Zelenskyy has a lot of cards

President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy listening to the report of the Head of the Security Service of Ukraine Vasyl Malyuk on the success of the operation “Spider's Web”. Photo: wikimedia.org

“This was certainly one of the most audacious drone attacks we’ve ever seen. It shows that surprise is still very much possible in war, contrary to what some people claim… It’s an exclamation mark on three and a half years of innovation, creativity, and evolution in how war is fought,” – says retired Australian Major General Mick Ryan as he weighs in on ‘Operation Spider Web’—Ukraine’s largest and most audacious drone attack yet—and what it signals not just for the war in Ukraine, but for the very future of warfare itself.

A leading military strategist, author, and one of the most respected western voices on the conflict, Ryan argues that while the Ukrainian strike may not be a turning point, it certainly underscores how drones, long-range strikes, and asymmetric innovation are reshaping the battlefield. He discusses the operation’s strategic, psychological, and geopolitical implications—from the toll on Russia’s air capabilities to the ripple effects in Europe, Washington, and beyond.

VAZHA TAVBERIDZE: Regarding Ukraine’s Operation Spider Web – which saw Ukrainian drones destroy 34 per cent of Russia’s strategic bombers – what’s the magnitude we’re talking about here? What are the immediate and longer-term military implications for the course of the war?

MICK RYAN: I think one has to consider both its impact on this war and its implications for warfare more broadly.

In this particular conflict, Operation Spider Web clearly has a military impact by reducing—by what percentage, I’m not sure yet—the number of bombers available to Russia. We don’t know exactly how many were destroyed, but it will diminish the number of aircraft that can carry those long-range, precise missiles—the ones that are harder to intercept and carry larger warheads. So there’s military utility in what Ukrainians have done.

Ukrainians have a real art for identifying where the Russians have failed to learn and adapt quickly enough

But perhaps even more important is the psychological impact—whether on the Russian Air Force or the Russian public. I don’t think it will change Putin’s mind. Very little can. If he were to lose the war, he’d be facing hundreds of thousands of angry soldiers coming home and people asking, “What was it all for?” So I don’t know that this will shift the trajectory of the war—because that would require changing Putin’s calculus, and I don’t think this has done that.

The other point I’d make is that the Ukrainians have a real art for identifying where the Russians have failed to learn and adapt quickly enough. The Russian Air Force has seen multiple bases attacked, yet still hasn’t caught up. That created a gap, and the Ukrainians exploited it. In modern war, if you’re not adapting fast enough, your enemy is going to make you pay for it.

I think its greatest significance lies in other areas — particularly in how other military organizations might view their own ability to reach out and strike adversaries. During the Cold War, only superpowers could conduct these kinds of long-range attacks. Now, anyone can. The bar has been lowered—not just for state militaries, but also for non-state actors. Drug cartels could do it, for example. That means that we all need to up our game when it comes to defending military bases and critical infrastructure. Democracies, I’d argue, are even more vulnerable than Russia in this regard.

Would it be fair to say this was the most impactful drone assault in history to date? Some even argue that this could mark a breaking point in favor of unmanned warfare over conventional tactics.

I’d say it’s certainly one of the most audacious drone attacks we’ve ever seen. It shows that surprise is still very much possible in war—contrary to what some people claim. But I wouldn’t call it a turning point. It’s more of an exclamation mark—on three and a half years of innovation, creativity, and evolution in how war is fought.

Drones are transforming warfare, no doubt. But I think most people who have been paying attention already came to that conclusion. What happened over the weekend just underscored it—loudly.

So for those who have been paying attention, it’s the continuation of an established trend. But for those who haven’t, or remained skeptical, has this attack opened a window into the future of war?

I think so. For those who’ve either ignored the lessons or have just been busy living their lives, this kind of attack is, as you said, a window—a wake-up call that things have changed, are changing, and will continue to change.

You mentioned the psychological impact. What kind of toll has this operation taken on Russia? Financial losses are being estimated anywhere between 2 billion and 7 billion US dollars. Then there’s the strategic time Ukraine has bought, the lives saved—military and civilian. Is there also a symbolic aspect to it?

Absolutely. As I said, there’s a very significant psychological impact on the Russians—but it’s just as important for the Ukrainians.

We shouldn’t forget: as Ukraine was pulling off this audacious strike, Russia was conducting the biggest drone attack of the war against Ukraine. For Ukrainian civilians who endure these brutal, needless attacks night after night, to see their military strike back is encouraging. They want to know they can punch back.
It’s psychologically important in Europe, too. People there continue to see that Ukraine is worth defending—and more than capable of defending itself with a modicum of support.

Other countries might begin developing independent long-range strike systems, especially if they share similar concerns about future US intelligence sharing under Trump

And you’d like to think it has a psychological impact in Washington, D.C.—on those who, rather surprisingly, appear to be siding with Russia. They need to see that a Russian victory, which Putin keeps promising, is far from inevitable. The Ukrainians have agency, and they are worth defending.

