Far from smooth, but successful. Slovak experience in settling the issue of national minority rights during the EU accession

Europe Courtyard in Komárno (Komárom), a Slovakia's principal port on the Danube. It is also a centre of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia which makes up 54 per cent according to the 2021 census. Photo: Andrzej Otrębski / wikimedia.org

HALYNA HYCHKA: Let’s get straight to the business. Could you please narrate Slovakia’s journey to EU membership and the significance of legislation regarding minority rights within that context?

ÁBEL RAVASZ: The 1990s marked a challenging period for national minorities in Slovakia. During this time, the Mečiar governments (disclaimer: Vladimír Mečiar was the Prime Minister of Slovakia 3 times, from 1990 to 1998 with short breaks in 1992 and 1994, ruled Slovakia during the collapse of Czechoslovakia, and was known for his authoritarian, populist and anti-Western style of governance) adopted relatively nationalistic policies, which included rolling back some of the minority rights that Hungarians and other minority groups had enjoyed since the socialist era.

One of the most significant rights under challenge was the right to mother tongue education. The government introduced a highly restrictive education law aimed at banning Hungarian-language schools in Slovakia, which numbered around 700 at that time (disclaimer: the ethnic Hungarian population of Slovakia at that time amounted to more than half a million people). This move triggered considerable local opposition from the Hungarian community and also became a point of contention during Slovakia’s EU accession negotiations (disclaimer: these negotiations began in a meaningful way only after Mečiar lost power, when Slovakia was stuck in the last carriage of a train moving along with the other Visegrad countries).

It was one of the demands of the European Union that Slovakia would fix its minority policies and basically it is what they did. They enacted legislation aimed at securing minority rights, particularly concerning education and the right to learn in one’s mother tongue.

There was a grand scheme for minority culture. Importantly, discriminatory laws targeting national minorities were abolished. With Slovakia’s accession to the EU in 2004, there was overarching optimism among Slovakia’s minorities that the EU would oversee the process and ensure their protection.

However, after the EU had admitted Slovakia, it became evident that the EU’s proactive engagement in safeguarding minority rights fell short of expectations.

We in Ukraine are facing a bit of a different problem. For instance, concerning our European integration, addressing minority rights and completing this work beforehand is crucial, as it constitutes one of the obstacles, so to speak.

It was the same with us. After the initial shock of the Russian attack on Ukraine, I contacted my colleagues at the research institute I directed, the Inštitút Mateja Bela, to emphasize the need to collaborate with Ukraine to address minority rights issues. Given Ukraine’s aspirations to join the EU, it became evident that some neighboring countries might block their accession due to concerns over minority rights. Hence, it was clear to me, as well as to my colleagues, that this would become a significant issue. Because that was the same in Slovakia – you had to fix it before you joined.

However, upon joining, the territory becomes relatively free as the EU’s ability to enforce rules diminishes. Essentially, countries must cross the threshold, after which they are required to report periodically, but overall, the situation remains manageable.

I believe it is also a matter of fundamental right for countries to grant relatively generous minority rights. These rights not only adhere to EU standards but also contribute to stabilizing the loyalty of minority communities toward the state. Thus, it is a matter of good policy, not solely influenced by EU pressures.

Was there opposition to this process in the Slovak case? I mean, did it become a topic of political quarrels and manipulated propaganda in Slovakia? What was the stance of the majority of society?

It is such a good question. One aspect I didn’t previously mention, but which you are aware of, is the representation of Hungarians in the Slovak parliament and their political party – in fact, there were several, but following 1994, some of the Hungarian parties consolidated into a single bloc and eventually a single party, the Hungarian Coalition or Strana maďarskej koalície (komunity), emerged. From then until 2020, a party consistently held seats in parliament.

Initially, they served as opposition to the Mečiar government and the nationalists. However, when Mečiar was ousted in 1998, it led to the formation of a coalition government that included the Hungarian party, thus ensuring Hungarian representation in government, which correspondingly solidified its stance on national minority issues.

Throughout this period, there was a clear divide between the Coalition, which included the Hungarian party, and the nationalists. While nationalists advocated against Hungarian separatism and pushed for school closures, the Coalition, particularly under the more liberal Mikuláš Dzurinda, took a pro-Hungarian stance.

During the crucial period from 1998 to 2006, which encompassed the EU accession process, having the Hungarian party as part of the government proved immensely beneficial. Despite attempts by some actors to exploit the topic of minority rights, the government maintained a pro-Hungarian position, which greatly aided the situation.

