The digital Trojan Horse in Romania’s elections

Călin Georgescu speaking to his supporters after leaving the Court of Appeal in Bucharest on December 30th, 2024. Photo: Shutterstock

On 9 March 2025, Romania’s Central Electoral Bureau (BEC) barred far-right populist Călin Georgescu from running in the May presidential election rerun, sparking clashes between his supporters and police. What might appear as a domestic controversy carries broader implications for the state of democracy across Europe.

The decision comes after a turbulent election year. In 2024, more than 70 countries went to the polls, with populist forces gaining unexpected traction. While the world’s attention was mostly focused on elections for the European Parliament or the president of the United States, one of Romania’s most significant political revolutions occurred far closer to home. These elections were more than a national affair — they exposed growing political polarization, weakening institutional trust, and the disruptive role of digital disinformation. Georgescu’s exclusion underscores not just legal controversy, but the fragility of democratic processes in a rapidly evolving political landscape.

Romania’s case is part of a wider trend: in an age where algorithms shape opinion more than debate, safeguarding democracy requires more than holding elections — it demands protecting the integrity of the public sphere itself.

Everything but Security

Examining Romania’s strategic position on the Eastern flank is key to understanding why it has become a target for such threats. NATO’s eastern defence plan heavily relies on Romania. In 2019, the country announced a 2.5 billion-euro expansion of the Mihail Kogălniceanu Air Base near Constanța, aiming to transform it into NATO’s largest military base in Europe. The project included new runways, hangars and barracks to accommodate up to 10,000 NATO troops.

From a military standpoint, Romania holds strategic significance as a frontline NATO state, particularly in countering Russian influence in the Black Sea region. The airbase expansion did not go unnoticed; during this time, Russian media outlets began covering the story, primarily emphasizing the potential offensive uses of the base and framing it as a provocative act that could escalate tensions in the region. Moscow responded swiftly when construction officially began on June 11th 2024. Russian officials voiced concerns almost immediately. Andrei Klimov, deputy chairman of the Federation Council Committee on International Affairs, called the expansion a “threat to Bucharest,” suggesting the base could become a primary target in future conflicts. Russia’s representative in arms control negotiations, Konstantin Gavrilov, accused NATO of undermining regional security. Meanwhile, the Russian foreign ministry labelled the development as part of NATO’s broader militarization of Eastern Europe, indicating potential consequences. Although these were merely comments from the Russian side at the time, it became clear that Russia was preparing some sort of offensive, albeit in a different way. Coincidentally, at the same time, Romania was preparing for its presidential elections, with higher geopolitical stakes than ever. With Russia knowing how to hijack elections, it decided to use the power of the media once again.

During the elections, several candidates competed for the presidency:

• Elena Lasconi (Save Romania Union – USR)
• Marcel Ciolacu (Social Democratic Party – PSD)
• George Simion (Alliance for the Union of Romanians – AUR)
• Nicolae Ciucă (National Liberal Party – PNL)
• Mircea Geoană (Independent)
• Călin Georgescu (Independent, nationalist)

However, the most unexpected turn of events came from Călin Georgescu, a relatively unknown figure with no significant political backing. Georgescu’s sudden rise to fame swept across Romania like a whirlwind. Relatively unknown in mainstream politics, he had no party backing him up, had no visible campaign presence, and was not mentioned in political debates. However, his name dominated online and in-person discussions in the final weeks before the election, leaving many intrigued by his sudden popularity. Romanian voters flocked to online forums to express their confusion. Many stated that until his popularity on TikTok, they had no idea who Georgescu was. He lacked party support and wasn’t well-known in debates. The question is how someone with no prior popularity became so significant overnight, how he achieved that, and whether Russia is somehow linked to it.

The TikTok takeover

Georgescu’s internet behaviour reveals a noticeable pattern upon closer examination. Understanding TikTok’s algorithm is essential to understand how the platform was leveraged to enhance its reach. To provide a personalized content experience, TikTok’s “For You” page uses an advanced recommendation algorithm that adapts to user behaviour. The algorithm primarily relies on the following:

User interactions: A video engagement includes likes, shares, comments, and viewing time. Quick swipes away indicate disinterest, but content that captures users’ attention for a longer time is prioritized;

Information about videos: Sounds, visual effects, hashtags, and captions assist in categorizing and matching content with suitable viewers;

Device and account settings: Factors such as language, location, or device type do not significantly impact recommendations;

When a new video is uploaded, TikTok presents it to a select few viewers to assess its popularity. The platform gradually expands its reach, securing wider visibility if the engagement rate is high. TikTok also enriches its content by incorporating various video types to prevent users from encountering the same material repeatedly. Users can further tailor their experience and enhance the algorithm’s recommendations by marking videos as “not interested”.

