Moscow’s tool of confrontation in the Baltic Sea region

Photo: Kirill Kostin /Shutterstock

The centralization processes intensified When Vladimir Putin became president for the third time in 2012. Anton Alikhanov, the governor of Kaliningrad Oblast from 2016 until May 2024, is a prime example of this tendency. Seemingly a technocrat, he built his political career almost entirely on family connections and sought to advance his career into Moscow at the expense of the region’s interests. This finally happened along with the recent reconstruction of the federal government, when Alikhanov became minister of industry and trade. His successor, Alexey Besprozvannykh, is an example of movement in the opposite direction. In Moscow he was made deputy minister of industry and trade in 2017 but was later demoted to Kaliningrad’s new governor. As a result, Kaliningrad Oblast is completely dependent on Moscow and its population feels the consequences of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine more acutely than the rest of the country. 

Constant pressure  

During Alikhanov’s term in office, the regional government turned into a structure focusing on swiftly implementing instructions from the federal centre. The regional legislative assembly became a body with no actual influence on the oblast’s political life, representing different interest groups that often had connections to the main oligarchic factions in Moscow and St Petersburg. All local, regional and federal elections in the oblast over the past decade have reduced the scope of political pluralism. In Kaliningrad city, opposition candidates were denied the opportunity to run and were even imprisoned on dubious charges such as tax evasion, corruption, or engaging in unfair electoral campaigns. 

Outside Kaliningrad city, the use of the so-called “administrative factor” to influence the electoral process means pressuring local constituencies, as jobs and social welfare are largely dependent on state institutions. It also involves access to substantial financial resources and preventive and repressive control concerning the judiciary. In the near absence of independent media, the state also wields tight control over the population’s everyday lives and political choices. As of early 2025, the actual potential for political protest or social upheaval in Kaliningrad Oblast was close to zero. The last major demonstrations took place in early 2021 when Aleksei Navalny was arrested and accused of corruption. They were limited to Kaliningrad city and involved a few thousand participants. 

Since the 1980s, one of the distinctive elements of the social and cultural reality of Kaliningrad Oblast has been a grassroots interest in the region’s pre-war history. Kaliningraders indulged in it to escape from the pains of perestroika and the post-collapse shock. Gradually, the interest in local history evolved into a variety of tourist products, with regional history books and spontaneous initiatives emphasizing the slightly different hues of residents’ cultural identity compared to their compatriots from other parts of Russia. 

Starting from 2012, however, the historical and cultural reality of Kaliningrad Oblast as the northern part of former East Prussia, dominated by western influence since the late Middle Ages until 1945, was gradually put aside. Grassroots movements and research projects that did not embrace the official interpretation of history were deprived of financing and criticized in the media. Any initiatives perceived as reminders of the German or western civilizational influence in the region were disregarded. Authorities in Moscow and St Petersburg, assisted by Kaliningrad-based journalists, authors and academics, forged a comprehensive counter story about the exclave’s past, connecting it closely with imperial Russian history. 

The Kremlin put a specific spin on the presentation of Russian and Soviet military victories across the centuries. The conquest of Königsberg was an act of moral justice and a modest territorial compensation to the Soviet Union for defeating the Third Reich. Today, Kaliningrad Oblast acts as Russia’s bulwark against the West, just like Crimea after 2014. Both regions are seen as being in some way separate from the mainland and both had to be fought for to become part of Russia. They host Russia’s Baltic and Black Sea Fleets. Both are threatened by Russia’s adversaries, such as the so-called “regime” in Kyiv and pro-US governments in Warsaw and Vilnius. In addition, Kaliningrad is the place where holders of Russian passports in Moldova’s breakaway region of Transnistria officially vote. In this imperialist narrative, Kaliningrad is a source of pride for all Russians, showing the country as a “besieged fortress” in a nutshell. 

Political tool 

The performative use of Kaliningrad’s political and historical themes was further exposed in September 2022, when Vladimir Putin introduced a new school subject called “talks about the important things”. Since then related topics have largely been replicated by the state-controlled media on a daily basis. During the “talks”, high school students familiarize themselves with the official take on current international developments, the history of Russia and of its neighbours, as well as traditional Russian values such as Eastern Orthodoxy and the heterosexual family. The curriculum makes the subject yet another propaganda tool, this time directly incorporated into the compulsory education system. Putin launched this initiative at the newly established Museum Complex in Kaliningrad, which symbolizes the linkages between the history of Rus’, Russia and the oblast. 

