Europe still needs a security council

Chamber of the UN Security Council in New York. Photo: Shutterstock

Donald Trump’s reelection as US president is likely to reignite tensions with European leaders over transatlantic security. Nevertheless, even if the United States remains actively engaged in NATO during and after Trump’s second term as president, Europe faces an uncomfortable reality: the era of unconditional US security guarantees is over. Meanwhile, the continent confronts a resurgent threat from Russia as its invasion of Ukraine continues unabated.

However, this context of uncertainty could serve as the impetus for European states to establish a European Security Council (ESC) to better coordinate their defense and foreign policies. First proposed by French and German leaders in 2019, the ESC would function as a high-level and streamlined decision-making structure to preserve peace and security in Europe. Crucially, it would operate as a steering committee for European states to take the lead in maintaining regional security while remaining aligned with NATO and EU structures.

The ESC will tackle the most pressing deficits in existing European security structures. Firstly, the ESC would ensure European states can proactively determine defense policies among themselves. Even without Trump’s reelection, the United States was already increasing its attention on the Indo-Pacific region, and would hence be less likely to continue its leading role in Europe’s defense. Such coordination could even bolster NATO’s “European pillar” if ESC members hold each other responsible for meeting their 2 per cent of GDP defense spending commitments. This added layer of mutual accountability will reinforce Europe’s collective defensive capabilities while simultaneously addressing Trump’s longstanding criticisms of Europe’s “freeloading” off of the United States’ existing military presence in the region.

Secondly, the ESC could facilitate the strengthening of the UK’s defense cooperation with the EU after Brexit. Despite departing from EU defense mechanisms in 2020, Britain remains a key stakeholder in European security. In fact, French President Emannuel Macron first proposed the ESC to maintain Britain’s involvement in Europe’s defenses, but the idea gained little attention in London at the time. Now though, the Starmer ministry is pursuing a defense pact with the EU while remaining outside of the bloc, and the party of European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen has similarly argued that the ESC should include Britain.

Finally, during times of emergency, the ESC would act as a convening place for European leaders to rapidly develop responses to such crises. NATO and the EU have sometimes struggled with decision-making due to their size and the need for consensus, whereas the ESC could respond quickly to rapidly emerging threats like cyberattacks and hybrid warfare. By avoiding the same need for unanimity that especially marks EU decision-making, the ESC could pre-empt obstruction from pro-Kremlin leaders like Hungary’s Viktor Orbán or Slovakia’s Robert Fico.

With that in mind, the ESC must be selective and geographically diverse with its membership, as well as stay at a relatively small size of 12-14 rotating seats. A smaller council ensures swift decision-making while rotating seats bring fresh perspectives and prevent dominance by larger powers, striking a balance between efficiency and inclusivity. Prospective members must also be non-neutral European states that have high military readiness, geostrategic importance, and sufficient democratic consolidation. Perhaps most importantly, the ESC must be capable of adaptability and self-renewal, so it should review its membership, structure, and procedures every decade to accommodate any shifts in Europe’s geopolitical dynamics.

Under those terms, the ESC should have five core members serving staggered five-year terms. This would ensure continuity and strategic leadership without the structural ossification that can arise with permanent membership in collective security bodies like the UN Security Council. Furthermore, these core members should be a geographically diverse group of European states which are already major contributors to European security with large standing armed forces. Consequently, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, and the UK would be the most logical candidates to become the five founding core ESC members.

In addition to these core members, the ESC should have seven to nine supporting members serving in two-year staggered rotating terms. Like the core members group, the supporting members group must be regionally varied to ensure the broader representation of all European states, including smaller EU members like Luxembourg and non-EU NATO allies like Norway. Observer status could likewise be extended to international bodies relevant to European security like NATO and the European Union, allies outside of NATO and the EU like Ukraine, and neutral European countries like Ireland and Switzerland.

That said, some critics have argued that the ESC would simply replicate or even weaken the mechanisms that already exist in NATO and EU structures. To be clear, the ESC must be designed to complement those structures by addressing the existing deficits within and between them. NATO would thus remain the cornerstone of transatlantic defense, while the ESC would act as a steering committee for Europe to be more self-sufficient with its defenses. This will enable European states to respond to regional crises more quickly, decisively, and effectively.

Although Trump’s second term will probably be a much more significant challenge to the transatlantic alliance than his first, it might actually provide an opportunity for Europe to take a leading role in its own security. Establishing the ESC would therefore signal Europe’s readiness to preserve peace and security in its own region without undermining existing alliance structures like those in NATO and the EU.

Francis Shin is an author and research analyst focused on global governance, democratic resilience, and grand strategy. His expertise spans anti-corruption regulations, clean energy policy, and alliance structures. He has held roles at various prominent think tanks around the world, including the Atlantic Council, the Royal United Services Institute, and the Center for a New American Security.

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defence, EU, European Security Council, NATO, Russian invasion of Ukraine, security, United Kingdom, United States, West