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Central Europe’s parliamentary edge: a democratic advantage

Recent years have seen criticism directed at countries like Poland and Hungary for a level of semi-authoritarianism in their governance. Whilst such issues clearly persist, the parliamentary systems in many of the region’s states have allowed for key checks and balances that have challenged these political shifts.

December 2, 2024 - Stuart Feltis - Articles and Commentary

Chamber of Deputies of Parliament of the Czech Republic. Photo: Shutterstock

Poland and other Central European countries – including Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia – enjoy a structural advantage that many presidential republics, especially those further east such as Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, do not. Despite political turbulence over the past two decades, including the rise of semi-authoritarian, populist movements in the 2000s and 2010s, these nations benefit from parliamentary systems that provide greater flexibility and mechanisms for accountability compared to presidential systems.

Flexibility and leadership accountability in parliamentary systems

One of the key strengths of parliamentary systems is their ability to adapt quickly to changing political circumstances. Regular parliamentary elections, combined with the possibility of snap elections, offer a responsiveness that presidential systems lack. In Central Europe, this allows governments to respond swiftly to political crises without being locked into rigid multi-year presidential terms. For example, in times of internal division or public dissatisfaction, a vote of no confidence can swiftly remove ineffective leaders and trigger new elections, creating a more fluid and dynamic political environment.

In contrast, presidential systems – such as those seen in Belarus and Russia – typically grant the head of state fixed terms in office, making it difficult to replace ineffective or unpopular leaders between elections. This rigidity can concentrate power in the hands of one person, increasing the risk of a personalist form of authoritarian rule. Central Europe’s parliamentary systems, by enabling leadership changes through legislative processes, reduce this risk by preventing the unchecked accumulation of power in a single office.

The European parliamentary tradition: stability and adaptation

Central and Eastern Europe’s adoption of parliamentary systems has deep roots in Europe’s political evolution. Following the collapse of imperial and monarchical regimes after the First World War, many European countries – including newly established states like Poland and Czechoslovakia – embraced parliamentary governance. This model of government, derived from the United Kingdom’s Westminster system, has proven resilient across much of Europe, allowing for greater checks on executive authority and fostering coalition-building within legislatures. Walter Bagehot, a prominent 19th-century British political analyst, underscored the importance of these checks, particularly in ensuring that governments remain accountable and adaptable.

Even in the face of authoritarian movements during the interwar period, Europe’s parliamentary tradition survived. Although fascist regimes in countries like Italy and Germany temporarily disrupted parliamentary governance, the recoveries seen in the Cold War period after the Second World War saw the restoration of parliamentary systems in many parts of Europe. In Central and Eastern Europe, the post-Soviet transitions of the 1990s further reinforced the value of parliamentary structures as safeguards against centralized authoritarian rule.

The success of parliamentary systems in Western Europe – such as in the Benelux countries, Germany and Scandinavia – served as a key model for Central Europe after the Cold War. Spain, Portugal and Greece restored parliamentary governance in the 1970s, further demonstrating its stabilizing role. Despite Italy’s frequent government collapses, its parliamentary system, like those of the UK, Ireland, Austria and Switzerland, has showcased a significant degree of democratic resilience. These examples influenced not only Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in the 1990s but also transitions in the Balkans, where countries like Bulgaria, Romania and even post-Yugoslav nations such as Croatia and Serbia adopted parliamentary frameworks vital for their democratic consolidation.

The authoritarian drift in presidential systems: a European perspective

In stark contrast, many post-Soviet states that adopted presidential systems – such as Russia, Belarus and Central Asia’s republics – have witnessed a drift toward authoritarianism since the 1990s and 2000s. Presidential systems often allow leaders to centralize power through extended terms and control over executive apparatuses. For instance, Russia’s presidential model has allowed Vladimir Putin to entrench himself in power through constitutional reforms and political manipulation. The lack of meaningful legislative oversight in presidential systems exacerbates these tendencies, enabling leaders to sideline parliaments and extend their rule with fewer institutional checks.

Belarus provides another clear example of this drift. Since 1994, Alyaksandr Lukashenka has maintained power through a highly centralized presidential system, suppressing opposition and manipulating elections to remain in office. In these environments, the absence of parliamentary accountability mechanisms has led to entrenched personalist rule.

