Collectively, we are losing this war

Photo courtesy of Serhiy Sydorenko

NEW EASTERN EUROPE: Let us look at the changes that are taking place globally. We clearly see some shifts in the world order. Do you think we are entering a completely new phase of global politics?

SERHIY SYDORENKO: We are not entering it; we are already in it. This is undisputable. Let’s look specifically at international legal norms, which were violated by Russia in 2014 but was not widely recognized by the international community as a breakthrough moment (in Ukraine it largely was, but not overseas). That’s why in 2014 we did not talk about the full violation or destruction of the post-war world order. And that’s important – the destruction of the world order starts to happen not when the changes are actually taking place but when there is a wide realisation about it.

That’s what we’ve got since 2022 and after. Now there is no doubt in Europe that international norms were violated and that if the aggressor is not punished and forced to step back, the world order can no longer be preserved. When we’re talking about the global order we can say that while the old order has already been destroyed, the new one has not yet been built. Thus, we are in a transition phase, where we can only guess what may come next. We speculate with a strong degree of certainty that some of the existing arrangements will not survive. I do not see much chance for the OSCE, for example, unless it is fully remade. We are witnessing a process of NATO’s reshaping. Let’s face the truth. Are we sure that in a year we will have NATO with 32 allies participating in its military component? I’m not sure. The US is one of those countries that could leave the Alliance effectively. Not fully, but effectively. We have been in such a situation before. We’ve had allies leaving NATO for decades. You could claim that they were members of the organization in political terms, meaning they took part in summits, but they were not taking part in what we can call NATO’s core. And that core is defence, not politics. Even though NATO is called a defensive and political union, defence comes first. So there is a chance that we will see a new reality even when it comes to NATO, the most effective military alliance in the world, and these are not just empty words. However, the situation is still evolving – we are at a phase where change has become real and is on the table. There are still plenty of mechanisms taking place, so we do not know what the world will look like in several years. I don’t know what will happen with the United Nations, not as much in the short term but in the long term, in ten years. But I do not want to speculate because so much depends on the details which are not yet clear. For example, how long will Putin live? What will happen to Russia once he dies? We know it will happen one day, but we don’t know what will happen afterwards. We also don’t know what will happen once the Taiwan Strait is crossed by Chinese military ships. That is why we can say that the changes that are taking place now are not only about the European continent and its future, but about the new world order. This new system derives from the developments which have been in place for the last 11 years, or perhaps more, but specifically the last three and a half years.

What is your interpretation of the current stage of Russia’s war against Ukraine and the negotiation process that has been initiated by the Donald Trump administration in the United Sates. Is there any room for optimism?

Let me be straight and say something which your readers may not like to hear, but which is the reality and that is why I need to say it. I cannot see any way, or almost no way, which would collectively allow the three main players in this war effort – that is Ukraine, the European Union (and its allies) and the United States – to not lose this war with Russia. When a country loses a part of its territory, it is already a defeat. I know that many of our allies say that we have saved our sovereignty and independence. Yes, we have. But you can save your sovereignty and independence and still lose a war. No one claims that Finland won the 1939 Winter War. The Finnish lost it, but they could have lost more. Just like us, Ukrainians, we could have lost more. We have managed to avoid the worst scenario, indeed. But this does not mean that this war is not a defeat for us. The US has also lost this war, but they don’t care. And it is up to them to decide if they want to remain a superpower which plays a major role in this part of the world, or not. However, the fact that the US has lost this war is also a signal to China and for that reason this defeat could be a threat to American interests in the future. Europe has lost this war as well. It has lost it because it got itself into a situation where the aggressor, Russia, has not been properly punished for the atrocities it has committed. Instead, it has kept its territorial gains, which in turn has convinced Putin that it is him who has won. Therefore, Putin sees his name going into the history books as a leader who has gained territory for Russia. Europe, on the other hand, is in a very vulnerable situation, where many European countries are not sure whether this war will not spread to their own territories.  This military defeat is not the end of the world. As Ukrainians, we have no choice but to keep living and doing our best to develop our country. However, it is important that we all face the truth and unfortunately I see many attempts from the West to deceive themselves by calling our defeat a “victory”. It is not a “victory”. The truth is, we have lost this war; together.