The sensitivity of Kaliningrad Oblast’s non-Russian history was revealed when Czech and Polish activists organized an internet prank. When Vladimir Putin announced the annexation of four Ukrainian regions after illegal referendums organized by the occupation authorities in September 2022, a “petition” was put forward to unite the semi-exclave with Czechia and Poland. The authors argued that medieval Königsberg was founded by the Czech King Přemysl Otakar II and that the vast majority inhabitants of the oblast voted for the change of borders. The authors altered the names of the main cities and towns, bringing to life Benešov nad Baltem (instead of Baltiysk) and Zelenského-hrad (instead of Zelenogradsk). 

The phrases “Královec je český” [Královec is Czech] and “Königsberg is ours” were meant to highlight the absurdity of the referendums and the brutality and illegality of Russia’s actions in Ukraine. This was met with a serious and fierce reaction from some Russian media outlets. They accused the authors of Russophobia and depicted the initiative as a rebirth of Nazism. 

Since the very beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Kaliningrad Oblast-based units have taken an active part in military actions. The 11th Army Corps from Kaliningrad was engaged in fighting for over three months and suffered serious losses. On average, the number of casualties in corps was higher than for other Russian units in the area around Kharkiv. 

Another role assigned to Kaliningrad Oblast was to transfer mid- and high-level officials to the occupied regions of Ukraine. This confirms that Moscow perceives the semi-semi-exclave’s separation from mainland Russia is an asset in pursuing belligerent foreign policies. The oblast’s authorities, upon instruction from the federal government, have taken part in managing the occupied territories of Ukraine. Alikhanov came to Kherson in August 2022, officially to bring humanitarian aid and sign agreements with selected municipalities. Alikhanov’s deputy, Sergei Eliseev, was tasked with overseeing much of the Russia-annexed Kherson Oblast.  

Transit problems 

For the Kremlin, the full-scale invasion of Ukraine has underlined the importance of securing the unimpeded land transit of people and goods to and from Kaliningrad Oblast. Historically, it became an issue in the early 2000s, when the European Union was about to enlarge by Lithuania. While the EU sought to accommodate Russia’s expectations during the negotiations, the transit question remained a way for the federal authorities to question Lithuania’s credibility. For Vilnius, the transit scheme always represented a tangible threat, as Moscow could violate its rules by transporting weapons and dangerous materials.  

After the 2022 invasion of Ukraine began, the subsequent sanction packages limited the scope of goods that could still be exported to Russia and/or conveyed by rail to Kaliningrad. Based on decisions the EU made in mid-June 2022, the Lithuanian authorities restricted the transport of certain goods, mostly raw materials, from Russia and Belarus across Lithuania to Kaliningrad. The fierce reactions of Russian officials subsequently led the EU to allow the transit of goods while obliging all member states to counter the circumvention of sanctions. Moscow also started to hint at the vulnerability of the so-called Suwałki Gap, the 60-kilometre-wide Polish-Lithuanian border that is the only land connection between the Baltic states and their EU and NATO allies. 

Controversies over the railway transit have been a smokescreen for the insufficient number of ferries operating between the ports of Kaliningrad and mainland Russia. Before the invasion, there were only three units in operation, which were obsolete and with limited capacities. The flow of critical products into the region has been limited by using civilian ferries to transport military cargo. Units deployed in the oblast have been receiving the bulk of petrol brought by rail and later by ferry. As the consecutive sanctions packages made the former channel unavailable, Kaliningrad suffered from growing fuel shortages and growing prices: 92 octane petrol rose by five per cent in 2022 and by 7.3 per cent in November 2023 (year-to-year), while diesel oil rose by 8.8 per cent in 2022 and by 11.6 per cent until November 2023. 

The regional authorities seem to have no clear understanding of how many and what types of new units the oblast needs to compensate for the losses. This is also due to the fact that this element has been neglected for many years. In March 2022, Alikhanov declared that the region would need ten such vessels. A few months later he increased this estimate to twenty. Whenever such estimates are made, it is unclear whether the ferries are supposed to substitute all transit via Lithuania or to provide extra bandwidth to the logistically easier and economically more viable railroad connection. 

Security around the Baltic, ever close to Bornholm 

The Russian government has been strengthening Kaliningrad’s destabilizing capacities and potential for carrying out special operations. Some activities target the balance of collective security in the Baltic Sea region. As Russia’s strategic position in the Baltic is worsening, with Finland and Sweden joining NATO, Moscow is likely to engage in a series of relatively small operations of a destructive and disruptive nature. 