In contrast, even where semi-authoritarian populism and illiberalism has taken root in Central Europe – such as in Hungary under Viktor Orbán and to a lesser degree Poland under the Law and Justice Party (PiS) – parliamentary systems have still offered institutional resistance. For example, while Orbán has reshaped Hungarian politics through his own particular and often personalist version of populist rhetoric, Hungary’s parliamentary system theoretically provides avenues for future political opposition to challenge his authority through elections and votes of no confidence, even if this system is under strain. This adaptability is far more constrained in presidential systems, where executive power is harder to dislodge.

Semi-authoritarian populism and illiberalism in Central Europe: a parliamentary challenge

The populist wave that surged across Central Europe in recent decades – exemplified by leaders like Orbán in Hungary and Jarosław Kaczyński in Poland – has tested the resilience of parliamentary systems. While these movements have tapped into legitimate concerns or grievances regarding economic neoliberalism and globalization – especially in the post-Soviet sphere’s context, where discontent with post-Cold War reforms runs deep – their authoritarian tendencies have often pushed beyond reasonable boundaries. The parliamentary frameworks in these countries, though under strain, have continued to offer checks and balances that prevent the full concentration of power in the hands of any one individual or party.

In Hungary, for example, though Orbán has consolidated considerable control, his Fidesz party must still navigate the complexities of parliamentary procedures, coalition-building and legislative oversight. Poland’s former PiS government, led by Kaczyński, similarly faced resistance from both domestic and European institutions despite its populist agenda. In both cases, the parliamentary system has offered an institutional counterbalance that is harder to find in presidential systems, where executive leaders often operate with less direct accountability to the legislature.

Even within the European Union, the influence of parliamentary governance can play a role in mitigating authoritarian impulses. While not without its own democratic deficits or other significant flaws – such as the unelected nature of the European Commission and the challenges posed by the Eurozone’s financial centralization – the EU’s parliamentary governance has notable strengths. Its institutions, based on the principles of checks on executive power and deliberation, provide a broader framework of accountability for member states. This system of external oversight adds another layer of protection against the authoritarian drift seen in more isolated presidential republics.

Post-Soviet comparisons: lessons from Central Asia and beyond

When comparing Central Europe’s parliamentary systems to the presidential systems of post-Soviet republics like Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, the differences become even more stark. In these countries, leaders have used the presidential model to cement their rule, often for decades. Constitutional changes, manipulated elections, and the suppression of political opposition have become hallmarks of these regimes. The lack of mechanisms for parliamentary accountability in such states creates conditions for long-term authoritarianism, where political change is only possible through revolutionary means rather than democratic processes.

Ukraine offers an interesting middle-ground case. Since its independence in 1991, Ukraine has oscillated between parliamentary and presidential models, resulting in a hybrid system. This system has at times hampered governance due to the conflicting interests of the parliament and presidency. However, Ukraine’s recent struggles for democracy, especially following the 2014 Euromaidan revolution and 2022 Russian invasion, highlight the importance of parliamentary checks on presidential power. As Ukraine continues to navigate its political challenges, the parliamentary elements of its system may prove critical in its efforts to stabilize, democratize, and resist external threats.

The case for parliamentary resilience in Central Europe

Central Europe’s experience with parliamentary systems underscores their value as a tool for maintaining democratic accountability and stability. While populism and illiberalism pose significant challenges, parliamentary structures offer mechanisms to mitigate authoritarian tendencies, ensuring that no leader can consolidate a level of power that is unchecked in nature. The ability to hold snap elections, remove leaders through votes of no confidence, and demand greater legislative accountability, are key advantages that presidential systems often lack.

As Central and Eastern Europe continues to evolve politically, the parliamentary model remains a vital safeguard against the drift toward authoritarianism seen in many presidential republics. While parliamentary systems are not immune to challenges, their flexibility and built-in checks and balances provide the best foundation for maintaining democratic governance in an era of increasing political instability.

Stuart Feltis is an internationalist and strategic consultant currently living in Frankfurt, Germany, focused on European and pan-American affairs.


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