The Russo-Ukrainian War after four months of Trump: what is next?

President Trump returning to the White House from a weekend in Mar-a-Lago in May 2025. Photo: Joey Sussman / Shutterstock

Many people associated the arrival of President Donald Trump in the White House with expectations of a quick end to the Russian-Ukrainian war. This brought Ukrainians hope for the restoration of peace and a normal life, and European and American politicians and businessmen hope for the restoration of the status quo destroyed by Russian aggression.

However, Trump’s first 100 days have not only failed to meet these expectations but have also brought many surprises for which the world was unprepared. A sharp change in US policy both in terms of protecting its allies and trade relations has revealed that the old world order no longer exists. Constant curtseys towards the Russian dictator Vladimir Putin have forced us to think about the objective reasons that push the US and Moscow into an embrace, creating threats to peace, democracy, free trade and human rights.

Strategic goals and red lines

“War is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means,” said Clausewitz. Russian politics is based on the fact that this is the last colonial empire and is driven by a desire to preserve this empire from collapse. As a result, it is trying to gain back the liberated colonies of the former USSR and its zone of influence in Eastern Europe. Some reasons for how this Russian re-imperialization became possible can be found in this article.

Considering the positions of Russia and Ukraine in the negotiations, we see that they do not fundamentally overlap. Russia demands from Ukraine, first of all, demilitarization and “denazification” (this interesting word in practice means the return of Russian agents to Ukrainian politics under the cover of Russian media, political, religious and cultural organizations). This essentially means the creation of conditions for the continuation of aggression and the capture of all of Ukraine. Obviously, these conditions are unacceptable to Ukraine. The lack of room for compromise makes hopes for quick agreements futile. We see that even the American-Ukrainian proposal to start with a full-scale ceasefire for 30 days does not find support among the Russian leadership, at least at the time of writing this article.

In such conditions, it is futile to hope that attractive offers of trade or investment projects by western businesses in Russia, invitations to restore the place of Russia in international organizations, etc. will encourage the Russian leadership to change its strategic goals. And even more so, attempts to tear Russia away from China (a “reverse Nixon”) or to plant the seeds of democracy in Russia are fundamentally unrealistic.

The situation after three years of war

Putin has not been able to achieve any of his strategic goals in three years of full-scale war. Russia has not captured a single regional centre (except for Kherson, liberated by Ukraine in the same year); has not destroyed the Ukrainian energy sector; has not collapsed the Ukrainian economy; has not secured dominance in the air or at sea; has not divided Ukrainian society and forced it to surrender, etc. In fact, today’s Russia is further from its strategic goals than three years ago.

So why is Putin not ready for negotiations? The reason is that he still has resources to wage the war. There is still money although the National Welfare Fund has been reduced to two thirds of its original size. There are still people to draft, although not in the necessary quantities, so North Koreans are necessary. There is still some old Soviet military equipment left, although it is used much less on the battlefield. The economy is still holding up, although problems are rapidly growing. Tankers are moving and oil is being sold. Schemes for circumventing sanctions on the supply of components to produce weapons are working at the moment. And last but not least, there is the daily advancement of the front line, although this is now less and less, reaching minimal noticeable gains (just one per cent of Ukrainian territory has been captured since early 2024 with huge losses).

At the same time, after Trump’s efforts to end the war by fast track, there is almost no strategic uncertainty left. What do we know at the moment?

1. Russia has failed to defeat Ukraine using military methods. Minimal advances with huge losses do not solve any of Russia’s strategic goals. Putin needs major cities, not tiny villages, and has zero chances of achieving that.

2. Russia has also failed to exhaust and divide Ukrainian society and force it to surrender.

3. In the absence of a military or political victory, Russia has no chance of achieving its strategic goals or at least legalizing territorial gains.

4. The inclusion of Ukrainian regions (with territories where a Russian soldier has never set foot) in the Russian constitution makes it impossible for Moscow to exit the war. Russia’s withdrawal from the war is impossible as long as Ukraine exists.

5. Changing the political and legal reality without the defeat of one of the parties, exclusively at the negotiating table, is impossible. Ukraine will not give up its territories and citizens and Russia will not give up its ambitions to control them. There can be no quick diplomatic victory.

6. Even in the event of a complete cessation of American aid, according to sociological surveys, 70 to 80 per cent of Ukrainians are determined to continue their resistance. As American officials say, Ukraine has been constantly underestimated.

7. A freeze on military operations is possible only with the consent of both sides. Ukraine is ready for a ceasefire, while Russia is not ready. The reasons are explained above.

