The 2024 Georgian elections and their geopolitical implications

Photo: Gela Bedianashvili / Shutterstock

“In most cases, voting was assessed as procedurally well-organized,” the report reads. “However, in six per cent of the 1,924 observations, which is a significant number, the process was assessed negatively, mainly due to indications of voter pressure and intimidation, sometimes accompanied by tension, unrest and overcrowding. While not against the law, party representatives, mostly from the ruling party, video-recorded the voting process at most polling stations. This, as observed, had an intimidating effect … [and] unknown individuals were observed tracking voters outside polling premises (10 per cent), frequently within the prohibited 100-metre perimeter … Of course, this widespread perception of voter intimidation conflicts with OSCE commitments and other international standards.”

Maintaining “dignity”

The situation in Georgia has been deteriorating since November 28th 2024, when the prime minister, Irakli Kobakhidze, abruptly announced the ruling Georgian Dream party’s decision to abort efforts to start accession negotiations with the European Union “until 2028”. He also stated that the cabinet would refuse all EU budget support. Kobakhidze announced the decision following a party consultation at a special briefing. He indicated the official party line was that while EU membership remained the priority for 2030, this would happen only on Georgia’s terms of maintaining “dignity”.

This manipulated argumentation flips the logic of EU accession – in which the EU Copenhagen Criteria for a functioning democracy and free market, the common regulatory framework, and the EU Council, ultimately dictate accession conditions. Moreover, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe recognized the October 26th 2024 parliamentary elections as illegal, fraudulent and falsified. It refused to recognize the legitimacy of the incumbent government and elected parliament. This means that Georgia could be excluded from membership in the Council of Europe, as is the case with Russia and Belarus. The European Parliament also adopted a resolution that condemned Georgia’s parliamentary vote as neither free nor fair, representing yet another manifestation of the continued democratic backsliding for which the ruling Georgian Dream party is fully responsible.

EU lawmakers urged a rerun of the parliamentary vote within a year under international supervision and by an independent election administration. They also called on the EU to impose sanctions and limit formal contacts with the Georgian government. European election observers said the balloting took place in a divisive atmosphere marked by instances of bribery, plural voting and physical violence. The EU suspended Georgia’s membership application process indefinitely in June 2024, after the parliament passed a law requiring organizations that receive more than 20 per cent of their funding from abroad to register as organizations “pursuing the interest of a foreign power” – similar to a Russian law used to discredit NGOs critical of the government.

As a result, the political crisis grew, with massive protest rallies organized by the majority of Georgian civil society. In response, the ruling party effectively adopted a Soviet-style leadership and governance model, which bears a resemblance to the “political vertical system” observed in the Russian Federation. These steady regime changes, together with a constitutional coup d’état, have created a new type of autocratic political system in Georgia, largely based on concrete political clans and group competition, as well as struggles inside the ruling party.   

Georgia’s ruling clans

The above-mentioned political system is very peculiar yet in some senses similar to the Bolshevik Party of the 1920s and 30s. This was before Stalin seized power in the party unilaterally and renamed the Bolshevik Party the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In this regard, there are key factions which make up the ruling party, all with various influences and interests. These factions can be called “clans” and can generally be clustered into five different groupings, as described below.

The first group can be called the “Kakhetian Clan”. This group is chaired by the incumbent chairman of the ruling party – Irakli Garibashvili. This group holds strong positions in the eastern part of Georgia, Kakheti, and in the southeast part of the country in the Kvemo Kartli regions. The clan owns solid businesses in the fields of oil and medicine and has financial means, with foreign linkages to China and Azerbaijan. This clan often competes and clashes with rival groups such as the New Pioneers and Kaladze-Italians. According to some sources, this clan had sought to develop very close ties with ultra-radical political groupings and neo-conservative movements. As soon as Garibashvili was replaced as prime minister in early 2024, the state security service organized special raids and arrests of members of this group, including Beka Vardosanidze, a member of the clan and key ally of Garibashvili.

The second group is referred to as the “New Pioneers”. This group is chaired by the incumbent prime minister, Irakli Kobakhidze, and includes younger politicians like Archil Talakvadze and Mamuka Mdinaradze. During the authoritarian period under Mikhail Saakashvili’s regime, members of this group were low-level bureaucrats supported by the billionaire (and de facto head of the party) Bidzina Ivanishvili. The clan completely controls the ruling party apparatus, as well as its regional branches and around 30 members of parliament and their staff. The clan promotes so-called “neutrality” in foreign policy and also controls the judicial system.

The third group is the “Technocrats” clan – chaired by the first deputy speaker of the parliament, George Volski. The group contains former Communist Party members and is involved in party and government bureaucracy. It appears that this clan is also closely linked with a strategic ally of the ruling party – the People’s Power movement – which has its own television channel, POST-TV, as well as several regional business and community networks.

The “Kaladze-Italian” clan is chaired by Kakha Kaladze – the mayor of Tbilisi and the deputy chair of the ruling party. It controls some committees and it has about 20 members of parliament. The clan completely controls the capital city of Tbilisi and its surrounding areas, including several regions of western Georgia. The clan has its own independent financial assets and analytical capacity, with the ability to possibly break away from the ruling party and develop its own political agenda. On several occasions, Kaladze was promised a promotion to a higher position, such as prime minister, but this has never been fulfilled. The clan promotes ties with radical-right political movements in several EU countries.

The “Personal Guard” clan is a group that is directly run by Ivanishvili. It fully controls the party leadership and entire law enforcement agency network. The clan certainly has very solid political and financial assets considering Ivanishvili’s wealth. It also has wide linkages to the Eurasian geopolitical space, in particular Russia, but also several EU countries.

