Europe at a crossroads: strategic security dependency in the age of uncertainty

Flags of NATO member countries flying outside the organization's headquarters in Brussels. Photo: Alexandros Michailidis / Shutterstock

The strategic wake-up call

As time passes since the start of the full-scale war in Ukraine, uncertainty has become the de facto state of the world. However, two statements hold true now more than ever. The first is when dealing with Putin he can only be relied upon breaking his word in pursuit of imperial ambitions. Consequently, Europe needs to strengthen its security. The initial point is demonstrated through a pattern of broken deals and revisionist policies, from the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, which guaranteed Ukraine’s sovereignty in exchange for denuclearization, to the Minsk agreements, which were continuously undermined by Kremlin-backed forces. The second truth was clearly and urgently exposed in the face of Russian aggression, as well as the US change of stance on geopolitics. Europe now finds itself exposed, reactive and largely absent from the very negotiations that will shape its strategic future.

In February 2025, during the Munich Security Conference, the US Special Envoy to Ukraine, General Keith Kellogg, made a statement that European nations would be excluded from forthcoming peace negotiations aimed at resolving the Russia-Ukraine war. He declared that European allies need to focus on concrete proposals and increasing defence spending rather than their absence from the negotiations. These dynamics reveal the geopolitical imbalance in which Europe has found itself. The fact that Europe is not at the centre of negotiations about Ukraine’s future is a direct indicator that it was unable to establish itself as a strong enough security actor. NATO remains heavily dependent on US leadership and resources. While European nations, especially countries like Germany, France and Poland, have been among Ukraine’s top supporters, with Germany alone pledging around 28 billion euros in military aid as of early 2024, this type of material support has not been able to translate into proportionate political influence. Europe is certainly participating in defence support but the terms of diplomacy are being highly driven by other actors.

Transatlantic frictions: competition over contribution

Tensions over burden-sharing in European security intensified during the February 24th 2025, meeting between French President Emmanuel Macron and US President Donald Trump. What once resembled strategic cooperation in defence of democratic values now appears increasingly as a geopolitical contest over influence and credibility.

A central issue in this debate is the provision of aid to Ukraine. President Trump claimed that the US had provided significantly more support than Europe. However, data from the Kiel Institute contradicts this narrative:

1. The United States contributed over 122 billion euros in military, financial and humanitarian assistance between 2022 and 2024.
2. The EU and its member states, along with the European Commission, contributed nearly the same amount during that period.
3. Including refugee support, the EU’s total contribution exceeds 251 billion euros, driven by hosting over 4.4 million Ukrainian refugees and extensive social spending.

In addition, defence spending across Europe has surged in response to the war. As of 2024, NATO members spent an average of 2.71 per cent of GDP on defence, up from 2.53 in 2023 and surpassing the long-standing target of two per cent. Only eight of NATO’s 31 members still fall short. Poland leads with 4.12 per cent of GDP spent on defence in 2024, outpacing both the United States (3.38) and Estonia (3.43). Still, while spending is critical, it is only one dimension of Europe’s strategic vulnerability.

This mismatch between Europe’s contributions and its geopolitical leverage stems largely from decades of strategic outsourcing. The transatlantic alliance has long relied heavily on American military power and strategic leadership. While this partnership remains vital, it has also reduced Europe to a reactive and often subordinate role – a reality Macron has repeatedly criticized. In 2019, he warned of NATO’s “brain death” and called for Europe to pursue “strategic autonomy”. Similarly, EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell admitted in 2023 that Europe’s military preparedness was lacking and demanded a “quantum leap” in defence cooperation.

Disputes over burden-sharing persist, with US leaders focusing on hard military metrics, while European leaders highlight broader commitments such as humanitarian support and nuclear deterrence.

US force posture in Europe: structure, legacy and strategic imbalance

Beyond financial contributions, the physical distribution of US troops across Europe reveals enduring asymmetries in defence responsibility. As of 2024, around 100,000 US active-duty personnel are stationed in Europe. This deployment reflects both historical alliances and renewed urgency following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Germany remains the central operational hub, hosting over 35,000 US troops and command centres like US European Command (EUCOM) and the Ramstein Air Base. Italy and the UK follow, while Poland – with around 10,000 troops – has become critical to NATO’s eastern defence. The integration of the US missile defence base in Redzikowo into NATO structures in late 2024 further reinforces this shift.

This force posture underscores a fundamental paradox: European states host troops and invest in defence, but strategic command and critical capabilities remain firmly in US hands.

Identifying the gaps: NATO’s capability shortfalls

Figures with past NATO experience have identified five core areas where European forces remain significantly dependent on US support: intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), including unmanned systems and space-based assets; integrated air and missile defence; long-range precision strike capabilities; strategic airlift; and air-to-air refuelling. These domains represent essential enablers for modern high-intensity warfare and crisis response.

The inability of European allies to independently field these capabilities constrains their ability to act autonomously or lead complex military operations without US backing. These gaps critically undermine Europe’s credibility as a self-reliant security actor and deepen the strategic imbalance within the Alliance.

