Text resize: A A
Change contrast

“A bad peace… would be worse than no peace”

Interview with Admiral Giuseppe Dragone, the Chairman of NATO’s Military Committee. Interviewer: Vazha Tavberidze.

March 12, 2025 - Giuseppe Cavo Dragone Vazha Tavberidze - Interviews

Italian Admiral Giuseppe Cavo Dragone speaking in Taranto on March 30th, 2023 Photo: Massimo Todaro / Shutterstock

“I would support any peacekeeping operation accepted by the parties, going there and guaranteeing a just peace and long-lasting stability in Ukraine, its sovereignty, its freedom, its territory, and a strong guarantee for the future,” says Admiral Giuseppe Cavo Dragone, the Chairman of NATO’s Military Committee, in an interview with RFE/RL’s Georgian service.

Vazha Tavberidze spoke with Admiral Dragone at the Munich Security Conference about the prospects for securing peace in the Russia-Ukraine war, Ukraine’s potential NATO membership, and Black Sea security.


VAZHA TAVBERIDZE: Let’s start with your recent Ukraine visit – the reality that you saw there, especially your assessment of the battlefield situation, and your take on the war’s trajectory.

ADMIRAL DRAGONE: I had the chance to meet the minister of defence, the minister of foreign affairs, and President Zelenskyy. The spirit is still strong, they are determined. They believe they can succeed. They also think peace can be reached. I think so too. A just peace, peace through strength – because peace through weakness only makes further aggression more likely. A bad peace… would be worse than no peace. On the battlefield – it’s fluid. The Russian Federation is making small advances, at the price of heavy losses. From the western military point of view, they are really paying an extremely heavy price for a very, very, very slow advance, and small gains, terrain-wise.

There is a consensus among analysts that Ukraine is on the back foot. Some even say that Ukraine is losing on the battlefield. Would you say that’s a fair assessment?

I would not. The other thing I would point at is that Ukraine does have strong support from NATO member countries. They’re backing them up, making a great effort that was never done before, and they have the determination to keep on doing this. This is because on one side, we want to speak about peace, we think it is time for peace to come, but on the other side, we want also to strengthen [the Ukrainians], so whenever they decide to sit at the negotiation table, they will do that from a very strong position.

The current US stance is not having any NATO boots on the ground in Ukraine, and also not pledging any security guarantees. What alternatives do you see if NATO boots are out of question, if a NATO security guarantee is out of question, what can be done?

We can go back to our past, without inventing anything new. There are international organizations like the United Nations that have been already doing that.

The UN that has Russia and China on the Security Council?

We have to consider everything. I wouldn’t keep anything off the table, we need to try and find what will support what we want to achieve and how we can do it. It could be a UN or EU operation. A coalition of the willing could also be another option. But to avoid some mistakes done in the past, whenever this will happen, we must be sure that our soldiers, the military, who will be safeguarding and watching over the peacekeeping agreement and monitoring, that they have the power, the rules of engagement and also the system armaments to make this happen. You can’t go over there with just your rifle, because you have to be there and be able to fight whomever is breaking the rules, whomever is breaking the peace agreement. So they must decide who is going there and give them the proper means, and also the rules and the strength to enforce what they are going for.

If this coalition of the willing materializes, and there is a peacekeeping force that’s not covered by NATO and therefore Article 5, what happens if they find themselves engaged in combat? Will Article 5 come into play somehow?

No, no. It will be nation “x” or “z” that will send their forces.

Another US stance is that after the talks are over, whatever the outcome might be, Europe should safeguard Ukraine’s security. Is Europe strong enough to shoulder that burden?

Europe is increasing its defence capacities right now. This is a path to be followed with determination, strength and speed. Europe [already] has some capabilities, but it depends on what will be the mandate, what we want to achieve over there, and in which area. So it has some capabilities, with more to come.

If we were to talk about a peacekeeping force, what size of contingent might we be talking about?

Some are talking about 200,000, others about 30,000. It is early to say, as it would depend on a number of factors.

Would 30,000 be enough?

Since we don’t know what area will be patrolled or exactly the mandate, it’s kind of premature to say, for now.

Would you support sending European peacekeeping forces?

I would support any peacekeeping operation accepted by the parties, going there and guaranteeing a just peace and long-lasting stability in Ukraine, its sovereignty, its freedom, its territory, and a strong guarantee for the future. Because going back, if we don’t do this properly, then there is no reason to be confident that something similar won’t happen again. Just look at 1998, 2008, 2014, 2022. Maybe there will be something again in Ukraine, maybe somewhere else.