At what point did you realize that we are losing this war?

I have been seeing movement in this direction for quite some time. Let me be frank and say that it is not only because of Donald Trump. Unfortunately, the current situation is also the result of US policy under the previous president – Joe Biden. However, at that time, Americans were more akin to hide their approach, even though they were implementing it as well. It was the previous administration which refused to associate the words “Ukraine” and “victory”. They were the ones who invented the “incremental support” approach, which aimed to allow the Ukrainian army to sustain itself but not to win. But of course, once Trump got into office, his decisions and actions exceeded all of our negative expectations. Before I was trying to believe that losing the war was avoidable, but now it is clear to me. Let me also say that Europe too was hesitant to move with full speed and only until very recently did it realize how dangerous the situation was.

Speaking about the new American administration, and more specifically about the rare earth mineral deal, we can say that it went from bad to better, and now to worse. Where, in your view, is it actually leading Ukraine to?

I am not sure how relevant my words will be in two months or even in a month when your readers will be reading this issue, because we can see that the situation is still developing and we do not know now what we will see in the end. But I am very content that the Ukrainian leadership has finally understood the reality and sees how dangerous this new deal is. This is how we can interpret Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s recent statements. From them we can see that the Ukrainian government is now convinced that we should not be paying for what was provided to us as grants, as an expression of support to Ukraine, nor for those weapons that we received but which not always were what we had asked for. It is absolutely unacceptable to convert these donations into loans (in the current mineral deal, Ukraine is expected to pay back the US for all the aid it has received since 2022 – editor’s note). Should we agree to these conditions, they would bring huge consequences and from our point of view they are unacceptable. Fortunately, the Ukrainian authorities are aware of these risks. It is possible that we will end up with some form of an agreement that will eliminate the provision that stipulates that we have to compensate for the aid. I believe that this would be the outcome, but I don’t know that for sure.

What could decide which of these options takes place?

What will decide here is which part of Trump’s circle wins. I am convinced that around Trump there are people who understand that Ukraine should not pay for the assistance it has received. At the same time, there are also those who feed Trump’s desire to go this way. The question is which group will win and this will define the outcome of the negotiations and whether we will sign the deal or not.

Are negotiations still possible?

Absolutely. From what I am seeing at the moment we are still at what we call the starting position. At this stage of negotiation, the proposals put forward can be unrealistic, because they are the starting point. When you put such a proposal on the table, you show that you are ready to negotiate. In international talks, we can see that parties often start with the toughest positions with something they can agree on. If, on the other hand, they start with a more realistic proposal, then they often end up with something worse than what they wanted. That is why I believe we are now seeing the starting position which has been deliberately drafted in an unacceptable form. And this explains why there is still room for negotiations. At the same time, I have no illusions that these negotiations will be difficult. We have already experienced this also this year when we negotiated that first draft, which was initially a disaster but which ended up being quite okay.

Let’s get back to the recent developments in Europe and the reactions to the situation in Ukraine. We have some urgent summits, and the launching of the so-called “coalition of the willing”, which is a group of countries that claim they are willing to send troops to Ukraine, once a peace agreement is reached. How do you assess these activities and Europe’s overall engagement?

I would say that the coalition of the willing is as important as the processes taking place in the EU with regards to strengthening its own military production, procurement and so on. The EU has adopted a good approach, and I believe it will allow the EU to truly rearm. Frankly, we have to admit that it was completely unreasonable to have the US pay for European defence for so many decades. That is why I see some solid ground in the American demands. What was the justification for the US to pay for Germany, France and to some degree the UK’s defence? I can see a reasonable justification for the US to help Poland or the Baltic states, as this assistance could contribute to some stability. But supporting Germany, which until recently was spending less than one per cent of its GDP on defence, makes no sense to me. It had to be addressed. Of course, now it is being dealt with in a very improper manner, with too much haste, but well, it had to end up this way. I see that Europe has finally come to terms with that and understands that the times when the US took care of European security are over. That is why all these efforts that Europe has undertaken recently make perfect sense to me. That multiplying of efforts to arm and increase military purchases would to some degree help Ukraine as well. It could help us sustain our military actions as I really don’t know whether there will be a ceasefire.

