The Kosovo-Serbia dispute amid global turmoil: a defining test for the EU

A refurbishment project of a bridge in Mitrovica funded by the EU. Photo: Giovanni Vale / Shutterstock

With the war in Ukraine entering its fourth year and tensions emerging in the transatlantic relationship, the EU finds itself at a pivotal moment in its history. The new European Commission is confronted with a myriad of challenges that will shape the future of Europe, ranging from economic instability and energy security to internal divisions and geopolitical tensions.

Among these challenges is also the long-standing Kosovo-Serbia dispute. While it may appear less pressing in the grand scheme of things, how the EU handles this issue will not only shape the stability of the Western Balkans but also determine the EU’s credibility as a geopolitical actor. For example, is it capable of enforcing its foreign policy priorities and maintaining security in its immediate neighbourhood?

The EU-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue was launched in 2011 with the purpose of normalizing relations between Kosovo and Serbia. Since then, there have been periods of both rapprochement and heightened tension, with the Brussels Agreement in 2013 and the Ohrid Agreement in 2023 hailed as major steps towards the normalization of relations. However, both sides have largely failed to implement the necessary agreed measures, leaving the Dialogue without a final resolution. As a result, tensions have persisted between both sides.

The EU recently appointed its new Special Envoy for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue, Peter Sørensen, succeeding Miroslav Lajčák. His task will be twofold: to move the Dialogue process forward and rebuild the EU’s role as a credible mediator. However, the current situation is complicated due to an apparent political deadlock between Kosovo and Serbia, as well as growing transatlantic discord. Despite these challenges, the EU must take decisive action to keep the negotiations on track. This must be done in order to reaffirm its role as the key geopolitical actor in its neighbourhood.

Lajčák’s agreement and unintended effects

In 2020, the EU signalled a renewed commitment to resolving tensions in the region by appointing Miroslav Lajčák as its first Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue and other issues in the Western Balkans. He introduced the Ohrid Agreement in 2023, a new normalization framework, nearly a decade after the 2013 Brussels Agreement. Under the Agreement, Kosovo committed to establish an adequate level of self-governance for the Kosovo Serb community in the north, while Serbia agreed to not oppose Kosovo’s membership in international organizations. Both parties also committed to good neighbourly relations, mutual recognition of national symbols and documents, and the exchange of permanent missions, among other measures.

The agreement, however, was only verbally endorsed. Following the meeting in Ohrid, the Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić refused to sign it, arguing that doing so would imply recognition of Kosovo’s independence. Shortly after, President Vučić also openly opposed Kosovo’s UN membership bid, a direct violation of the Agreement. A further setback followed in December 2023, when then-Prime Minister Ana Brnabić, in a letter to the EU, explicitly stated that Serbia does not consider the Ohrid Agreement legally binding. Vučić and Brnabić have also noted that Belgrade will not actively comply with certain provisions of the Agreement. Serbia later voted against Kosovo’s membership in the Council of Europe. In September 2024, the EU claimed Serbia withdrew this letter, but the Serbian government has not confirmed this move.

Since then, no progress has been made despite numerous meetings in Brussels. At the same time, multiple incidents have exacerbated security concerns. Kosovo’s government efforts to dismantle Serbian-run parallel institutions in the north of Kosovo have sparked protests and clashes with the local Serb population. The EU has subsequently imposed restrictive measures that continue to be in place. In 2023, a Serbian armed group also attacked the Kosovo police in Banjska. In the following year, attacks were carried out on Kosovo’s critical infrastructure. Both actions were condemned by the EU as acts of terrorism. This ongoing fragile security situation in the north underscores the urgent need for a sustainable resolution.

A fresh start: Sørensen takes the lead in negotiations

The appointment of Peter Sørensen as the new Special Envoy marks a fresh start for the Dialogue. Unlike his predecessor Miroslav Lajčák, whose Slovakian background raised questions about his impartiality, Sørensen hails from Denmark, a country that recognizes Kosovo. This shift addresses concerns of potential bias that had previously surrounded the negotiations. A seasoned career diplomat rather than a former politician, Sørensen brings extensive experience in both EU and UN roles across the Western Balkans. His deep familiarity with the region, coupled with his lack of political affiliations, presents an opportunity to reinvigorate the Dialogue process.

