Poland and France, towards a promising reset?

Prime Minister Donald Tusk and French President Emmanuel Macron signed a groundbreaking treaty in Nancy on May 9th 2025. Photo: Office of the Prime Minister of Poland / wikimedia.org

Over the last month, Poland has been very high on the French political agenda. Or perhaps we should say, once more.

French leaders, diplomats and analysts have been scrutinizing both the diplomatic rapprochement between Prime Minister Donald Tusk and President Emmanuel Macron on May 9th, as well as the presidential election leading to the victory of the PiS supported candidate, Karol Nawrocki, on June 1st. Closely followed by Paris, these two major political events can appear to be puzzling. On the one hand, the Polish leadership is taking important steps in reviving its relation with Paris, Brussels and the “European liberal mainstream”. Yet, on the other hand, the Polish voters sent a conservative and Eurosceptic message to its own coalition government and to all the liberal European leaders.

But let us focus on the bilateral relations between France and Poland and on the perception that the French have now acquired of Poland’s fast-growing role in Europe.

Back to square one?

Since the appointment of Donald Tusk as prime minister on December 13th, after a tense general election, the French government had been experiencing a “Polish relief”. The “PiS decade” seemed to be over, the Weimar Triangle was back on track and political and economic ties could be revamped. Cooperation at the European level was to overcome the stumbling blocks of the constitutional and judicial system reforms implemented by the previous Morawiecki government and the Duda presidency.

However, the victory of Nawrocki in the second highly disputed round of the presidential election has been seen in Paris as a setback to the potential reset in bilateral relations, as well as the “Polish normalization” hoped for by Macron. Assessing Polish political life by their own standards, the French elites branded those electoral results as “mixed messages” to Warsaw’s partners in Europe. Indeed, the PiS candidate, now president elect, who will take office on August 6th, has often been labelled in France as the “Polish Trump”. He is continuously criticized for his Eurosceptic stance by the ruling parties.

What seems to be mixed messages from Paris are in fact domestically understandable. The Polish political stage is, has been, and probably will remain, divided, disputed and heated. Thus, Paris must live with a recurring question: can Poland be trusted as a reliable partner (to Macron) on the European stage? Or is the promising reset established in Nancy already ailing? Is there now any “Polish relief” or is it “back to square one”?

A personal and electoral rapprochement

To France, in the long, rich and sometimes tumultuous alliance between Warsaw and Paris, a significant milestone was reached on May 9th in Nancy. Back then, the two countries added a new comprehensive bilateral treaty to their multilateral agreements (EU, NATO, Weimar Triangle, etc.) that have bound them together since the end of the communist bloc and the 2004 EU enlargement.

To Paris, Macron and the liberal Europhile elites of the business circles, this strategic agreement is of real substance. Many pro-government French media outlets have been highlighting the mutual assistance clause of the treaty, comparing it to the pre-war alliance against Nazi Germany and underlining its importance for the European Union’s defence initiatives. Within NATO and Europe, such bilateral military agreements are rare: during the Macron presidency, the only precedent is the strategic agreement signed with Greece in 2021. And outside of Europe, France is striking such deals only with prominent military powers such as India, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. This has been done in support of the country’s defence industry campaigns.

To a lesser extent, some diplomats and observers have emphasized that the new course taken by the bilateral relationship has put an end to a decade-long period of partisan frictions between the PiS Polish governments and the diplomacy of Hollande and Macron. With the Morawiecki government and Macron’s time in office, relations have been at their lowest for many years.

The “Nancy sequence” is nonetheless not deprived of ambiguity from the French perspective. First, with this treaty, Paris is a “diplomatic follower” rather than a strategic pioneer. Indeed, it has been a while now since Poland has become an economic superpower in the EU. The more recent military build-up of Warsaw has also already taken place. Second, it can be contended that France’s rapprochement with Poland is taking place quite late because it is prompted by partisan affinities between Macron and Tusk. The new treaty can even be seen as direct partisan support to the Civic Coalition campaign for the Polish presidential election. The strategic rapprochement is in the making but the electoral mutual support is even more obvious.

Catching up with a lost decade

This agreement is meant to trigger a “reset” between Paris and Warsaw. It has been branded as a “new chapter” by President Macron. The French authorities have given their best to make it symbolic and solemn, by choosing the right place and time.

