The complexity of the peace deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan speaking to President Ilham Aliyev during the BRICS Summit in October 2024. Photo: Madina Nurmanova / Shutterstock

After 35 years of conflict, Armenia and Azerbaijan have drafted a peace treaty, finalizing the end of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. However, a few days after the public announcement, Azerbaijan accused Armenia of preparing for war, naming ceasefire violations as the issue. Since the European Union’s local monitors have not confirmed the incident, it creates the impression that Azerbaijan is spreading disinformation, searching for a reason to justify all means of rejecting the peace process.

There is still a long way to go before the agreement is signed, but the outcomes of the process remain uncertain. Firstly, there is no third party outside the traditional regional players guaranteeing the fulfilment of the parties’ responsibilities. Secondly, it remains unclear whether the treaty will bring lasting peace and stability to the region or simply further encourage the presence of realpolitik.

The Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh is deeply rooted in both historical grievances and Soviet-era policies. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the conflict remained frozen and unresolved until the war in 2020 marked a turning point, with Azerbaijan reclaiming significant territory. The subsequent ceasefire agreement, brokered by Russia, resulted in the deployment of Russian peacekeepers and a reshuffling of territorial control. However, in September 2023, Azerbaijan took full control of Nagorno-Karabakh in a 24-hour offensive. Unfortunately, in comparison to the war in Ukraine, democratic world leaders were substantially inactive. There were hundreds of casualties and more than one hundred thousand Armenians fled the area over one week. Subsequently, the public reaction to the recent treaty remains divided in Armenia, especially considering the unenviable conditions of the document. Dissatisfied Armenians blame President Pashinyan for betraying the country’s national interests, viewing the agreement as not peaceful and equal to a capitulation that will only further encourage Baku to demand more. It is also seen as a grand plan of the Kremlin, which never met its responsibilities within the CSTO while Armenia was under attack. “Let them not forget about the second Karabakh war, how they begged for mercy from us on their knees, how they appealed to Russia at the highest level ten times a day, asking to stop the war,” the Azerbaijani president bitterly reminded his neighbours several months ago. Despite this, some of the Armenians are still in favour of the treaty as the last hope to avoid war with Azerbaijan, making courageous concessions.

In reality, the fear of further escalation is not delusional, as Ilham Aliyev’s view of future regional policy developments is compatible with the global geopolitical realignment, where power and nationalism, rather than morality, drive change these days. “The old world order seems to no longer be here. So, what will be the new configuration of the international community’s interaction? Nobody knows. What is absolutely clear is that every country should be more concentrated on its own capability, not to rely on any kind of assistance or even not to rely on international law,” stated Aliyev to Euronews. Armenia is in an odd, asymmetric environment, preparing to sign a treaty with a better positioned neighbour, not relying on international law either theoretically or in practice.

As for the terms of the treaty, what is known so far is that with the request of Baku, Yerevan shall recognize Azerbaijan’s sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh on a constitutional level, which requires a national referendum to amend the constitution or the adoption of an entirely new document. Regardless of how the Pashinyan government will present this as progress toward peace or a positive outcome, this might result in a serious backlash within the country before the parliamentary elections in 2026.

The draft of the peace treaty also refers to abolishing the “obsolete” Minsk Group, prohibiting the EU’s Monitoring Mission (EUMA) along the shared border, and withdrawing legal claims from international courts. These demands fully isolate Armenia in dealings with Baku and put Yerevan in a more difficult situation to secure its interests. But worse is yet to come, as the removal of EUMA will be a great setback on the way to Brussels, which has already approved the extension of the Armenian monitoring mission until 2027.

Notably, the draft does not address the issue of the Zangezur corridor despite its necessity for transit between Azerbaijan and its territory of Nakhchivan. It obviously leaves room for future developments. Given this, Baku will likely apply additional pressure to advance its connectivity and supply chain ambitions and leverage economic incentives, particularly as China and other external actors expand their influence in the South Caucasus concerning the Middle Corridor in terms of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Turkey’s role is also substantial in this regard, as Ankara realizes the potential it might gain as the outcome of opening borders with Armenia. Bearing in mind that since the war in Ukraine, Russia’s ability to act as a tangible force in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict has been increasingly questioned, leading to a power vacuum allowing Turkey to play a larger role.

For Armenia, this is a difficult moment to navigate the challenge of balancing sovereignty concerns with the potential economic benefits of integrating into emerging trade routes. Perhaps, for the European Union and the whole transatlantic community, seeing Armenian, Azerbaijani and Turkish leaders together at the BRICS Kazan Summit in 2024 should have been a wake-up call as the neighbours set out to convince the BRICS audience of the prospect of a peace deal and regional stabilization.

Watching Armenia seek alternative economic sources should not have come as a surprise to the West, given Yerevan’s precarious position. However, logic dictates that Washington and Brussels should have been alarmed while observing the reshaping of strategic calculations between Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey. Now entangled with autocratic ties to Chinese and Russian leadership, this move puts the role of human rights, Bretton Woods, and liberal democratic values at stake. The same logic applies to the peace treaty. While the prospect of resolving the conflict and bringing stability to the region is positive, critical aspects should not be overlooked by external stakeholders while praising it as a fact.