The competent Russian agency in this field is the Main Directorate of Deep-sea Research (GUGI). It is an independent branch of the federal ministry of defence, outside of the Russian fleet’s chain of command. Located in St Petersburg, the directorate has had strong ties with Kaliningrad Oblast. Both Kaliningrad and Baltiysk were the main bases for fishing and exploratory expeditions to the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans already in the Soviet times. GUGI has the necessary experience, infrastructure and political backing to perform destructive underwater operations. In addition, the aerial component of the Baltic fleet has been extensively used in small-scale provocations around the Baltic Sea, usually including brief airspace violations. In June 2021, the political message carried by the incident was evident, as a Russian strategic bomber and two fighters entered Lithuanian territory while the BALTOPS 2021 naval exercises were taking place. 

Russia’s aerial and naval presence around Denmark’s Bornholm has increased since the annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of war in Ukraine. In September 2022 its presence was observed close to Danish territorial waters, approximately where the explosions that affected the Nord Stream gas pipeline took place on September 26th. This was followed by three other explosions in the Danish and Swedish exclusive economic zones. A major investigation by Scandinavian journalists proved that the Russian authorities had been using fishing boats and other civilian ships to perform surveillance and other intelligence gathering tasks in the North Sea and in the Danish straits. 

This pattern is also apparent in the southwest Baltic Sea basin, with Bornholm being a particularly sensitive location. In addition to affecting marine mammals and fish, the four explosions took place close to a site in the Bornholm Deep where around 11,000 tonnes of chemical warfare agents and munitions were disposed of in 1947. The total amount of chemical and conventional weapons deposited in the Baltic Sea is estimated at 300,000 tonnes. On top of the strategic or tactical gains from sabotage of underwater infrastructure, such as power grids or gas pipelines, the possible exploitation of the sea-dumped weapons for similar purposes is yet another factor in the security of the Baltic Sea Region. In all such activities, Kaliningrad Oblast occupies or has the potential to occupy a central place. 

Uncertain prospects for the future 

Kaliningrad Oblast is the most significant remaining territorial gain of the Russian state since the Great Northern War and the establishment of St Petersburg in early 18th century. Kaliningrad is as close to the core of NATO and EU territory as contemporary Russia can get. For these reasons, the oblast is a blueprint for the way in which Russian elites perceive the West and its actions towards Russia. Today, the tightly interconnected Baltic Sea is almost a NATO and EU pond; Yet almost makes a big difference as nine West-affiliated countries in the region need to take into account the security challenges posed by the two Russian coastal footholds: Kaliningrad and St Petersburg. The former will remain predominantly a military base and assume an increasingly hostile posture. This one-dimensional role excludes perspectives for meaningful cooperation with the neighbouring states regarding cross-border trade, cultural exchange, common initiatives or selective joint security-related efforts over matters related to seabed explosives or energy infrastructure. All indicators are thus pointing towards a further development of Kaliningrad Oblast as a predominantly negative and even disruptive factor in the Baltic Sea region. 

Within a possible next-level escalation in the ongoing Russia-West confrontation, the politically and militarily delicate railway transit arrangements will immediately return to both sides’ operational attention. This is where the sensitivity of the Suwałki Gap is likely to be exploited by the Russian authorities should it decide that it can put additional pressure on the Baltic states and Poland. Kaliningrad is also destined to remain a security issue for Denmark and for other Nordic states. The islands of Bornholm and Gotland are the closest and most obvious potential targets for destabilizing or disruptive activities. 

As a result, the rapidly integrating nine EU and NATO member states around the Baltic Sea will be unable to take full advantage of their cooperation. In the long run, this absence of common goals poses serious questions in a number of areas where hybrid threats are especially visible, such as environmental protection, seabed explosives and the creation of secure transport corridors. The West needs to prepare for the Kaliningrad Oblast becoming a real nuisance, which at first sight only has a regional dimension. In reality, however, it has the potential to affect security in the whole of Europe, becoming an even more important part of both the EU and NATO’s relations with Russia in times of growing geopolitical tensions and ruptures. 

Miłosz J. Cordes is a research fellow at the Danish Foreign Policy Society and the Casimir Pulaski Foundation. He teaches U.S. students at DIS – Study Abroad in Scandinavia. He is the author of a report titled “Kaliningrad Oblast 2024. Russia’s vessel of havoc on the Baltic Sea”, published by the Danish Institute of International Affairs in May 2024 and available on www.diis.dk. This article is an updated summary of that report. 

Europe, Kaliningrad, Russia, Russia's war against Ukraine