As for the place, all French kids learn at school that Nancy is the urban embodiment of Polish influence in France due to the role of the Duke of Lorraine, Stanislas Leszczynski. The city shows the traditional yet structural impact of Poland in France, along with the musical works of Chopin and the scientific achievement of Curie. Undisputedly, the new treaty has been signed in the most Polish town of France.

As for the time, the French presidency has chosen to sign the treaty exactly when Warsaw and Paris have converged in supporting Ukraine, resisting the new US presidential administration and launching a new European defence initiative. Killing two birds with one stone, President Macron is catching up with the Polish economic miracle and supporting the Civic Coalition electoral campaign. Indeed, the treaty goes far beyond security and defence cooperation and cements various economic ties and endeavours.

France and Poland have been partnering for a long time in order to bolster an ambitious EU Common Agriculture Policy. They even had a clear, objective alliance throughout the PiS versus Macron controversies to protect this almost federal policy against fiscal cuts. New fields of cooperation are now being opened up by the “Nancy spirit”, such as nuclear energy. This is likely to create business opportunities in Poland regarding the jewels of the (French) crown, such as the major state companies EDF, Orano and Framatome.

Nuclear energy, defence, agriculture… All these topics are very dear to French (political) hearts and to Macron’s policies. One can say that the Polish charm offensive in France has been impressive. And that France has ultimately been rewarded for initiatives it did not take over the last decade.

Towards a common roadmap?

Can this agreement lead to concrete outcomes for France, Poland and the European Union? Let us put aside the tactical rapprochement, the electoral fight and the PR operations. Instead, it is better to assess the real level of potential that exists after the PiS victory in the presidential election.

At their heart, the structural needs of the two countries can be combined and realigned. But at this stage we only are witnessing a convergence in the making.

Poland – even with a president supported by PiS – needs to diversify its alliance network and enlarge its risk mitigation tools. The second Trump administration could prove be attractive for many PiS politicians. But it cannot be seen as reliable regarding the security of the country in the long run: all Polish citizens have witnessed the way Ukraine is constantly bullied by the US, the pro-Russian stance taken by President Trump, and his negligence towards NATO commitments. In a way, Poland can use the French strategic stance on the US to rebalance its influence on the US and in NATO.

Both countries need also to make the most of the ReARM initiative. After all, they have large needs, enjoy solid defence industrial companies, and fear the German market share in the domain.

Moreover, on Ukraine, Poland has gradually set the tone in Paris. For example, both countries now converge in their “unwavering support” to Kyiv; they share the proposition to put “boots on the ground” to secure any potential peace agreement; and they want to shape the ceasefire talks on Ukraine.

May aspects of the structural bonds remain to be strengthened and disagreements to be bridged. First, economic and trade links are weak: Poland is only the tenth trade partner of France, while France is the fifth trade partner of Poland. Second, the Weimar Triangle (often declining but regularly revived) needs to be stabilized to become a more efficient scheme. The window of opportunity is there: Macron, Merz and Tusk have common goals. But Germany is obviously tempted to sing its own song.

The “Nancy spirit” can only become a real common roadmap if concrete actions are taken together in the long run.

Reality checks

The real impact of the 2025 bilateral treaty and the materialization of the “Nancy spirit” are to be assessed in the coming months and years. Reality checks are to be performed, especially at times when the Macron presidency is entering its last period.

Stumbling blocks are to be overcome on migration policies, Ukraine’s EU accession process (France is tempted to delay it), economic ties (Poland relies on Germany, not on France) and domestic political fights (PiS will remain the main target of Macron’s European politics). Progress is also to be made in the economic field, and fast.

Yet, Poland and France can make all the difference in making sure that Europeans have a seat at the negotiation table on Ukraine and that Germany will seriously rearm. As of today, relations between the two countries are proving to be promising. Let us closely follow whether the administrations will keep their promises. The reset is on its way. However, it is far from its destination.

Cyrille Bret is an associate researcher at Notre Europe – Institut Jacques Delors.

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Donald Tusk, Eastern flank, Emmanuel Macron, EU, Europe, France, Poland, Polish foreign policy, Polish-French relations