Repression in Azerbaijan

A view of Baku, Azerbaijan's capital. Photo: Halit Sadik / Shutterstock

The repression of the few remaining independent voices against President Ilham Aliyev’s regime continues in Azerbaijan. In recent weeks, among others, the journalists Ahmad Mammadli and Ulviyya Ali have been arrested, with the researcher Igbal Abilov receiving a long sentence after months of pre-trial detention. We spoke about the situation in the country with Cesare Figari Barberis, a postdoctoral researcher at the Institute of Security and Global Affairs at Leiden University.

ALEKSEJ TILMAN: In an article you wrote for the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI) together with Ahmad Mammadli, you mentioned a double wave of repression in Azerbaijan: one in 2014 and one between 2023 and 2024, in the lead-up to the presidential elections of February 7th 2024. You concluded that the regime aimed to suppress any form of organized opposition. Is it correct to say that since then, the repression has extended to individuals?

CESARE FIGARI BARBERIS: That is something I have been thinking about these days. In 2014, civil society in Azerbaijan was much more active and organized, and the government targeted several groups. If they went after individuals, it was to hit those groups. Since the summer of 2023, they have started targeting the last remaining independent media outlets, like Toplum TV and Abzas Media, and several smaller, less structured political groups.

Now they are going after individuals. It surprised me somewhat, considering who has been arrested. Ahmad Mammadli had not belonged to any political group for some time and was communicating through his YouTube channel Yoldash Media, which only had about a thousand views per video. Ulviyya Ali worked for Voice of America and was not affiliated with any political group either. Igbal Abilov had a small online magazine about Talysh culture [the largest minority in Azerbaijan]. I know Bahruz Samadov personally, and he too was a researcher not involved in any political group.

So initially, they targeted more organized entities. Once those were neutralized, they moved on to individuals.

What concerns us now (I say “us” because these are issues we discuss with Azerbaijani friends and acquaintances) is that they are really scraping the bottom of the barrel – targeting even marginal activists. There is now widespread panic, and it is hard to find people willing to speak to foreign media about the situation in the country, even those who had previously written critically about the government. The cases of Samadov and Abilov show that they now even arrest Azerbaijani citizens residing abroad when they return to Azerbaijan.

Speaking of the case of Ahmad Mammadli, what are the charges against him, and what is he facing?

The charge is stabbing. The story they fabricated is that he took a taxi and got into a verbal argument with another passenger (not the driver), and as a result, he stabbed that person.

This is not the first time someone has been accused of stabbing. The same tactic was used against the trade unionist Afiaddin Mammadov in 2023. Among the movements repressed that year were also labour unions, and Mammadov was involved in efforts to unionize Wolt delivery drivers. They had organized a small demonstration to improve their working conditions.

Mammadov’s trial ended this January with an eight-year sentence. So unfortunately, a similar sentence can be expected for Mammadli.

My Azerbaijani acquaintances and I are quite pessimistic because just a few days ago, prosecutors requested twelve years for journalists connected to Abzas Media. Abilov received eighteen years for “treason against the state” and “incitement to ethnic hatred”. These are very long sentences, raising serious concerns for Bahruz Samadov, who is facing at least ten years for “treason against the state”.

Sentences have become harsher over the years.

From an international standpoint, do you think it is accurate to say that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has strengthened Aliyev’s position to the point where he can completely ignore (or stop pretending to care about) human rights in Azerbaijan? Or was that already underway regardless?

Aliyev is a realist and very skilful in his multi-vector foreign policy. The war in Ukraine certainly changed his calculations on Nagorno-Karabakh. He realized Russia would be too distracted elsewhere, and having 2,000 Russian troops in Karabakh was becoming inconvenient. Plus, he understood that Putin needed Turkish support, especially for mediation concerning Ukraine. So, partially at Russia’s expense and with some Moscow backing, he advanced his agenda to achieve full control over Karabakh by 2023.

The almost total silence from the West had an impact on internal repression in Azerbaijan. Let’s go step by step.

The 2020 war ended with no consequences for Baku. In 2022, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen visited Baku to sign a memorandum of understanding to increase gas imports from Azerbaijan (from ten to 20 bcm/year). This is an unachievable goal without further investment. The actual increase will be between one to two bcm. To me, this is a short-sighted strategy, both in the short and long term, and a legitimization of Aliyev.

So yes, we could say that the war in Ukraine indirectly helped President Aliyev. The EU needs Azerbaijani gas to offset the loss of Russian supply, pushing member states to turn a blind eye to human rights issues in Azerbaijan.

After the 2024 presidential elections, European Council President Charles Michel congratulated Aliyev, legitimizing a process everyone knows was a sham. More recently, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas visited Baku and in her speech called Azerbaijan an “important partner” who had helped the EU diversify its energy supply.

Kallas also spoke about infrastructure, logistics and transport. This followed her visit to Central Asia. One possibility is that they are counting on Azerbaijan not just for gas (one to two bcm) but also to connect Central Asia via trade, goods and energy – again building on an anti-Russian perspective. But this is a truly long-term plan.

So the western response to what is happening in Azerbaijan has been complete support from all EU institutions, with the exception of the European Parliament.

Italy, in particular, has the greatest interest in Azerbaijani gas (Azerbaijan accounts for less than three per cent of EU gas needs but over 15 per cent of Italy’s). From my sources in Brussels, I know that Italy actively works to block discussions on human rights in Azerbaijan within EU institutions. Meanwhile, Italian media show very little interest in covering the human rights situation in Azerbaijan.

We spoke with Bahruz Samadov shortly after the 2023 war, and he mentioned the Azerbaijani reconquest of Karabakh as one source of President Aliyev’s popularity. Do you think he is still riding the wave of the military victory or are things changing?