TikTok played a crucial role in Georgescu’s rise to fame, as the platform saw a sharp increase in engagement with his content in the weeks leading up to the election. According to the data below, the hashtag #călingeorgescu surged during this period. This spike illustrates how TikTok’s algorithm can effectively disseminate political messages and influence public opinion on a large scale.

Source: exolyt.com

A chart from Exolyt illustrates how Georgescu, previously unknown and barely appearing in popularity rankings, suddenly surged in visibility just weeks before the elections. Călin Georgescu’s popularity has experienced dynamic shifts in recent months. Network analysis indicates that his name has become central to discussions on politics, activism, and regional issues in mid-November. Notably, the hashtags associated with him are strategically linked to mainstream themes, helping to help him rise into the charts across diverse audiences.

Source: exolyt.com (the chart shows related hashtags in Romania)

A spike in TikTok engagement between November and December marked a peak in his visibility, likely driven by campaign efforts or viral content. However, this spike was about more than just organic interest. Some Romanian TikTok influencers have acknowledged receiving payments for promoting hashtags related to Georgescu, such as #Presidency2024.

Marius Catlain, who has over 800,000 followers, stated he was paid to promote Georgescu through an app called Fame Up. The other key hashtag used was #echilibrusiverticalitate. One notable influencer, Alex Stremițeanu, shared his experience of being part of this campaign. He revealed that upon using the hashtag #echilibrusiverticalitate, his TikTok posts were inundated with comments supporting Georgescu, such as “votăm Călin Georgescu” (“we vote for Călin Georgescu”). Below in the chart, it is shown how this hashtag became popular in TikTok.

Source: exolyt.com

As a result, his poll standings increased. The campaign employed coordinated hashtags, including #echilibrusiverticalitate, to extend its reach and impact. This hashtag was used for Georgescu’s social media strategy, affecting his online presence and public perception. The chart highlights how this hashtag gained traction. More importantly, it demonstrates how the hashtag was directly linked to Georgescu. The related hashtags showcase Călin Georgescu’s rise in popularity within the same timeframe.

Source: exolyt.com

However, what made Georgescu’s TikTok campaign particularly compelling was the platform’s implicit facilitation – TikTok did not classify his content as a political campaign, allowing paid influencers to promote him without disclosure. The Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI) identified TikTok user Bogdan Peşchir (“bog”) as a key financial contributor, donating over one million euros to Georgescu’s electoral efforts. Adding to the controversy, Romania’s intelligence agency (SRI) uncovered that TikTok influencers promoting Georgescu were funded through FameUp, a platform designed to monetize online marketing.

Campaign slogans and hashtags appeared out of nowhere and spread like wildfire, and Georgescu went from a political outsider to dominating Romania’s political conversation in just days. The numbers speak for themselves: Romania has 19.5 million registered voters, and according to statistics, around nine million people use TikTok. The chart below illustrates the dynamics of TikTok’s target audience in the Romanian. Primarily, the audience consists of voters.

Source: PiPidas

Georgescu’s TikTok videos amassed 117.2 million views and 7.5 million likes. His digital influence was unprecedented, highlighting online platforms’ immense power – and potential dangers – in modern elections. In November 2024, Călin Georgescu utilized TikTok as a cornerstone of his presidential campaign, promoting a blend of populist nationalism, cultural conservatism, and personal relatability.

This approach reshaped the political discourse and brought his message to younger, digitally engaged voters. Interestingly, the TikTok platform did not classify him as a political candidate. The chart below shows how his popularity grew throughout November despite his lack of content beforehand.