8. Thus, it is impossible to end the war without the defeat of one of the sides.

9. Kyiv’s defeat can be ensured in the event of a complete embargo on aid to Ukraine, which Putin demands repeatedly. But this is unlikely to happen because it opens Europe to a Russian strike. In addition, direct US participation in the defeat of Ukraine will lead to tectonic consequences for world politics and economics.

10. Russia’s defeat can be ensured in a fairly short time by sanctions; blocking ways to circumvent sanctions on the supply of components to produce weapons; closing oil exports; and supplying Ukraine with weapons to destroy Russian middle-range logistics.

Trump’s shuttle diplomacy has proven that there are no magic solutions. Any diplomatic changes in Moscow or Kyiv, Washington or Berlin will not change the underlying interests, motivations, limitations and aspirations of the parties.

To complete the picture, two things need to be added. First, the accumulation of problems in the Russian economy. I will not dwell on this issue, as numerous publications are devoted to this topic. Russia is gradually approaching a deep economic crisis.

Secondly, Ukraine is gradually and with great effort building up its military capabilities. The actual withdrawal of the Russian Black Sea Fleet from the war; offensive operations on Russian territory; the achievement of an extremely high loss ratio; the destruction of a large part of the Russian army’s potential in heavy equipment; constant deep strikes on Russia’s military industry, as well as oil refining and logistics facilities; the gradual destruction of air defence in temporarily occupied Crimea; and other factors are well described by military experts.

It must be clearly stated that despite the fact that Ukraine is bleeding, Putin is now approaching not his victory, but his defeat.

Trump created a window of opportunity for Putin to exit the war with some face, but he did not take advantage of this chance. The next such opportunity may not arise.

What scenarios are possible?

The base scenario is a gradual decline in Russian capabilities, leading at some point to Russia agreeing to freeze hostilities and a ceasefire. This is unlikely to happen before the end of 2025.

The second scenario would see Russia unable to stop the war in time, which at some point would trigger a path to a Russian defeat. High uncertainty has produced a fairly wide range of scenarios, some of which carry unacceptable risks for Europe and the United States. At the same time, others, on the contrary, minimize risks and promise benefits. Europe and America need to stop being afraid to talk about Russia’s defeat and start actively analysing scenarios to be prepared for such a development. This would minimize the likelihood of negative scenarios and increase the likelihood of positive ones.

At the same time, it is necessary to loudly declare the presence of a serious threat to Europe as a third scenario. Unable to achieve strategic goals in Ukraine and unwilling to stop, Russia may change its overall goal. The dramatic shift in American policy has created a situation of strategic vulnerability for Europe. The current size of European armies looks like an invitation to invade.

It should be noted that rapid innovations have radically changed the battlefield. However, generals, as is known, are still preparing for the last war. First, it should be noted that the battlefield has become completely transparent to observation, making the covert preparation of operations and concentration of mass, which has been the basis of warfare for millennia, impossible. Second, armoured vehicles, which were the basis of offensive operations for over 100 years, have lost their value, and the same is happening with large warships. Third, high-precision weapons, which have been the basis of western power for the past 30 years, do not work in battlefield conditions of intensive use of electronic warfare. Fourth, traditional air defence does not protect against massive drone attacks. Fifth, aviation no longer dominates the air as it did in the 20th century. Missile-carrying drones and even drone-carrying drones have already appeared. The development of electronic warfare is rapidly leading to the creation of fully autonomous combat platforms. In three years, all the military experience of the 20th century has become irrelevant.

Thus, no European army is ready for modern high-tech warfare at the moment. But the Russian army is ready. This creates a window of opportunity for Putin. Russia cannot simply bring home over half a million soldiers from the Ukrainian front who only know how to kill, as they will destroy Russia itself. They must be given a new target.

This means not only the need to rapidly prepare European armed forces for war, adopting Ukrainian experience in conducting combat operations and rapidly increasing military innovations. It also means direct communication with societies. This may come with political costs but is necessary for increasing resilience. The lessons of Ukrainian resilience are irreplaceable for Europeans, and the Ukrainian mistake of early 2022, when they reassured society that there would be no war, should not be repeated.

The best way is to quickly increase European investments in the Ukrainian defence industry. This will simultaneously solve the task of increasing the time for Europe to deploy its own capabilities, adopting innovations and reducing the risks that war will spread to new territories in Europe.

Valerii Pekar is a chairman of the board of Decolonization NGO, the author of four books, an adjunct professor at the Kyiv-Mohyla Business School and Business School of the Ukrainian Catholic University, and a former member of the National Reform Council.

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Donald Trump, Russian invasion of Ukraine, Ukraine, Ukraine at war, US foreign policy, US-Russia relations, US-Ukraine relations