And that Zelenskyy does, in fact, have some cards up his sleeve.

Zelenskyy has a lot of cards. One of the most important is the creativity and innovation of the Ukrainian people—military and civilian alike.

President Zelenskyy emphasized that the operation was planned “solely by Ukraine”. Does that mean there was no Western involvement at all? Or is that simply Kyiv’s official line? What should we read into it?

When I was last in Ukraine, it was around the time the US intelligence cutoff happened—and that had a profound impact, particularly in places like Kursk. But, more importantly, it had a broader psychological effect. The Ukrainians finally internalized just how vulnerable they were without US targeting data for long-range strikes.

So they’ve been working hard to develop alternative sources—because they don’t want people to be able to veto their strikes. And as bad as things were under the Biden administration, which took years to provide ATACMS, they believe things could get even worse under the current administration. They have good reason to think that.

So this was a critical step: developing greater independence in targeting and strike capabilities. But it also sets a precedent—other countries might begin developing independent long-range strike systems, especially if they share similar concerns about future US intelligence sharing under Trump.

Bit of a Pandora’s box, isn’t it?

It absolutely is. It’s forced a lot of countries to ask tough questions—many of which we don’t yet have answers to. But a lot of countries are now de-risking their alliances with America by seeking alternative sources. European defense industries will become increasingly important, both for weapons and for intelligence.

Let’s talk about the US response to Spider Web. In President Trump’s recent conversation with Putin, we didn’t see him pushing back on Putin’s stance that there will be a “hard response” to the attack. What do you make of that?

Past US presidents, whom we used to call leaders of the free world, would have condemned a dictator invading a democracy. They would have defended that democracy strongly. That’s not happening now. Trump basically said, “Of course Putin’s going to attack Ukraine again,” without even a token condemnation. That’s got to be a first for an American president—and it sets a new low for how the US deals with fellow democracies.

And what about Putin’s pledged “reckoning”? He said there are no more red lines. What sort of response should we expect?

Well, you know Putin’s lying when his lips are moving. What’s the difference between his promised “reckoning” and a normal night in Ukraine, when 300 to 400 drones are hitting cities? Between 2,000 and 4,000 drones strike Ukraine every month.

I don’t see a real difference in what Russia might do in response. He’ll just use this as further justification for his continued attacks on civilians and infrastructure.

So you don’t think he’ll up his game—go to another level? Some have even compared this event to Pearl Harbor. Is that a valid analogy?

How can he escalate further? Nothing he’s done has improved his chances of winning. The only weapon he hasn’t used is nuclear. And if you talk to Ukrainians, they’ll tell you: even if he does use a nuke, it just means more of them die before they eventually win.

I don’t see how he can escalate in a meaningful way, unless he chooses to target other countries in Europe. He’s already throwing everything he has at Ukraine.

There was a good metaphor I heard recently: imagine if, four years after the US invaded Iraq, it only controlled 15 per cent of the country and had lost a million soldiers. Would we say the US was winning? No. And that’s the situation Russia’s in. Putin’s confident, but he is not winning. It’s hard to see what more he can do to improve his chances.

So you don’t think he’ll stage some bombastic, Hollywood-style show of force—some kind of tactical nuclear strike to hammer a point home?

He could try. But I find it hard to imagine he’ll go nuclear. Any NATO red lines that exist now would vanish overnight. Trump would be forced to act, and I think the American people and Congress would demand a much greater response to support Ukraine.

He might try larger bomber raids or air assaults, but that would just make him more vulnerable to Ukrainian air defenses. His “reckoning” could backfire and turn into a major embarrassment. So he’ll have to calibrate it very carefully.

I don’t expect a game-changing response, but I do expect something, and it will likely be brutal for Ukrainian civilians, unfortunately.

And finally, Has Operation Spider Web strengthened Ukraine’s position in the peace talk negotiations, or made peace an even more distant prospect?

Peace was already a remote prospect long before this. Putin hasn’t changed his objectives—they’ve always been maximalist: subjugate Ukraine, erase its sovereignty. Spider Web simply reinforced Ukraine’s message: “We are free, and we intend to stay that way. We’re not surrendering.”

This interview was originally published in Georgian by RFE/RL

Mick Ryan is a retired major general in the Australian Army. A graduate of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and the U.S. Marine Corps University Command and Staff College and School of Advanced Warfighting, he is a passionate advocate of professional education and lifelong learning. In January 2018, he assumed command of the Australian Defence College in Canberra.

Vazha Tavberidze is a Georgian journalist working with RFE/RL’s Georgian Service.

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Armed Forces, drone warfare, Russia's war against Ukraine, Ukraine, Ukrainian army