Armenia’s precarious position on Iran

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan visiting the Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian in Tehran in July 2024. Photo: Press release from the Office of Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia

Relations between Armenia and Israel have been limited primarily because Israel maintains a strategic alliance with Azerbaijan. Israel serves as one of Azerbaijan’s main military suppliers, a role that has been pivotal in Azerbaijan’s victory in the 2020 Second Karabakh War, subsequent military offensives against Armenia resulting in the occupation of over 200 square kilometers of its border areas in 2021–2022, and the military conquest of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023. This alliance has created an environment of mistrust, limiting Armenian-Israeli cooperation. Israel has also exploited the issue of the Armenian Genocide by simultaneously refusing to officially recognize it while at the highest levels of leadership invoking it as a political tool against Turkey to deter criticism of Israel’s actions in Gaza. Armenia on its turn recognized Palestine in 2024.

Conversely, Armenia has recently strengthened ties with the United States, formalized through a formal strategic partnership agreement signed by the outgoing US Secretary of State Antony Blinken in January 2025. While scepticism initially emerged within Armenian society regarding whether the Trump administration would commit to its implementation, this uncertainty has been dispelled. President Donald Trump, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and other prominent American officials publicly reaffirmed the agreement’s validity, signalling continued support for strengthening US–Armenian relations. Several US delegations and interagency teams have visited Armenia in recent months to follow up on the implementation of the Strategic Partnership Agreement, supporting Armenia’s broader objectives of diversifying its security partnerships, the civilian use of nuclear energy through small modular reactors, and thus reducing its longstanding dependence on Russia. Armenia and the US have also conducted the joint “Eagle Partner” military exercises in 2023 and 2024.

Despite their fundamentally different political and ideological systems, Armenia and Iran share certain regional interests that have fostered pragmatic cooperation. Armenia has embraced democratic governance and a commitment to human rights. It also maintains a secular political system, while holding the historical distinction of being the first nation to adopt Christianity as a state religion. In contrast, Iran is an Islamic authoritarian state in which the religious authority is deeply embedded in the structure of political power. Iran’s regional posture is shaped by stigmatization and isolation by the West and economic sanctions.

As regional powers compete over the future of connectivity in the South Caucasus, Iran has emerged as a key actor providing an implicit security buffer for Armenia amid Azerbaijan’s contentious demand for an extraterritorial corridor through Syunik. The contrasting visions represented by the proposed “Zangezur Corridor,” Armenia’s “Crossroads for Peace” initiative, and the Iran–Azerbaijan “Aras Corridor” underscore broader geopolitical rivalries and competing interests over the modalities of regional transport routes.

Azerbaijan’s notion of a “Zangezur Corridor” refers to its demand for establishing an extraterritorial route through Armenia’s Syunik province to connect mainland Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave. The project is backed by both Russia and Turkey: Russia supports the establishment of such a corridor under the control of its Federal Security Service (FSB), viewing it as a means to circumvent western sanctions. Turkey, in turn, envisions the corridor as a key component of its broader pan-Turkic or pan-Turan aspirations, linking the Turkic world through contiguous territory. This notion leaves Armenia in a blockade and threatens its territorial integrity.

Armenia’s project “Crossroads for Peace” envisions opening regional transportation routes, crossing its territory under its national sovereignty and reduced customs procedures, including from Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan, expecting to use other regional communications in exchange. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen suggested that Armenia could become part of the Middle (Trans-Caspian) Corridor, positioning it as a key transit hub between Europe and Asia. However, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev swiftly dismissed the proposal, publicly rejecting any plans to include Armenia in the Middle Corridor framework. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has recently discussed Armenia’s vision with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, seeking to convince him that the “Crossroads of Peace” could also serve Turkey’s regional economic interests. Iran, on the other hand, has shown little enthusiasm for the project.

These divergent models of connectivity reflect deeper strategic orientations: Armenia advocates for cooperative, sovereignty-respecting solutions, while Azerbaijan, supported by Russia and Turkey, pursues a coercive and unilateral approach aimed at asserting regional hegemony.