Source: exolyt.com

Georgescu’s campaign put Romania’s interests front and centre, often at the expense of external alliances. He framed national sovereignty as the key to prosperity, stability, and security. In one widely shared TikTok video, he declared, “I am running for Romania, not for Ukraine,” which struck a chord with voters who felt foreign policy had come at the cost of domestic well-being. Throughout his campaign, he questioned Romania’s close ties with Western institutions, casting doubt on whether EU and NATO membership truly benefited the country’s autonomy. Even now, he is very popular across Russian media channels, using the same rhetoric as Russian representatives regarding the new NATO base in Romania.

His anti-globalist views resonated with those frustrated by Brussels and Washington, portraying these alliances as barriers to self-determination. He pushed for economic protectionism and resistance to foreign influence, subtly reinforcing his nationalist stance. Outside politics, Georgescu positioned himself as a defender of Orthodox Christian values and Romanian customs. Videos of him attending churches and engaging in traditional customs presented him as a guardian of cultural legacy, which appealed to conservative people troubled about fast modernization and “liberal values”. Simultaneously, he tried to reach younger viewers by offering glimpses of his private life – from morning jogs to judo training. From that point, these videos helped him to seem more approachable with the digital generation and more friendly. Using the algorithm, his approach created a dual persona: a relevant figure and a strong, nationalistic leader. This combination helped him bridge generational gaps and expand his support base.

Broader regional trends

More importantly, Georgescu’s campaign closely resembles strategies observed in previous elections throughout Eastern Europe. For instance, Moldovan candidate Igor Dodon similarly championed Moldova’s sovereignty, often opposing closer ties with the EU and advocating for non-alignment to enhance connections with Russia. Both Georgescu and pro-Russian Moldovan candidates capitalized on nationalist sentiments to portray themselves as defenders of their country’s autonomy against perceived foreign interference.

Both campaigns tapped into scepticism about western institutions and appealed to voters disillusioned with their governments’ western-aligned policies. In other Eastern European nations, candidates aligned with these narratives maintained strong ties to the Orthodox Church and traditional values, presenting themselves as protectors of national identity against liberal western ideologies. A critical observation is that these campaigns target specific voter demographics, prioritizing marginalized or overlooked groups while framing themselves as alternatives to political elites.

It is essential to view Georgescu’s campaign within the broader geopolitical context. While his campaign does not explicitly classify as pro-Russian, its thematic alignment with anti-western, nationalist, and culturally conservative narratives mirrors strategies employed by pro-Russian candidates in other Eastern European countries. These strategies mobilize support by leveraging dissatisfaction with the status quo, scepticism of Western influence, and an appeal to traditional values. These similarities underscore broader regional trends in political campaigning, where nationalist and populist rhetoric often intersects with Russian strategic interests, whether directly or indirectly. As digital platforms increasingly influence political discourse, understanding these dynamics becomes vital for safeguarding democratic processes against coordinated influence campaigns.

Georgescu’s unexpected rise is not merely a Romanian anomaly but a case study of the evolving nature of political influence. Traditional electioneering is no longer the sole determinant of voter behavior. Instead, algorithmic manipulation, influencer-driven messaging, and undisclosed funding networks have become essential tools in modern hybrid warfare. Romania’s 2024 elections offer a glimpse into this new era, where democracy is shaped not by tanks and missiles but by social media algorithms, data analytics, and strategic disinformation campaigns. While Georgescu’s removal from a legal standpoint may have been justified, it nonetheless feels unfair to voters, as it removes their ability to decide, and risks being perceived as political interference. The U.S. case, where Donald Trump continued to run despite multiple legal challenges, highlights the global tensions between electoral integrity and democratic choice. This should serve as a wake-up call for democratic governments worldwide: disqualifying candidates after they have gained significant public support undermines trust in institutions. Authorities must act before the first round, not after an outcome they find undesirable.

For Romania’s 2025 elections—and for democracies more broadly—ensuring transparency in digital campaigning, enhancing platform accountability, and educating voters on media literacy will be critical. If governments fail to address these vulnerabilities proactively, they risk deepening public distrust and enabling future electoral manipulation under the guise of democracy.

Tinatin Lolomadze is a PhD candidate at Tbilisi State University, specializing in personal data protection enforcement mechanisms and European best practices. She is currently participating in the Natolin Fellowship Programme at the College of Europe, focusing on EU policies, the transformation of the Eastern Partnership, and regional relations.

Please support New Eastern Europe's crowdfunding campaign. Donate by clicking on the button below.

disinformation, Georgescu, Romania, Romanian politics, social media