The challenge we face today in Ukraine (dealing with is the mission of our institute navigating it in Zakarpattia) involves a perception among certain segments of Ukrainian society that the EU is imposing changes through what feels like blackmail, Hungarian blackmail. This sentiment extends beyond just nationalism, as some view it as an interference in Ukrainian affairs driven by the interests of organizations like the Venice Commission, the EU and so on. However, this viewpoint is puzzling and illogical because, in striving for a healthy society and democracy, it’s essential to heed the voices of minorities because they are citizens of Ukraine. And now it is really a significant part of ongoing politics, with various actors attempting to gain popularity through it. Was it possible in Slovakia, for example, to create a national consensus on this issue using civil society and influential figures who supported so to speak more rights for Hungarians and would assert that it is okay, emphasizing that it is not about politics but about democracy? How did the situation appear from within Slovakia?

But the situation in Slovakia is indeed very different, as you also mentioned. I’ll provide an answer, but let me take a moment to look back. It’s very different when you have a situation where a few individuals either support the government or not, compared to a scenario where a party has one, three, or four coalition partners in the government. If any of these partners vote against, the government fails, leading to significantly different negotiating positions. So, that structure is very different from the situation in Ukraine. When it comes to the situation of Hungarians in Slovakia, I don’t believe there was ever a national consensus. 

It was highly contested, but a majority of MPs in parliament supported the necessary measures, even though they lacked moral high ground. They might be saying “This is the right thing to do.” But the bottom line was “We need to do this to get to the EU.” A significant change occurred in 2016, more than 10 years later, when the Hungarian party formed a coalition with the Slovak National Party. This coalition was born out of necessity rather than willingness to cooperate, as neither party initially desired collaboration, yet they ultimately joined forces. For many Slovaks, this coalition marked a turning point when they saw that now that the nationalists were okay with the Hungarians, so probably the Hungarians were good.

Additionally, this period coincided with the return of Viktor Orbán, who began advocating for pro-Slovakia policies. Instead of escalating tensions, Orbán aimed to foster positive relations and engage in mutually beneficial endeavors with Slovakia. These two different waves formed a very nice calm sea: Slovak National Party now has Hungarian friends, Orbán is regarded as a friend of Bratislava and that has created the consensus, albeit 12 years after European accession. Nowadays, I believe there is no longer any dispute regarding the rights of Hungarians to maintain their institutions and benefit from economic advancements in regions where they constitute the majority.

Let’s jump to a very short question. What is the primary concern facing the pro-Hungarian minority in Slovakia presently?

Economic development. It parallels Zakarpattia quite closely.

Are you facing waves of migration?

Somewhat, primarily toward Hungary. There is this very unhealthy dynamic that if you have a Hungarian party in the government, then they are trying to push out investments into Southern Slovakia where the Hungarians live. When a Hungarian party holds government positions, investments flow into the southern regions. Conversely, in their absence from government, funding for these areas ceases. And it’s very particular because even though the Hungarian parties are part of the government half of the time, the time they are there, the southern regions get as much as the other regions, but they don’t get anything when they are not part of the government.

Consequently, maintaining the same standard of development becomes untenable, leading to longstanding grievances within the Hungarian communities regarding the mismanagement of the southern regions. Once prosperous, these areas are now witnessing economic decline. Now people don’t talk about Eastern Slovakia as a poor region. They say “Eastern and Southern Slovakia” instead.

This predicament exacerbates the core issue. Assimilation and migration are certainly concerns, but without fostering robust economic structures, people will seek better opportunities elsewhere, even outside the country. Gradually, economic vitality has emerged as the paramount issue. I can say it in a different way. Instituting essential reforms — education, cultural funding, political representation — is pivotal. However, once these foundational institutions are established, economic prosperity takes precedence.

Notably, Slovakia once had an interethnic party, the Bridge Party (disclaimer: Most–Híd), comprising both Slovaks and Hungarians. There was a notable synergy between the aspirations of Slovak residents from the southern regions for development and the desires of minority communities in the same areas. Regarding the Zakarpattia issue: I wonder how increased economic development for Hungarians in the region can detrimentally impact Ukrainians? On the contrary, such development fosters local structures and benefits the entire community. Given the relatively small population in this compact region, the influx of funds contributes to the region’s overall prosperity. Thus, this presents a compelling rationale for fostering coalitions and collaborative efforts.

A question regarding borders: When Slovakia and Hungary joined the EU, you also became part of the Schengen zone, eliminating borders. Did this help alleviate tensions and create a calmer atmosphere, particularly for Hungarians who no longer faced restrictions when traveling to Hungary? Because of our shared border, we anticipate that EU membership will benefit local Hungarians, facilitating increased connections.

