Russia is stealing Ukrainian grain. It wants to do so without any restrictions

Loading grain into holds of sea cargo ships. Photo: Shutterstock

In one of the rounds of negotiations between the US and Russia at the end of March, Russian representatives raised the issue of the “Black Sea Initiative”. This was enacted and implemented in 2022 with the support of Turkey and the UN to allow for the safe export of grain from Ukrainian Black Sea ports. However, after a year, the Russian government withdrew from the agreement. Now Russia wants to discuss opening up Black Sea shipping and trade again, presumably to legalize the export of grain and other goods from the occupied Ukrainian territories. “This is a crime. We must constantly fight to prevent the legitimization of this phenomenon,” says Kateryna Yaresko of the Ukrainian organization Myrotvorets in an interview with Kateryna Pryshchepa.

KATERYNA PRYSHCHEPA: How does Russia export goods from the occupied territories of Ukraine?

KATERYNA YARESKO: There are various schemes employed. Ukrainian grain is exported through Crimean ports, which were closed to international trade even before the full-scale aggression in 2022, through the ports of Berdyansk and Mariupol, and through Russian ports. The countries that buy Ukrainian grain are changing. For example, in 2022 Turkey was receiving a lot of grain through this route but after a while it withdrew from this practice somewhat. We now record far fewer cases of Ukrainian grain stolen by Russia ending up in Turkey. After Turkey, significant amounts of grain went on to Syria. But after the change of regime in Syria, this also changed. The Syrians have refused to buy this grain. At the moment, Egypt is the main recipient and the principal hub for grain from the occupied territories. We are convinced that Ukrainian grain is also exported directly through Russian ports but it is very difficult to trace. Grain from Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories including Crimea, as well as the occupied parts of the Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Donetsk and Luhansk regions, is exported in huge quantities. All these regions are known for their massive agricultural territories.

Given this systematic practice of exporting grain from the occupied territories, what impact might the possible easing of restrictions on Russian trade in the Black Sea, announced in Moscow and presumably considered by the US, have on Russia’s actions?

In my opinion, it is an attempt by Russia to gain political advantage. They are using this grain to raise their status, to increase their influence over the countries to which they export grain. For example, we have recorded grain shipments to Yemen, to ports controlled by the Houthis. However, it is difficult for the Russians to implement this policy effectively, as there is generally a negative global attitude towards such practices. Ukrainian embassies in particular are very active trying to prevent attempts to export grain from the occupied territories to third countries. For example, in 2022 the Russians tried to export grain to Lebanon, but they failed and the shipments were blocked. So the Russians are trying to normalize the practice of selling grain from the occupied Ukrainian territories by seeking permission to export this grain. They claim, for example, that there are restrictions on the export of Russian agricultural products. This is not true, there have never been such restrictions. In my opinion, these statements are made in order to legitimize the stolen grain from the occupied Ukrainian territories. It is the task of Ukrainian negotiators to prevent this because this practice is a crime. Much of this grain was grown on land belonging to farmers who were forced to leave the occupied territories. Under occupation, their elevators and agricultural machinery were taken away from them. Their land was handed over to third parties and is now cultivated by someone else. All this is a crime. We must constantly fight to prevent the legitimization of this phenomenon.

You mentioned that there are no restrictions on trade in Russian agricultural products via the Black Sea. Russia also exports grain grown on its own territory via this route. Presumably it is relatively easy to camouflage supplies in order to market and sell grain from the occupied territories as being grown in Russia?

This happens all the time. In our investigations, we try to trace the route taken by stolen Ukrainian grain. We have several publications in which we prove the true origin of the grain. In one investigation, we trace grain from Melitopol that was transported to the port of Sevastopol and loaded onto a ship there. When grain is exported directly through Russian ports, the appropriate paperwork is manufactured for this purpose. In the case of grain coming from the Zaporizhzhia region or other occupied Ukrainian territories, documents are issued stating that it originated from crops grown in Russia. The authors of one of the investigations discussed two separate sets of documents – one issued when the grain was loaded on the ship in Russia and the other when it was presented to the Turkish authorities upon arrival at the port there. This is why it is important to keep talking about this, so that international organizations and our partners are also involved in preventing this practice. Otherwise, the Russians will continue to do this with impunity.

What methods do you use to trace the origin and route of Ukrainian grain?

We use nautical monitoring platforms such as MarineTraffic to track vessel routes. Unfortunately, many of the vessels involved disable their AIS (Automatic Identification Systems). In addition, “signal spoofing”, the practice of falsifying a digital signal to present false data about a vessel or its route, is used extensively in the Black Sea. This means that official open sources are insufficient for tracking grain shipping routes. We therefore use information from sources in the occupied territories, which we do not disclose.

Does this information come directly from those in the occupied territories?

These are various sources. We are helped by the shipping industry, but much of the information we use is unofficial.

Does all the grain from the Ukrainian territories occupied by Russia go for export? Or does any part of it go to Russia itself?

Russia has always produced and exported large quantities of its own grain. There is no need to store grain from the occupied Ukrainian territories.

When it comes to assessing export volumes, we assess them based on crop estimations in the occupied territories. It is common practice to use data from the NASA Harvest programme. This programme annually analyses the world’s food resources based on images from space. According to their estimates, the volume of grain production in the occupied territories of Ukraine is around six to eight million tonnes per year. We estimate that around two million tonnes of grain are exported annually through Crimean ports. The rest has to go somewhere. We believe that it is exported abroad through Russian ports. This is quite difficult to prove, but there have been cases where Ukrainian grain has been detected in these ports. We have also documented on several occasions how grain is transported from the occupied territories overland via Mariupol to Russia.