The Azerbaijan-Iran Aras Corridor is an infrastructure project under construction along the Aras River, that connects mainland Azerbaijan to its exclave Nakhchivan via Iranian territory – bypassing Armenia. It reflects the cooperation between Azerbaijan and Iran, and serves as a strategic alternative to Azerbaijan’s demanded extraterritorial route through Armenia. However, it also diminishes the relevance of transit options through Armenia in regional planning. Iran opposes the so-called Zangezur corridor, viewing it as a threat to its 44 kilometres-long northern border with Armenia, as it provides Tehran with direct access to the South Caucasus and serves as a buffer against regional isolation by Turkey and Azerbaijan for both Iran and Armenia. At the same time, faced with growing risks, Iran may be tempted to soften its red line on the so-called “Zangezur Corridor” in the hope of reducing Azerbaijan’s support for Israel or securing backing from Russia.

Given the blockade by Azerbaijan and Turkey, Armenia’s access to international markets remains constrained. In this context, Iran and Georgia serve as Armenia’s only land gateways to the outside world. Iran provides Armenia with vital connectivity to the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and South Asia – including growing strategic and trade ties with India, now an important military supplier and trade partner. The viability of Armenia’s border with Iran is therefore indispensable to its economic security and strategic diversification.

Since the Trump administration took office, Azerbaijan has reportedly tried to leverage its close relationship with Israel to secure tacit approval or at least minimize US opposition to its potential military actions aimed at creating the “Zangezur corridor” through Armenia by force. Nevertheless, senior US officials, including Rubio, have publicly noted a “real risk” of an Azerbaijani invasion of Armenia, emphasizing that the US is actively working to prevent such an escalation.

This stance combined with the opposition of Iran and the presence of the EU civilian observation mission in Armenia, effectively serve as security deterrents against a potential Azerbaijani military offensive. The defence of Armenia’s territorial integrity represents a rare point of convergence among the US, the EU, and Iran, despite their broader geopolitical disagreements.

A further risk stemming from the Iran–Israel–US conflict is the erosion of the global rules-based order. The normalization of unilateral military offensives, especially those launched under the pretext of “preventive war” which lacks clear justification under international law, sets dangerous precedents. When such actions are driven by ambitions of regional hegemony, they pose an even greater threat. For a small state like Armenia, which has recently been subjected to cross-border attacks and coercion by Azerbaijan, these developments represent a serious and enduring risk to its security and sovereignty.

A critical dimension of the Iran–Israel conflict’s impact on Armenia is the potential risk of nuclear disaster. Military targeting of nuclear facilities could trigger catastrophic regional consequences and is therefore prohibited under international law. Any attempt to legitimize such actions also sets a highly dangerous precedent. Given Armenia’s proximity to Iran and its small territorial size, this risk further heightens its vulnerability, reinforcing the urgency of returning to negotiations on Iran’s nuclear deal.

Looking ahead, potential “regime change” in Iran could trigger profound regional instability, beyond a change in governance system. Iran’s multi-ethnic composition includes approximately 20 million ethnic Azerbaijanis residing near the Armenian border, with a history of irredentist sentiments promoted by both Iranian and Azerbaijani nationalist actors at different times. Any future political upheaval could risk the fragmentation of Iran’s multi-ethnic structure and destabilization of its border regions. Iran’s Armenian community, estimated at around 70,000 people and recognized as a religious minority under the Iranian constitution, may face increased security risks. In such a scenario, a potential refugee influx into Armenia could pose both economic and hybrid challenges for the country.

Ultimately, Armenia faces a strategic dilemma as it seeks to balance neutrality and multi-alignment amid growing regional and global polarization. It relies on both Iran and the United States as de facto security deterrents against Azerbaijani aggression. Balancing relations between these two actors, who are adversaries in the Iran-Israel conflict, places Armenia in a vulnerable position. Maintaining neutrality may become increasingly difficult as regional tensions escalate, and Armenia risks becoming a collateral victim of the broader Iran–Israel–US rivalry.

Sossi Tatikyan holds a Master of Public Administration degree from the Harvard Kennedy School, has been a NATO Defense College Partnership for Peace Research Fellow, and is currently a PhD Researcher in Sorbonne Nouvelle University. Her main research topics are: Ethnic conflicts, cognitive and information warfare and lawfare, Euro-Atlantic integration, and security dilemmas of small states.

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Armenia, Armenian foreign policy, Azerbaijan, Iran, Israel, South Caucasus, turkey, USA