It is a challenging time for the US and Europe, and their response to the peace treaty also indicates this. While the Trump administration’s policy toward the South Caucasus remains still undefined, the US State Department hailed the treaty as a historic moment, calling it an opportunity for Armenia and Azerbaijan to turn the page on decades of conflict – echoing President Trump’s vision for a more peaceful world. The statement emphasizes the urgency of signing and ratifying the treaty to usher in a new era of regional prosperity. Meanwhile, US National Security Advisor Michael Waltz has called for the swift completion of the Armenia-Azerbaijan normalization deal and the release of Armenian prisoners held in Baku. The visit to Baku by Steven Witkoff, Trump’s envoy, immediately after negotiations in Moscow was also notable, but did not expose the talks’ outcomes.

The remaining responses from the international community also reflect the priorities of their busy agendas, offering praise for the peace treaty without delving into details or questioning future aspects. NATO and the UN echoed similar rhetoric to the US, welcoming the peace treaty negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan as a significant step toward normalization and a major achievement for regional security. Also, Kaja Kallas articulated the European Union’s position, emphasizing Armenia’s concessions and encouraging both nations to maintain this momentum and ensure a smooth completion of the process. Ironically, Russia also advocated for the normalization of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, emphasizing that Armenia could always rely on Russia’s support.

While the global world order is transforming significantly, the Armenia-Azerbaijani peace deal is not an abstract case; it does not remain solely a regional security challenge. If, after all, the treaty will be truly signed, and while it might be a significant step towards regional economic development, at what cost will the agreement be made? And where does the West see its role in the South Caucasus, in a strategic competition with China or a confrontation with Russia and Iran? These questions should be answered promptly while we are witnessing a pattern-breaking moment, which has the potential to become a future example for resolving other conflicts.

Azerbaijan found the most opportune moment to consolidate its power with Turkey’s backing against their weaker neighbour, and if the boundaries are not drawn now by external players having leverage on Baku and Ankara, the outcomes might be devastating not only for Armenia but for the transatlantic partners as well. The South Caucasus is not only a geographical crossroad but a political one as well for everyone interested in connectivity, supply chains, and trade from the Caspian to the Black Sea basin. 

Despite some severe statements, maintaining distance from the conflict has always been the strategy for Europe and the United States, first considering Russia’s predatory policy in this neighbourhood and, secondly, politico-economic relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan. The testament to this is the Minsk Group, which has been co-chaired by the US, Russia and France since 1992 in order to oversee the process. However, its influence has waned in recent years. The current draft treaty was negotiated largely outside of this framework. What once seemed insufficient in past years will be just a drop in the ocean in the future. The West has been actively supporting human rights in this particular conflict, although it has never paid enough effort to meddle substantially. Unfortunately, it is now going to be even more challenging as Europe and America are required to focus on strengthening their own defence capabilities.

Since its deployment, Russia and Azerbaijan have criticized the EU mission in Armenia, accusing it of gathering intelligence against Russia, Azerbaijan and Iran and labelling it a “paramilitary” force or a “military presence”. The EU mission has also faced claims of being co-opted by NATO. The removal of EUMA would undermine Armenia and the region’s European trajectory and democratic oversight, especially when Yerevan still depends heavily on Russian energy and trade and hosts a Kremlin military base, illustrating the difficulty of totally breaking off relations with Moscow. Also, signing a peace treaty even in these terms will underscore that power dynamics dictate policy shifts and the dominance of realism in today’s geopolitical landscape. Azerbaijan’s powerful position is already visible and could continue to become more threatening, rather than willing to reach a settlement with its neighbour. This is despite the fact that the two countries have yet to negotiate when and where the peace deal will be signed.

While the peace treaty text has been agreed upon, the signing of the document still remains a distant prospect, considering Azerbaijan’s assertiveness and Armenia’s domestic turbulence. In this context, the US and Europe face a strategic dilemma: engage more actively in the South Caucasus or risk losing influence as autocratic powers consolidate their positions. Whether this peace treaty delivers genuine stability or merely reinforces power asymmetries remains to be seen. In an era of global competition, the South Caucasus remains a crucial battleground – not just for regional players but for the strategic interests of the transatlantic community. Even if the peace treaty is signed, unresolved disputes, such as disagreements over the modalities of transportation routes and the economic unblocking of the South Caucasus, leave room for future tensions and question its geopolitical ramifications once again.

Nino Lezhava is a research analyst in international security and affairs. She is a Non-Resident Fellow at Center for European Policy (CEPA) at the Transatlantic  Defense and Security Program. Her work spans the security and democratic developments of the wider Black Sea region and the Caucasus, hybrid warfare, and democracy building. Nino holds a master’s degree in International and European Security from Geneva University and has recently completed distinguished professional programmes at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University and the Geneva Center for Security Studies. She lectures at German and Georgian universities, contributes her expertise as a freelance contributor for various media outlets.

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Armenia, Azerbaijan, geopolitics, Nagorno Karabakh, peace talks, South Caucasus