, it is Azerbaijan that has stalled the peace process, adding tough preconditions after the treaty text was already agreed upon. The initiative has clearly been in Baku’s hands, not Moscow’s. Therefore, it is surprising that many international observers frame recent events in the region as a decisive blow to the Kremlin’s influence.

Arguably, observers have been overlooking the many factors that constrain a full breakdown in Azerbaijan-Russia ties and prevent a sharp pivot toward the West. In particular, these involve Baku’s long-time and established multi-vector foreign policy, and structural economic factors tying Russia and Azerbaijan together. The current tensions with the Kremlin are consistent with this strategy rather than a departure from it. We will now discuss more in depth these constraining factors.

Aliyev’s deceptive pendulum between Russia and the West

Both Ilham Aliyev and his father Heydar Aliyev before him have traditionally conducted a calculated multi-vector foreign policy aimed at balancing relations with Russia, Iran, Turkey, the West, and now increasingly also China and the Turkic countries of Central Asia. The logic behind this approach is to manoeuvre between competing powers without aligning fully with any of them. In the case of Azerbaijan, it functions like a deceptive pendulum, swinging between external powers. It is a form of strategic ambiguity that allows Baku to extract concessions from different actors and avoid risky entanglements.

Indeed, before the recent Azerbaijan-Russia tensions, we should bear in mind that the two countries traversed a period of excellent relations, while links with the West were ambiguous. In particular, between 2021 and 2023, Baku ramped up its anti-western rhetoric, especially against France, which has been accused of being pro-Armenia. Enraged by the European Monitoring Mission sent to patrol southern Armenia in 2022, the Azerbaijani ambassador to the EU made threats that the EU mission could be shot if members got too close to the Azerbaijani border. In August 2023, the monitoring mission allegedly even came under Azerbaijani military fire. In the same period, Baku’s deepening ties with Moscow culminated in an alliance agreement signed just two days before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. As late as December 2024, Aliyev openly praised the agreement as a “milestone” in Russia-Azerbaijan relations, referring to the two countries as “allies”. This was a time when the pendulum was swinging closer to Russia, whose indirect support was needed to favourably deal with Armenia and the Karabakh issue. Indeed, the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) did not come to Armenia’s defence when it was attacked by Azerbaijan along its southern border in September 2022, nor did Russian peace-keepers stationed in Nagorno-Karabakh interfere with Azerbaijan’s complete military takeover of the region in September 2023.

Yet, even at the height of this pro-Kremlin tilt, Baku maintained ties with the West and especially with the EU. After the invasion of Ukraine, Brussels scrambled for alternatives to Russian gas. In July 2022, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen flew to Baku to sign a memorandum of understanding to double Azerbaijani gas exports to the EU by 2027. Perhaps because of the need for alternatives to Russian gas, the EU Commission and European Council’s reaction to the September 2023 ethnic cleansing of Nagorno-Karabakh’s Armenian population has been restrained. The EU’s support for Azerbaijan was reconfirmed in February 2024, when European Council President Charles Michel congratulated Aliyev on his re-election. This is despite international reports pointing to political repression and the absence of any real competition. In April 2025, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas, travelled to Baku and publicly referred to Azerbaijan as a “reliable partner”. Moreover, Baku has made itself essential to the EU through its role in the Middle Corridor. This east–west route links China to Europe by way of Central Asia and the South Caucasus, avoiding both Russia and Iran. Brussels views the corridor as a channel for importing more critical raw materials, which are vital for the European Green Deal championed by Von der Leyen. The EU–Central Asia Summit held in Samarkand in April 2025 reflects the growing importance of the Central Asian states as strategic suppliers of critical raw materials, and Azerbaijan as a transit corridor.

In essence, Azerbaijan has been skilfully able to deceptively manoeuvre between Russia and the West, each time benefiting from its ambiguous position. Each side has tried to court Baku to its side, supporting its foreign policy and/or closing an eye to the country’s authoritarian consolidation. But a consistent multi-vector outlook requires stably committing to no side. The recent Baku-Moscow tensions should, thus, be analysed within this calculated pendulum strategy.

