The reassurance force for Ukraine needs a strategically mature Europe

EU Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen and the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy during a press conference in Kyiv, September 20th, 2024. Photo: Shutterstock

On July 10th, leaders and senior officials from over thirty countries around the world convened in London for another conference on the European-sponsored “Coalition of the Willing” to support Ukraine. The event offered many eye-catching plans, such as a commitment to establish a future operational headquarters in Paris for a reassurance force steered by Britain and France, as well as reaffirmations regarding the existing promise of providing at least 40 billion euros in military aid. The conference also notably included the participation of US Special Envoy to Ukraine Keith Kellogg and senior US legislators. Their attendance in a coalition meeting for the first time, along with the second Trump administration’s recent decision to resume US military aid to Ukraine, suggests that the United States could contribute to the reassurance force through the provision of logistics, intelligence and aerial support. While such support would be essential for the force’s success in the short term, the uncomfortable truth remains that European forces are still too reliant on the United States for these “strategic enablers”.

It is for this reason that NATO’s European members should view the impending establishment of the reassurance force, alongside the emerging EU-led Readiness 2030 Initiative, as an accelerant for its strategic “coming of age”. Europeans must be able to sustain this coalition without a perpetual dependence on US support, especially as uncertainty grows about the United States’ future role in NATO. By investing in Europe’s defence industries to prioritize the production of these strategic enablers on a mass scale, the chances of a successful deployment of the reassurance force will grow significantly and would likewise mark Europe’s transition into a strategic actor in its own right.

The planned establishment of the reassurance force under the guidance of the coalition is part of Europe’s larger strategic pivot. This involves taking a more flexible and proactive role in bolstering its Eastern Flank. In such a position, Europe would be able to collectively act with strategic purpose without necessarily relying on US support – a major change that ironically addresses the primary criticism of “freeloading” that some US officials have of NATO.

Regardless, even with this newfound initiative on Europe’s part, much of the coalition’s operational strength will still depend on US military support in the short term. This is true even without the presence of US troops in the reassurance force. European militaries do not have the same airlift, pre-positioning, and supply chain capabilities essential for large-scale military shipments. They lack the intelligence competencies needed for strategic level defence planning and operations (predominantly in satellite intelligence and border surveillance). There are further issues relating to the airpower that the United States must initially provide to ensure the reassurance force can operate with maximum efficiency. And most European states still acquire much of their military equipment from the United States. As a result, it will be years before these states will have the military industrial capabilities needed to be more self-sufficient.

Thus, without US participation, the reassurance force would be severely hamstrung, unable to deter threats, and potentially be exposed to Russian aggression. This is precisely why building solid European defence capabilities is so imperative.

Europe must accordingly treat the deployment of the reassurance force as a catalyst to build its own strategic enablers. Relatedly, such efforts must be designed to endure and outlast political cycles on both sides of the Atlantic as well.

To achieve this, NATO’s European states must create binding frameworks to accelerate the development of Europe’s military industrial capacity through consistent defence spending. This must be done all while integrating defence procurement processes and creating a unified defence infrastructure across the region.

European states should address these needs by establishing the European Defence Mechanism (EDM), a proposal which EU finance ministers are already considering. The EDM, which would simultaneously plan and execute processes to procure military equipment, would include a supranational fund to commission and own the production of strategic enablers. It would moreover involve the founding of a single defence market, as well as joint procurement for critical commodities, systems and technologies (like artillery shells and drones).

The EDM’s fund is particularly innovative as the burden of upfront costs concerning military spending would be centred on the fund instead of any EDM members. Individual countries would be primarily responsible for equipment usage fees and maintenance costs. This would ensure that EDM members would not be as fiscally encumbered as they would be if most of these expenses were on their own balance sheets. The EDM’s efforts would additionally complement the existing activities of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) programme, which oversees the harmonization of procurement efforts. This would be true regarding the European Defence Agency (EDA) as well, which plays a key role in the joint development of strategic enablers.

Although this armament task looks daunting, Europe’s deployment of the reassurance force could mark the beginning of its status as a strategic actor. This is because it would be the catalyst for NATO’s European members to build the strategic enablers needed for the force’s deployment in the long term. Only once Europe has these enablers will it be able to complete its strategic maturation and become a credible leader in its own defence.

Francis Shin is an author and research analyst focused on global governance, democratic resilience and grand strategy. His expertise spans anti-corruption regulations, clean energy policy and alliance structures. He has held roles at various prominent think tanks around the world, including the Atlantic Council, the Royal United Services Institute, and the Center for a New American Security.

New Eastern Europe is a reader supported publication. Please support us and help us reach our goal of $10,000! We are nearly there. Donate by clicking on the button below.

EU foreign policy, NATO, Russian invasion of Ukraine, Ukraine