Both things are true. Aliyev is still very popular, as he is seen by Azerbaijanis as the one who liberated Karabakh.

At the same time, there are issues, particularly regarding the treatment of veterans. Many have not received adequate support after the war, with several suicide cases reported even by some local media. It’s said they haven’t had enough psychological or economic help.

There is also inflation, which people feel. Citizens realize money is not being spent well in Karabakh. Relocation plans are slow, with big infrastructure projects like the Stepanakert/Xankəndi university, so mainly young students, not IDPs from the 1990s war, are moving back.

Moreover, many Azerbaijanis now want a peace treaty – a view that differs from the government’s agenda. People supported the 2020 war. By 2023, based on interviews I conducted in Azerbaijan between 2021 and 2023, many were against another war for the remaining parts of Karabakh. They felt enough young Azerbaijanis had died already, and it wasn’t worth more lives (the seven districts surrounding Karabakh and Shusha were seen as most important).

So the 2023 war was not widely celebrated, though people were still generally pleased. But now, people want peace, even those not aligned with the opposition. Most are also against war for the Zangezur corridor [the southern Armenian region separating Azerbaijan from its exclave of Nakhchivan].

Aliyev is still seen as the hero of Karabakh, but discontent is growing, especially over inflation, veterans and reconstruction. And because people want a peace deal.

Let’s talk about Azerbaijan’s neighbours. Starting with Armenia, we have been in this limbo for months. On the one hand, the peace treaty text is supposedly ready, but on the other, there are aggressive statements from Azerbaijan. What is Baku’s real goal?

I do not think Aliyev wants to sign a peace treaty, because that would start a new post-conflict chapter for Azerbaijan. At that point, what would be his role? It would be like his mission is over. As long as we remain in this post-conflict but pre-peace phase, his power stays legitimate.

So I think he is looking for any excuse not to sign the treaty. First, they delayed finalizing the text. Now they have this absurd demand that Armenia change its constitution. The core issue is that the preamble references the 1990 Declaration of Independence, which itself mentions the joint decision by the Armenian Soviet and the Karabakh Council to reunify Karabakh with the Armenian Soviet. So Azerbaijan believes that the constitution contains territorial claims against them.

Aliyev knows full well how hard this is: changing the constitution requires a national referendum. It is not certain the Armenian public would support this.

According to polls, Pashinyan’s popularity is declining. In recent municipal elections in Gyumri, Armenia’s second city, his party won but didn’t get a majority – a partial defeat. He still lacks a strong challenger, but one might emerge.

So this is a deliberate excuse not to sign the treaty, fully aware of its complexity. If a referendum is held and fails, Azerbaijan can say: “Armenia does not want peace, they are full of revanchists.”

This matches narratives in Azerbaijani media, which say that Armenia refuses peace because of territorial claims in its constitution, and that nationalism and revanchism are rising – both false claims.

This could even justify a future war over Zangezur. I would not rule it out completely. If it’s a targeted operation without harming EU monitors stationed on the Armenian side of the border (which Aliyev wants gone), western condemnation would be mild.

So yes, Aliyev wants to stay in control during this “post-conflict” period and uses these narratives against Armenia – narratives that fewer and fewer Azerbaijanis actually believe. People want a peace treaty, though not necessarily reconciliation. They just do not want any more young people dying for unclear reasons.

My second question is about Georgia. The media focus is on Russian interference, but Aliyev’s support for Georgian Dream is evident, as is the presence of an Azerbaijani minority in Georgia. What can you tell us about Azerbaijani interference in the elections?

Azerbaijani state interference in regions with Azerbaijani minorities in Georgia is well-documented. We also know Aliyev has a good relationship with Georgian Dream, which benefits from negotiating with a similarly autocratic counterpart, attempting – though less successfully – a multi-vector foreign policy.

In this context, Georgia is increasingly unsafe for Azerbaijani activists, with extraditions and abductions, and the Georgian authorities turning a blind eye.

For Azerbaijan, Georgia is crucial as a transit corridor in case Zangezur remains blocked.

Let’s end with Russia. Relations between Moscow and Baku have soured, especially after the downing of the Azerbaijan Airlines plane last December. Do you think this breakdown is mainly a matter of ego between authoritarian leaders, or are there deeper reasons that predate the incident?

Aliyev is pursuing his well-established multi-vector foreign policy. As we have seen, he has been engaging more with European partners, which means appearing more confrontational toward Russia at times. When the moment is right, however, he will likely move closer to Putin again – who, by the way, visited Baku recently.

Aliyev is a native Russian speaker and has insisted on maintaining and even expanding Russian-language schools in Azerbaijan – there are more than 300 of them.

In my view, the December plane incident was a real headache for Aliyev. He could not afford to appear weak in front of his own people. As for not going to Moscow for the May 9th Victory Day celebrations, that too is part of his carefully calculated multi-vector strategy.

This article was originally published in Italian on the Meridiano 13 website and social media channels.

Bahruz Samadov was sentenced to 15 years in prison in Azerbaijan on June 23. 

Cesare Figari Barberis is a postdoctoral researcher at the Institute of Security and Global Affairs, at Leiden University

Aleksej Tilman is an Italian Communications Specialist with a strong interest in the Caucasus. He covers the region for Meridiano 13 and other outlets, including Q Code Magazine and Valigia Blu.

New Eastern Europe is a reader supported publication. Please support us and help us reach our goal of $10,000! We are nearly there. Donate by clicking on the button below.

Aliyev, Azerbaijan, human rights, repression, South Caucasus