Why Russia still matters

Beyond the strategy of multivectorism, several factors prevent Baku from sacrificing its special relationship with Moscow. First, Azerbaijan has so far been unable to meet its gas export commitments to the EU. At the same time, reports have emerged confirming that Baku is helping Russia evade oil sanctions. Persistent suspicions also linger that Azerbaijan may be increasing imports of Russian gas to fulfil its EU export obligations.

But energy ties are only part of the story. Another key reason a rupture between Moscow and Baku remains unlikely is the deep economic integration of Azerbaijani-born businessmen within Russia. Many capitalized on the post-Soviet privatization wave to build powerful empires spanning the energy, real estate, and logistics sectors. Among the most influential is Vagit Alekperov, the former head of oil giant “Lukoil”. As of March 2025, Forbes ranks him the richest person in Russia, with a net worth of 28.7 billion US dollars. Lukoil remains a key player in Azerbaijan’s hydrocarbon sector, holding around 20 per cent shares of the Shah Deniz gas-condensate field. In 2020, in recognition of his contributions to strengthening the ties between Azerbaijan and Russia, Azerbaijani President Aliyev awarded him the “Dostlug” Order for his role in strengthening bilateral ties.

Another major figure is Araz Agalarov, the head of real estate empire “Crocus Group”. A known Kremlin loyalist, Agalarov has reportedly secured major state contracts without competition. His son Emil, a Russian pop star and businessman, was once married to President Aliyev’s daughter. Through his company, Agalarov Development, he also maintains active ventures in Azerbaijan. It is also worth mentioning God Nisanov, one of Moscow’s top commercial property tycoons. Nisanov is rumoured to have close ties to Russia’s foreign intelligence chief, Sergey Naryshkin. A series of murky real estate deals has been noted involving Naryshkin’s daughter. In recent years, reports have uncovered business ties between him and the Aliyev family throughout Russia.

Beyond oligarch ties that create enduring economic and political links, Moscow serves as an important market for Azerbaijani agricultural exports. Nearly 46 per cent of all remittances sent to Azerbaijan come from Russia, where, according to official figures, over 300,000 Azerbaijanis live and work. If the Kremlin were to take steps that make life significantly harder for these labour migrants, the Azerbaijani government could face serious economic losses and growing political pressure at home as thousands return.

Main takeaways

Aliyev is capitalizing on the EU’s urgent need to secure transit routes for critical raw materials essential to the Green Deal, alongside its search for alternative gas sources. This gives him leverage to tilt closer to the EU, gaining immediate economic and political benefits, including closing an eye to increased political repression inside the country. However, this shift follows a recent swing toward Moscow that lasted until late 2024, and should be contextualized within Baku’s consistent and calculated multi-vector foreign policy. As the pendulum keeps swinging, we should not be surprised if in a few years Azerbaijan starts tilting again towards Russia.

In conclusion, the recent tensions between Baku and Moscow reflect more than just geopolitical posturing. Indeed, they show a personal reckoning between two autocrats. Aliyev never accepted Putin’s December 2024 apology over the downing of an Azerbaijani plane, which lacked both an admission of guilt and a thorough investigation. Strengthened by EU political and economic support, and Russia’s growing weakness, Aliyev is signalling to Putin that he demands more equal relations based on mutual respect, not one-sided deference.

Cesare Figari Barberis is a Postdoctoral researcher at the Institute of Security and Global Affairs (ISGA) at Leiden University. His research explores the role of emotions in the Caucasus and EU foreign policy.

Leonardo Zanatta is a PhD candidate in international relations/political science at Corvinus University of Budapest. His doctoral research explores Russia’s role in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

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Aliyev, Azerbaijan, Azerbaijan-Russia relations, Russia, Russian foreign policy, South Caucasus