Yes, but the border was never as difficult as this one. I am 38, and when I started attending university, I commuted to Budapest while residing in Slovakia. Every week, I crossed the border, where passport checks took merely five seconds. After 2004, both countries were part of the EU, and while there were border checks, they were not stringent, focusing less on smuggling and deliberately slowing down travelers. With the advent of Schengen, border controls simply evaporated, creating a liberating feeling. I vividly recall the celebrations at the border. This development significantly revitalized local economies on both sides. Especially in regions where the border isn’t delineated by the Danube, such as in the western part of the country, where the Slovak-Hungarian border runs along a river.

There’s the same amount of border crossings and bridges, but in the eastern part of the country now you have a lot more local border crossings that you can use. This development has undoubtedly contributed to economic growth as well as it helped symbolically for sure. I believe that adopting a system similar to Romania’s, where EU membership is maintained without full Schengen integration, would represent a significant improvement. This approach starkly differs from the current Slovak experience. Slovaks only come to Ukraine out of necessity or for specific purposes, like if they want to make some money on cigarettes or something like that because nobody in their right mind wants to wait for hours on the border.

They also come here for dentistry. It’s very popular.

Fair point.

Have you had the opportunity to review the situation in Ukraine regarding minority rights and our process of initiating negotiations bilaterally with Hungary, as well as with the EU? How would you evaluate the progress? Perhaps you could offer some advice on this matter?

Yeah, I understand that part of Putin’s justification for the war includes the Russian ethnic minority in eastern Ukraine. It is really challenging in this climate to talk about the necessity for tolerant minority policy. However, I firmly believe it’s the only path forward. I acknowledge efforts to de-Russify certain institutions and processes in Ukraine. Nevertheless, if this results in neglecting existing minority rights, particularly in education, it’s impractical policy. Ukraine undeniably requires loyal citizens, including those from minority backgrounds. Those people are not to blame either for being born in this country, which was not their choice, or for the actions of other countries that they might be affiliated with, be it Russia or Hungary. Citizens have the right to education and culture in their homeland. If coupled with positive economic developments, they will have no incentive to support any country other than Ukraine. Conversely, abolishing established rights and neglecting regional development would provide neighbouring countries’ propaganda with ample ammunition to turn these people against Ukraine.

At the onset of the war, there was widespread speculation that eastern Ukraine would fully support Putin due to its Russophone population. However, this did not materialize as anticipated. While there may be isolated instances, the majority of Russian speakers in Ukraine have demonstrated unwavering loyalty to their country, with many making the ultimate sacrifice on the front lines. In light of this, should the reaction be to close schools, or should it be to cultivate goodwill by implementing a tolerant minority policy?

Is it possible that we have a similar problematic situation with Slovakia regarding the rights of the Slovakian minority in Ukraine? Are there any indications from the Slovak minority?

While the Slovak community in Ukraine has been relatively less developed institutionally compared to the Hungarians, it does exist and has its own institutions. We have received communication from them signalling concerns about legal changes and expressing dissatisfaction with the ways things are developing. The citizens of Ukraine from the Slovak community are not as politically active as, for example, the Hungarian communities. I believe the Slovaks are not deeply considering their position in this conflict; they are pro-Ukraine and have always been. Strengthening the school system for these individuals would be a positive step towards Slovakia. As a Slovak citizen, I feel proud that Slovakia has been a loyal friend to Ukraine during this war, not only at the governmental level but also through the grassroots efforts of individuals volunteering and offering support. Therefore, reciprocating by bolstering Slovak institutions in Ukraine would be a cost-effective way to express gratitude and ensure the happiness of these individuals in the future. The Slovak community around Uzhhorod is relatively small, but this gesture would still hold significant value.

Do you see merit in the principle of mirroring rights situations, legislation, and bilateral cooperation with Slovakia and Hungary?

The notion of reciprocity and mirroring has often been invoked to justify the reluctance to grant additional rights. It has been particularly prevalent in Hungarian-Slovak relations, with the Slovak side citing the situation of Slovaks in Hungary as a reason for not extending further rights. However, I don’t find this approach particularly constructive. Instead, I believe it’s more beneficial to focus on how we want to treat our own minorities and to set an example based on our values. We can say, “Listen, we have implemented these measures to support your community, if you wish to help ours, please do that.” But let’s not use reciprocity as a weapon and say “You’re not doing this to the Ukrainians in Hungary, therefore, we are not doing this for the Hungarians in Ukraine.”

The publication was prepared within the framework of the Re:Open Ukraine project, implemented with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. The opinions expressed are solely those of the authors and do not reflect those of the International Renaissance Foundation.

Ábel Ravasz is a Slovak sociologist and politician of Hungarian nationality. From April 2016 to March 2020, he served as the Plenipotentiary of the Slovak Government for Roma Communities.

Halyna Hychka is a Ukrainian journalist.

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EU integration, Hungary, minority rights, Slovakia