However, despite this transparency, progress in closing the gaps has been slow. While initiatives such as the EU’s Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the Strategic Compass echo many of the priorities identified through PARP, coordination between the EU and NATO frameworks remains fragmented. Duplicated efforts, national procurement preferences, and underinvestment in enabler capabilities continue to limit effectiveness.

Addressing these capability gaps is not only a matter of burden-sharing but of strategic urgency. As questions about long-term US commitment grow – particularly in light of shifting political dynamics in Washington – Europe’s ability to act collectively and credibly in defence of its own territory and neighbourhood remains in doubt. Without reducing reliance on US platforms in these five areas, any vision of European strategic autonomy will remain constrained by operational dependency.

Prospects for autonomy

The NATO multinational battlegroups deployed in Eastern Europe under the Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) initiative only reinforce Europe’s dependence. These battlegroups, stationed in countries such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, are led by framework nations like the US, UK, Germany or France but operate under NATO’s integrated command. Even when led by EU powers, they rely heavily on US infrastructure and reinforcement.

Nonetheless, a set of key European states – France, Germany, Poland and the UK – are emerging as core actors shaping the continent’s defence trajectory. France champions the concept of European strategic autonomy, leveraging its status as the EU’s only nuclear power and its role as a permanent UN Security Council member. It also leads several European initiatives, such as the European Intervention Initiative (EI2), which aims to foster rapid joint deployment capacity outside NATO or EU structures. Germany, traditionally cautious in military matters, has launched its “Zeitenwende” policy shift, committing to sustained investment in force modernization, supply chain resilience, and increased defence spending. This last point includes the establishment of a special defence fund worth 100 billion euros.

Poland, situated on NATO’s eastern frontier, has become one of Europe’s fastest-growing military powers, doubling the size of its armed forces and acquiring advanced weapons systems from both the US and South Korea. Warsaw has also advocated for a permanent NATO presence in the East and increasingly positions itself as the backbone of European frontline deterrence. The United Kingdom, though no longer an EU member, continues to exert military leadership through NATO, the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), and bilateral security arrangements with European partners, including the recently reaffirmed Lancaster House Treaties with France.

Beyond these four leading states, other European countries are also enhancing their defence roles, contributing to a more distributed but still uneven security landscape. The Baltic states – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – have demonstrated disproportionate commitment relative to their size, consistently exceeding NATO’s two per cent GDP benchmark and advocating for stronger deterrence measures on the Alliance’s Eastern Flank. Finland and Sweden, with their recent accession to NATO, represent a significant shift in Northern European security, bringing advanced capabilities and a deep understanding of hybrid threats, particularly in the Arctic-Baltic region.

Southern European states, such as Italy and Spain, are also expanding their defence profiles. Italy plays a key role in the Mediterranean and North African security environment, hosting NATO naval commands and participating in EU missions. Spain, while historically more reserved in the military sphere, has increased its contribution to NATO’s rapid deployment and response forces and invested in cyber defence and maritime security.

Together, these states possess the military capacity, economic weight and political influence to shape a more autonomous European defence identity. Yet their efforts are only as effective as the unity behind them. The absence of a shared strategic culture and common threat perception continues to obstruct collective action. While France emphasizes autonomy and a more sovereign European defence, Poland prioritizes close alignment with the US and NATO. Germany remains ambivalent, balancing historical restraint with new commitments. The UK, operating outside the EU framework, pursues a flexible approach rooted in alliances and coalitions. The Nordic-Baltic region is increasingly aligned, yet broader convergence with Southern and Central Europe remains limited.

Academic observers have long pointed out that effective defence integration depends not merely on military investment but on shared political intent. Anand Menon has argued that strategic unity within Europe is undermined by national interests and fragmented institutional structures.

As Sven Biscop argues in A Call for an EU Grand Strategy, sovereignty in security cannot rest on capabilities alone – it must be guided by a shared political vision and the strategic will to act collectively. He emphasizes that the EU must define its interests and act strategically in defence of them, rather than simply reacting to events. Without such unity of purpose and proactive leadership, increased defence spending may improve deterrence, but it will not translate into genuine strategic autonomy. In an unpredictable international environment, strategic independence depends as much on political cohesion and common ambition as on material power.

Conclusion

Europe stands at a defining crossroads. The war in Ukraine has laid bare the fragility of its security order and the limits of its geopolitical influence. Despite rising military expenditure and rhetorical commitments to autonomy, Europe remains structurally dependent on US military leadership.

The challenge now is not merely to spend more but to invest wisely and cooperatively. European security must be underpinned by credible capabilities, institutional readiness, and political cohesion. Until then, Europe will remain on the periphery of global negotiations, even when the stakes are highest on its own soil.

Tamar Gamkrelidze is a research fellow at the College of Europe in Natolin and a Ph.D. student at the Georgian Institute of Public Affairs (GIPA). Her research focuses on education governance and the impact of European integration on Georgia’s education system. She has worked in research coordination and management at Ilia State University and the Horizon Europe National Office of Georgia.

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defence, EU foreign policy, EU-US relations, geopolitics, military spending, NATO, US foreign policy, West