What are the main obstacles to the trade in stolen Ukrainian grain at present?

Significant restrictions result from the decisions of international coordination bodies. At the end of 2023, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) issued a resolution in connection with the Russian-Ukrainian war, in which it confirmed the closed status of Ukrainian ports. This means that trade through ports in Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory is considered illegal. The IMO appealed to all participants in the shipping industry to respect this position.

However, the organization only controls the situation with regard to the closed Ukrainian ports. It cannot control or prevent the export of Ukrainian grain through Russian ports. If the grain has been transported overland to Rostov, Azov or other Russian ports, the IMO is not in a position to prevent this. On the other hand, if a ship enters a closed Ukrainian port, this creates grounds for sanctioning the carrier, as this is a violation of the Ukrainian state border. In such cases, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine turns to the government agencies of the countries under whose flags such ships are sailing and the countries where the grain ultimately ends up. Sometimes this work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine yields results.

It can be inferred from statements by the US authorities that Washington plans to lift restrictions on the grain trade from the occupied Ukrainian territories. Will the easing of sanctions make it easier for Russians to trade through Russian ports?

I am sure that no one will lift the existing bans and restrictions. They have been introduced by international organizations. But the Russians, as I said, are using various manipulations. For example, they will export grain from closed ports to those countries with which they have relevant agreements and where this grain is expected. Another part of the grain will be effectively camouflaged and sold as Russian.

What is the response to your investigations? Do you contact representatives of international organizations?

We had a lot of contact with journalists from the world’s biggest outlets who wrote extensively about this practice in 2022 and 2023. They were happy to use our material. In contrast, we do not communicate directly with international organizations. There were instances when we met with a representative of the Turkish embassy in Kyiv in 2022, when Ankara was still actively receiving stolen grain. We presented our findings to him.

Does the pattern of grain exports from Ukraine to Turkey still work?

It practically no longer exists, although there are still Turkish companies involved in these exports. However, this predominantly concerns the schemes where the grain is transported from Sevastopol to ports in the Caucasus and reloaded there onto other ships. We know that some Turkish companies are involved in this practice. But compared to the situation immediately after the start of the full-scale invasion, when Ukrainian grain from the occupied territories flowed to Turkey in what was a wide stream, these are insignificant quantities. This flow has been virtually eliminated.

Was this due to decisions by the Turkish authorities or did international sanctions work?

The high publicity around this practice had a significant impact on the Turkish authorities. A number of journalistic investigations regarding the ships and grain that were going to Turkey were published by the international media. This practice was taking its toll on Turkey’s reputation, so the authorities simply could not leave it at that. Furthermore, Turkey was actively involved in establishing and implementing the grain corridor for Ukraine. It would look bad if the Turkish authorities simultaneously participated in the grain corridor together with the UN and turned a blind eye to receiving stolen Ukrainian grain. Besides, the launch of the grain corridor has simply filled Turkish ports. Ships carrying legitimate grain left the Danube ports and sailed to Turkey, where the grain was reloaded onto larger ships. All these factors combined have led Turkey to reduce the practice of accepting grain from the occupied Ukrainian territories.

Apart from grain, what other categories of goods are exported from Ukraine’s occupied territories through Black Sea ports?

This involves the produce of companies operating in Crimea, such as Crimean Titan and Crimean Soda Plant, which is sent overland to Russian ports. A few years ago, we noted cases of these goods being exported directly from Crimea. One ship was even banned from sailing as a result. But with the opening of the Crimean bridge, cargoes are going by land to ports in Russia. Coke and steel are still exported via Mariupol.

It is worth mentioning that ports in the occupied territories, even if they are operational, are degrading very rapidly. The amount of cargo that passes through them has fallen dramatically. Russians are not investing in port infrastructure and equipment. Ports do not have the resources, for example, to purchase tugboats or repair cranes.

Can the material you have collected be used as evidence and presented in court if necessary? Or do government agencies have to investigate and collect their own evidence themselves?

We have cooperated with the state prosecution services. We make our material available to law enforcement agencies upon request. In one case, the prosecutor’s office interviewed our investigative journalist as a witness in the case. In the case of the materials we provide, the state authorities undertake investigations and collect additional information. For example, I know of a case in which the prosecutor’s office asked the MarineTraffic online platform to confirm that a screenshot in our materials had indeed originated from their platform.

Our investigations serve to provide a basis for sanctions policies against Russia by Ukraine and other countries. For example, the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) added the ship ZAFAR (International Maritime Organization identification number – 9720263) to the sanctions list due to the actions of its captains and the Russian owner’s company, who were transporting grain from Ukraine to Yemen. The Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine cites our material regarding this ship in their War and Sanctions Project.

Kateryna Yaresko is a journalist working as part of the investigative project SeaKrime at the Myrotvorets Center, as well as the head of the Department of Business Journalism and Digital Media at the Kharkiv S. Kuznets National University of Economics.

Kateryna Pryshchepa is a Ukrainian journalist and a contributing editor with New Eastern Europe.

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Russian invasion of Ukraine, turkey, Ukrainian economy, Ukrainian grain export, war in Ukraine