Armenia’s geopolitical awakening: a democracy caught between empires

Republic Square is the central town square in Armenia's capital Yerevan. Photo: Alina Mosinyan / Shutterstock

As the old world order collapses and new spheres of influence take shape, Armenia — long seen as a Russian satellite — is rapidly becoming one of the most exposed democracies in the world. Pressured by authoritarian neighbours, abandoned by old alliances, and uncertain of new ones, Armenia now sits at the fault line of a global disorder defined less by law and more by raw ambition.

The dilemma faced by the country is as follows: can a small democracy in such a situation reorient its foreign policy toward the West in time to survive the ambitions of those surrounding it — and will anyone care if it fails? The seeming indifference of the Trump administration to democracy is another complicating factor. Does the US, in fact, still reward anyone for being a democracy?

For decades, Armenia was tethered to Moscow. It hosted Russian military bases, joined the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and tolerated Kremlin influence in exchange for security guarantees. But then Azerbaijan attacked on several occasions. This happened first in 2020, and then in September 2022 Baku attacked the territory of the Republic of Armenia proper. This was followed by a blockade of the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh from late 2022, with Azerbaijan driving out its over 120,000 ethnic Armenians in September 2023. Russia did nothing during these events. CSTO mechanisms were not triggered. The Russian peacekeeping contingent, present in the area, stood down. The alliance collapsed without firing a shot.

This betrayal marked a turning point. Armenia is now pivoting westward. The country has conducted joint exercises with the US, approved an EU accession bill in parliament, and spoke openly about leaving the CSTO. It is also cautiously reaching out to Iran. But none of these overtures have yielded real security guarantees. There is symbolic support, yes. But concrete protection? Not yet.

This exposes Armenia’s existential foreign policy dilemma. With the East no longer reliable, and the West seemingly not quite ready, how can Yerevan buy time, deterrence, and survival?

All of this is unfolding as two emboldened regional powers — Azerbaijan and Turkey — tighten the vice. Their alliance – often described as “two states, one nation” on account of their shared Turkic ethnicity – is more than rhetorical. Ankara provided crucial military support to Azerbaijan during the 2020 war, including drone technology and battlefield training. Now it is helping restructure Baku’s military along NATO lines while deepening joint infrastructure, trade and energy initiatives.

This partnership is part of a broader vision. President Erdogan’s Turkey is not simply reacting to instability – it is leveraging it. Across Syria, Libya, Eastern Africa, and now the Caucasus and Central Asia, Ankara is asserting itself as a regional architect. Through the “Middle Corridor” initiative – a trade route linking Turkey to China via the South Caucasus – Ankara is building a sphere of influence that bypasses both Russia and Iran.

These are not isolated moves. Erdogan has embraced what some call a “neo-Ottoman” posture, projecting Turkish power wherever opportunities arise. Russia, for its part, is operating with imperial nostalgia of its own. While the two support opposing sides in Syria and Libya, they have demonstrated an ability to tactically coordinate, especially in regions like the Caucasus where their spheres of influence intersect.

Caught between these ambitions is Armenia – strategically located, geopolitically inconvenient, and increasingly isolated.

Internally, the situation is no less complex. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s democratic reform agenda is under strain. Public trust has eroded, especially among those who view the government’s pivot from Russia as reckless or premature. Others see it as inevitable. Either way, Armenia’s domestic political cohesion is now tied directly to its foreign policy credibility – and vice versa.

The break with Russia may not carry the drama of Ukraine’s defiance or the speed of the Baltic states’ western alignment, but it is arguably more symbolic. Armenia, for decades, was the compliant junior partner. That even this small, embattled democracy has chosen to distance itself from Moscow underscores the scale of the Kremlin’s regional decline.

Yet, Armenia’s westward pivot remains fragile. While the EU and US have expressed strong rhetorical support, they have stopped short of offering meaningful deterrence. Military assistance has been limited. No western power has drawn red lines. As seen in 2023, Azerbaijan and Turkey both appear willing to push their agendas without fear of western intervention.

Iran, though strategically important to Armenia, is an unpredictable and constrained ally. Facing international sanctions and regional isolation, Tehran offers limited capacity and significant geopolitical baggage. Aligning too closely with Iran risks alienating western backers and entrenching Armenia further in a volatile regional balancing act.

This all points to the collapse of the old security guarantees. For decades, countries like Armenia placed their bets on great power alignments. It was believed that Russia would protect its “near abroad”; the West would reward democracy; and institutions like the UN and OSCE would manage conflict. No part of that framework still holds. Great powers are now driven by self-interest and improvisation, not rules and commitments.

Meanwhile, Azerbaijan continues to exploit this vacuum. Its strategy, which I describe as “scrolling aggression”, involves relentless but calibrated pressure — capturing territory here, issuing new demands there, and somehow generally avoiding dramatic provocations that might trigger a global response. This gradual erosion of Armenia’s position has proven effective and difficult to counter.

Despite these challenges, Yerevan retains one crucial advantage: its democratic credentials. In a region dominated by autocrats, Armenia’s political pluralism, civil society and reform agenda make it stand out. This identity could provide leverage in building deeper ties with western democracies (even if for now this applies more in Europe than the US). But this will only matter if those democracies decide that Armenia’s survival matters.

To seize this opportunity, Armenia must adopt a strategy of pragmatic resilience. That means continuing domestic reforms to solidify its democratic model and strengthen institutions. These are, in fact, their own reward, regardless of the actions of outsiders. It also means diversifying economic and energy ties away from Russia. It means cultivating a multi-vector foreign policy that recognizes the risks of over-reliance on any single partner.

It also means confronting hard truths: the West may never fully embrace Armenia as a strategic ally. Deterrence may need to come from internal strength and regional diplomacy, rather than outside guarantees. To that end, Yerevan must deepen ties with emerging players — India, Gulf states, even China — while not losing sight of its core values and long-term aspirations.

The world, distracted by bigger conflicts and more visible crises, has largely overlooked Armenia’s transformation. But what is unfolding in Yerevan is not just the realignment of one small country. It is a warning shot for the rest of the world: alliances are crumbling, order is unravelling, and small states are once again becoming pawns in larger games.

Whether Armenia survives this crucible will depend not only on its ability to adapt, but on whether others finally recognize its strategic and symbolic significance. In a world increasingly shaped by spheres of influence, power politics, and transactional alliances, Armenia is the test case for whether any space remains for small, democratic nations to chart their own course.

This is not just Armenia’s story. It is the story of what happens when the old rules no longer apply, and no one comes to help you.

David Akopyan worked for 26 years for the UN in 15 countries across all regions, including in Afghanistan, Somalia and Syria, holding leadership positions as UN Development Program deputy director, country director and Resident Representative.

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Armenia, CSTO, EU-Armenia relations, geopolitics, Nagorno Karabakh, South Caucasus