The predictions about direct confrontation between Russia and NATO, with Russia becoming bold enough to attack NATO – we’ve seen some forecasts from the British, seen some from the Nordics. Five years, ten years, and so on. What’s your take?

I don’t foresee this [as being] very probable, but it’s not impossible either [that this would happen]. Of course, if they attack one of the NATO countries, there will be the strongest reaction from the whole Alliance. And on the conventional confrontation level, NATO is way above Russia. Also, on nuclear confrontation, with the US, UK and French arsenal, NATO is way, way above. I don’t think this would be in Putin’s interests.

I think any military strategist in the West could also say it was not in their interest to have a three-year long – and ongoing – war in Ukraine, but they are still doing it, despite the losses.

But this started as a four-day special military operation. That was the plan. And it wasn’t just a failure – it was a total failure. He probably thought he would do this like in Crimea, probably three days, almost bloodless.

In Brussels, Secretary General Mark Rutte told us that if Russia were to attack NATO tomorrow, they would lose almost instantly. They would lose within a week. I suppose you too subscribe to that view?

Yes, I agree. But whether it would be over in one week or not, Russia would quickly end up as a loser.

If that’s the case, then wouldn’t Russia lose even more badly against a NATO that would have Ukraine amongst its members? Which would bring battle-hardened soldiers, equipment, know-how? If Russia cannot attack NATO as it is now, then obviously, it won’t attack a much stronger NATO with Ukraine in it. If Russia is guaranteed to lose a confrontation with NATO, then what’s the reason for not admitting Ukraine?

Nobody says that Ukraine will be never admitted, when the time and conditions will be ripe. Let’s start from the fixed point, which is the Washington summit in July 2024, when Ukraine was told that it is on a path to joining NATO. That is irreversible. Whoever is saying something else is just one voice, but this requires consensus. Maybe it will happen, maybe not, but Ukraine has the desire, a long-term desire, to become a member of NATO. They will go through the normal admission path procedure that we are doing for everybody. First, you should want to become the member of this club, then you do the reforms, transformation. And they are doing that, but they are not at the end of it. Then it will be the Alliance examining everything and deciding. Nobody can say to Ukraine or any other country that [they won’t ever become NATO members]. Neither Mr. Putin nor anybody else.

Another factor on whether a country is admitted is whether it is adding to NATO security, right? Would Ukraine add to NATO security?

Of course.

And yet, Ukraine’s NATO membership is being made into a negotiation matter. So from that perspective, how realistic does it look in the near or medium-term future?

[In negotiations], the first thing they have to think about is a long, lasting, just peace. The question of yes or no regarding NATO membership, I think it’s a second line discussion. If we are professionals and manage to get a long-lasting, just peace for Ukraine, that’s the first step. This is a point where everybody is trying to get to.

Being an admiral, I would be remiss not to ask you about naval matters. Particularly, Black Sea security, how is it looking?

There will be a lot of stuff to do in the future there. The coastal member states have already set up a counter-mining task force, there will be a lot of things to clean. Then there is monitoring. These are international matters and they will remain as one, nothing less than it all was before the war. I think we will see a stronger Black Sea presence, with at least three NATO member states present.

Admiral Giuseppe Cavo Dragone is an Italian naval officer, who has been serving as Chair of the NATO Military Committee since 17 January 2025.

Vazha Tavberidze is a Georgian journalist and staff writer with RFE/RL’s Georgian Service. His writing has been published in various Georgian and international media outlets, including The Times, the Spectator, the Daily Beast and New Eastern Europe.


Please support New Eastern Europe's crowdfunding campaign. Donate by clicking on the button below.

 

, , , ,

Partners

Terms of Use | Cookie policy | Copyryight 2025 Kolegium Europy Wschodniej im. Jana Nowaka-Jeziorańskiego 31-153 Kraków
Agencja digital: hauerpower studio krakow.
We use cookies to personalise content and ads, to provide social media features and to analyse our traffic. We also share information about your use of our site with our social media, advertising and analytics partners. View more
Cookies settings
Accept
Decline
Privacy & Cookie policy
Privacy & Cookies policy
Cookie name Active
Poniższa Polityka Prywatności – klauzule informacyjne dotyczące przetwarzania danych osobowych w związku z korzystaniem z serwisu internetowego https://neweasterneurope.eu/ lub usług dostępnych za jego pośrednictwem Polityka Prywatności zawiera informacje wymagane przez przepisy Rozporządzenia Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady 2016/679 w sprawie ochrony osób fizycznych w związku z przetwarzaniem danych osobowych i w sprawie swobodnego przepływu takich danych oraz uchylenia dyrektywy 95/46/WE (RODO). Całość do przeczytania pod tym linkiem
Save settings
Cookies settings