I also think that while European efforts are belated, they are really needed. We know that it’s always better when things are done later rather than never. And that’s why the decisions that are being taken by the European leadership now are important. Yet, some implementation, such as sending troops to Ukraine, for example, requires a ceasefire. And I am not so sure if a ceasefire is going to take place. Had you asked me about the ceasefire before, even earlier this year, I would have told you that there would be no ceasefire without the US participation. Now, I believe we could have a ceasefire, just because there will be no US participation. Also, some countries are hesitant to participate in these newly proposed efforts. I understand why: political leaders want to be re-elected and for that they need to tell their voters that they will not send troops to the front line in Ukraine. This yet can change once a more or less sustainable peace is achieved. Then it should not be such a big problem to send troops to Ukraine. Even more, I believe it will make perfect sense for European armies to go to Ukraine to learn combat techniques. This will be especially valuable for countries that may need to defend their people and territories in the future. This group also includes those that are now saying that they will not send their soldiers anywhere – like Poland. Learning from the Ukrainian experience will certainly make European armies stronger.

Seemingly NATO has closed its doors to Ukraine, but the EU’s doors remain open. How do you assess the EU process and the chances for integration?

Let me stress that I really believe that NATO’s doors have not been closed forever. It is very important to state that and I am happy that our leadership makes such statements too. Let’s also admit that we don’t know if NATO will survive in its current form. Or whether there will be a new military alliance on the European continent. For Ukraine it is important to stay committed to its future membership which, I believe, will happen one day, nonetheless. I am realistic that it will not happen in the near future.

What about EU integration?

I can hardly see our accession as long as the hot war is ongoing. It’s unimaginable and for plenty of reasons. They are technical, structural, political and so on. That is why I am more prone to believe that when this war is over – it has to be over one day – we will have a window of opportunity to integrate with the EU. It is important, however, to understand that EU membership is not a result of political will but large reforms. From what I am hearing from our political elite there is a growing understanding of that in Ukraine. The problem is we don’t know when the hot war will be over. Let me stress here that I do not expect that this war will end with the worst case scenario for Ukraine. But I also cannot say that Kyiv will remain the capital of Ukraine until, let’s say, 2030. I believe it will but I have no ground to say so with full certainty. The scenario that we say is the most probable today is that Ukraine would more or less be similar, not identical, as to what we have now. We can also predict that at a certain point both Ukraine and Russia will probably become exhausted. Hopefully there will be no nuclear strikes, but this is also something I cannot also exclude. If we exclude such a scenario, it means that we don’t accept reality.

Returning to the most possible scenario that I described, we may say that one day we will have some kind of peace which will be claimed to be long-standing and stable. And I’d like to stress that when I am saying that this peace “will be claimed”, it does not mean that it will be long-standing and stable. However, it will be a moment when we will have a window of opportunity for concrete actions. This means that we have to prepare for that day when peace, even if temporary and semi-stable, becomes our reality. We have to be then as advanced as possible in our reforms. At that moment, we will also have a chance for success in our accession. Fortunately, the European leaders have come to an understanding of how important it is for Ukraine to survive, which is also important for them. Let me remind you what I said towards the beginning of our conversation – we have gotten to a point where it becomes almost unavoidable that Ukraine loses this war. And Europe will lose it too. Europe now understands that. There might be some public denial, but the leadership has an understanding of that. That is why they don’t want to lose again.

Serhiy Sydorenko is the co-founder and editor of European Pravda, the largest Ukrainian news portal with a primary focus on EU Affairs, European events, and Ukraine’s European future.

Donald Trump, mineral deal, Russia's war against Ukraine, Ukraine, United States