Kazakhstan’s nuclear future runs through Europe

Institute of Nuclear Physics of the Ministry of Energy of Kazakhstan. Pavel Mikheyev / Shutterstock

On October 6th 2024, Kazakhstan went to the polls in a rare national referendum. By a surprising 70 per cent margin, voters chose to approve the construction of their country’s first post-independence nuclear power station. Though controversial given the legacy of the Soviet nuclear testing programme in Kazakhstan, nuclear power can help Kazakhstan lower energy costs, diversify its energy supply, and promote its long-term climate resilience and energy security. 

Crucially, the success of any initiative hinges on choosing the right partner to construct, maintain and supply reactor technology. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has shortlisted France’s EDF, Russia’s Rosatom, South Korea’s KHNP, and China’s CNNC to be part of a consortium to construct and maintain the reactor. Though all four companies will play a role, it remains to be seen which actor will take the lead in providing reactor technologies. Partnering with EDF to supply EPR1200 reactor technologies would prevent Russia and China from gaining greater influence over Kazakhstan and strengthen trade relations with Europe, which remains eager to diversify its uranium supply away from Russian imports. 

Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy

Kazakhstan’s support for a nuclear energy development consortium is reflective of its multi-vector foreign policy strategy. This aims to minimize dependence on any one power while sustaining effective economic and political ties between competing global players. This approach has so far proven successful, with Kazakhstan’s trade volumes having doubled since 2015. More recently, they grew by 32 per cent between 2021 and 2022 alone. 

The primary vectors: Russia and China

China and Russia remain Kazakhstan’s largest trade partners in terms of imports, amounting to 10.9 billion and 17.3 billion US dollars respectively. Yet, economic dependence on these neighbours poses clear risks. 

Russia’s use of energy resources as geoeconomic leverage against Europe during its invasion of Ukraine, combined with its existing influence in Kazakhstan’s uranium sector, highlight concerns of similar coercion in a future confrontation. The Rosatom subsidiary “Uranium One” already owns 26 per cent of Kazakhstan’s uranium deposits, as well as rights to a further 22 per cent of production. It is also a major shareholder in a plurality of the mining subsidiaries owned by Kazatomprom. Of course, giving Russia’s state-owned Rosatom corporation a leading role in Kazakhstan’s nuclear energy consortium risks increasing technical and financial dependence on Moscow.

Furthermore, a recent round of sanctions against Rosatom by the previous Biden administration could create complications in maintaining an international nuclear consortium to oversee the project. This will prove especially true should Rosatom be selected as the primary partner. 

Inversely, contracting with China for reactor technologies could threaten to undermine Kazakhstan’s leverage over its powerful neighbour. Kazakhstan supplied two-thirds of China’s nuclear fuel in 2023 and remains its cheapest source market. With China serving as the world’s second-largest producer of nuclear energy and housing the fastest-growing civil reactor fleet, Chinese dependence on Kazakhstan’s nuclear supply chain will continue to grow. A contract with China’s CNNC could undermine the positive leverage Kazakhstan has developed in recent years and intensify a pre-existing overdependence on Chinese imports in other industries. 

The secondary vectors: the United States and Europe

Although Russia and China are neighbours, Kazakhstan can still develop nuclear energy-related ties with western powers like the United States and European Union. The United States has been a strong partner. However, the uncertain foreign policy priorities of the Trump administration may weaken this relationship’s reliability. 

In contrast, France, along with the rest of Europe, appears a more stable and committed partner. Following Tokayev’s recent November 2024 visit to Paris, Astana increasingly considers its relationship with Paris as its most important in Europe. The two states now possess a crucial strategic partnership. Alongside recent trade agreements with both France and Germany, Europe’s growing demand for uranium, amplified by the Russo-Ukrainian War, creates a natural opportunity for Kazakhstan to step in as a key supplier. Unlike Russia or China, Europe’s distant borders and adherence to liberal economic models make it a more predictable partner that is less inclined towards coercion.

The strategic benefits a partnership with Kazakhstan offers to France and Europe

Any partnership with Kazakhstan would provide France with a more reliable source of uranium to support its nuclear energy sector. It would also help to reduce Europe’s overall reliance on Russian materials for its energy needs. As EU authorities consider placing Rosatom under sanctions, Kazakhstan’s uranium reserves and potential for energy exports offer a timely solution. Such a move would likewise bolster France’s case to fellow EU members to grow their nuclear energy capabilities as to safeguard Europe’s energy security away from Russia.

New possibilities

A nuclear energy agreement between France and Kazakhstan as part of the consortium would be mutually beneficial. For Kazakhstan, the agreement would align with its multi-vector foreign policy, avoid an increase in its reliance on Russia and China, and build public trust through stringent safety standards. For France and the rest of the EU, the agreement ensures access to critical resources, bolsters energy security, and reduces Russian and Chinese influence in Central Asia.

This collaboration could even potentially pave the way for broader EU-Kazakhstan cooperation in critical minerals, clean energy and other strategic energy sectors. By working together, France and Kazakhstan could set a new standard for partnerships in Central Asia and contribute to a more stable and diversified global energy landscape.

Francis Shin is an author and research analyst focused on global governance, democratic resilience, and grand strategy. His expertise spans anti-corruption regulations, clean energy policy, and alliance structures. He has held roles at various prominent think tanks around the world, including the Atlantic Council, the Royal United Services Institute, and the Center for a New American Security.

Jacob Paquette is an expert in Russian and Eurasian foreign and public policy, transatlantic relations, and international affairs. He now participates in the US Fulbright Program in Kazakhstan. Previously, Jacob worked in support of civil society and human rights issues in Armenia and Ukraine as a programme associate at Freedom House.

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Central Asia, energy policy, EU-Central Asia, France, Kazakhstan, nuclear power