This outline of the clans indicates that Georgian Dream does not have much of a solid and credible political basis. This means its core base is actually something closer to 35 per cent of the electorate, with more than 50 per cent against the ruling party or disappointed with its policies. Georgian Dream’s victory in the upcoming parliamentary elections would be dependent on very low turnout.

Ivanishvili returns

In addition to the concept of the “political vertical”, Georgia appears to be developing a Eurasian-style “comprador” system, characterized by the rise of powerful tycoons who dominate political and economic life – similar to what happened in Russia between 1996 and 2000, when seven oligarchs held significant control over the country’s governance. In Georgia’s current case, three influential figures have emerged who are shaping the national political landscape: Bidzina Ivanishvili, with an estimated fortune of 4.5 billion US dollars; Vano Chkhartishvili, estimated to hold assets valued around 1.5 billion dollars; and Davit Kezerashvili, a former defence minister and financial backer of the opposition United National Movement, with a fortune of roughly 2.5 billion dollars (Kezerashvili currently resides in Cyprus).

Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) results for Georgia 2012–2022 / Source: Transparency International Georgia

On December 30th 2023, Ivanishvili unexpectedly announced his return to active politics for the third time. His first political appearance was in November 2011, when he founded the Georgian Dream coalition to oppose the then-ruling United National Movement. He served as prime minister until 2014. His second return occurred in 2018, when he became chairman of the ruling party.

Now, in what appears to be his final political comeback, he has re-entered the scene once more. Ivanishvili’s return is driven by several key factors, most notably the dramatic rise of elite-level corruption during the previous government. This corruption not only surpassed acceptable norms but also crossed a critical threshold that seriously threatened the very foundations of Georgian statehood. While geopolitical competition among major powers – US, Russia and China – continues to impact the dynamics of the South Caucasus and Caspian regions, it is internal corruption that poses the most pressing challenge to Georgia’s political stability today.

For reference, Georgia’s standing in Transparency International’s 2022 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) improved slightly by one point (it is noteworthy that change by one point is considered statistically insignificant by the methodology of the CPI). Even though the country leads in Eastern Europe and Central Asia with 56 points, the watchdog noted that “this is due to previous gains in eliminating low-level bribery; the country has stagnated on the CPI since 2012.” Moreover, as opposed to some countries in the region, such as Armenia or Moldova, which have experienced significant improvement since 2017, Georgia has not progressed in the fight against corruption in recent years according to the index.

The graph above indicates that efforts to fight corruption in Georgia have sharply decreased since 2013. This is when Georgian Dream came to power and the political regime transformed into the so-called “hybrid regime” and comprador state, with around 60 per cent of parliament members close to being millionaires. It is important to note that all of this has resulted in the decreasing position of Garibashvili, the former prime minister, as he was appointed the chairman of the ruling party but only with nominal power. Kobakhidze retained his party position as political secretary and Ivanishvili became the honorary chairman – in other words, the real chairman of the party.

New priorities

Kobakhidze, as prime minister, has announced four main geopolitical aims as the basis for his government’s future foreign policy priorities. These include integration into EU structures; the restoration of peaceful relations with Russia; providing political stability to Georgia; and developing stable regional security. The creation of the so-called “Caucasian geopolitical code” is viewed as the key foreign policy mission. This means that any pro-NATO agenda has been erased from Georgian foreign policy’s priority list. There was also no mention of strategic relations with China, while the “Russian vector” appears to be more of an appeasement policy when it comes to the country’s northern neighbour.

It remains unclear whether the development of the “Middle Corridor” (Middle Transit Corridor) will continue to be treated as a top strategic priority under the new government, as it was under the previous administration. There is also speculation that Georgia may consider promoting the idea of the “3+3” regional security platform. The platform, which is promoted by Russia, would be made up of the three Caucasian states of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, as well as their three “big neighbours” – Russia, Turkey and Iran.

Nevertheless, the main political mission of the new government appears to be ensuring that the ruling party retains power through future parliamentary elections. As a result, a form of “light isolationism” may be emerging in Georgian politics during this transitional period. Interestingly, the Kremlin appears to be showing less overt support for the current ruling party and its centralized “political vertical” system.

Instead, the Kremlin seems to be nurturing a new political “echelon” made up of more overtly pro-Kremlin actors. According to some sources, the Kremlin has allocated over 20 million US dollars to conducting a hybrid information war against Georgia. This effort is reflected in the return of Otar Romanov-Pirtskhaladze – Georgia’s former chief prosecutor and a figure designated by the US State Department as a “Kremlin agent”. He is now promoting a pro-Russian political movement called Peace and Solidarity. Additionally, a new television channel, Solidarity and Peace, has been launched in Georgia, openly broadcasting pro-Russian content and narratives.

In the end, in understanding the current political system of Georgia, it becomes clear that the Kremlin’s strategy – which is centred on hybrid warfare, including information-psychological operations and the use of the so-called “sharp power” – has achieved some success. The Georgian government is no longer openly anti-Russian and can be even considered softly pro-Russian.  It is enough to keep it out of the West’s orbit and ultimately gives Moscow more influence in its neighbourhood. 

Vakhtang Maisaia is a military analyst and head of geopolitical studies at the Georgian Strategic Analysis Center (GSAC). He is also a professor at the Józef Goluchowski University of Applied Sciences in Poland.

clans, Georgia, parliamentary elections, politics, South Caucasus