Furthermore, while Lajčák’s mandate encompassed both the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue and broader Western Balkan regional issues, Sørensen’s role is solely focused on the Dialogue. This reflects a more targeted approach, allowing him to dedicate his full attention to facilitating negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia. By narrowing his portfolio, the EU aims to enhance the effectiveness of its mediation efforts, ensuring that the Dialogue receives the sustained focus and diplomatic resources necessary to achieve tangible progress.

Finally, the shifting political landscape in Serbia and Kosovo offers an opportunity to advance the Dialogue. In Serbia, mass demonstrations following the collapse of the main train station’s roof in Novi Sad in November 2024 have weakened the current ruling coalition government. To address the accusations of democratic backsliding, Serbian government leaders may want to re-engage with the negotiations to demonstrate their commitment to EU integration and values. Meanwhile, although Kosovo’s recent election has not yet led to the formation of a government due to ongoing political tensions, a new government is expected to be formed, presenting an opportunity for renewed engagement. Peter Sørensen should seize this moment to push for a stronger and results-driven framework.

Escaping crisis mode: between priorities and challenges

Sørensen must address critical issues from the outset to bring the Dialogue back on track. A key priority is initiating the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement, with a clearly defined sequence of steps for its enforcement. To achieve this, Sørensen must tackle two outstanding challenges. The first is resolving the EU’s continued restrictive measures against Kosovo that were meant to encourage re-engagement with the Dialogue and incentivize the implementation of the Association of Serb Majority Municipalities. At the same time, he must convince Serbia to withdraw its letter from December 2023 questioning the Ohrid Agreement’s legality to secure Belgrade’s full commitment to the Dialogue. Without addressing these two critical issues, the Dialogue will remain ineffective, as demonstrated throughout 2024.

Sørensen must also have a contingency plan for the new US administration, which could unexpectedly shift its approach in the negotiations. In 2020, the US presidential envoy, Richard Grenell, initiated a parallel dialogue with Kosovo and Serbia. The result was the Washington Agreement to normalize economic relations done outside of the scope of the EU-facilitated Dialogue. A similar scenario could unfold again, and Sørensen must be prepared to navigate potential disruptions while maintaining the EU’s leadership in the process.

Since the war in Ukraine, the EU has acknowledged the geopolitical necessity of EU enlargement not only in the case of Ukraine and Moldova, but also the Western Balkans. The new Commission has promised to deliver progress in bringing candidate countries closer to the EU. For Serbia and Kosovo, this progress is conditioned upon the successful normalization of relations. This enlargement momentum presents a unique opportunity for Sørensen to assert leadership and rally EU member states behind the successful resolution of the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue. This would strengthen EU leadership and remove a major barrier to regional stability, moving all six Western Balkan countries further along the path to EU membership.

Maša Ocvirk is the Senior Policy Advisor for security and defense at Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Washington, DC. Originally from Slovenia, she has several years of experience working in legislative affairs and foreign policy in Brussels and Washington. She has authored numerous articles on EU foreign policy, transatlantic security, and the Western Balkans.

Visar Xhambazi is a researcher, consultant, and project manager based in Washington, DC, with more than a decade of experience in the nonprofit sector. His areas of interest include Euro-Atlantic integration, authoritarian influences in the Western Balkans, regional cooperation, and the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue. He currently works as an editor at Sbunker, a nonprofit media organization based in Kosovo, covering politics, economics, culture, and society. In January 2023, he became a member of the Wilson Center’s Transatlantic Writers’ Group, a platform promoting emerging voices among the next generation of transatlantic policy makers.

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Aleksandar Vučić, Balkans, EU foreign policy, Kosovo, Kosovo-EU relations, Kosovo-Serbia relations, Serbia-EU relations