There will be no peace in Europe with Putin in power

Photo courtesy of Borja Lasheras

IWONA REICHARDT: Ukraine is making progress on its path to integration with the European Union. However, this is the first country that is at war at the time of integrating with EU structures, which is an unusual situation and a challenge, both for Ukraine and the EU. How does the EU assess Ukraine’s road to membership, given these circumstances?

BORJA LASHERAS: There are several factors to take into account in this regard. When it comes to the so-called fundamental clusters, meaning the rule of law and judicial reform, Ukraine has made some progress. But more still needs to be done. The approach of the European Commission is more or less the same as it is toward EU integrating countries such as Albania, Serbia or Montenegro. At the same time, the EU, of course, realizes that Ukraine is fighting an existential war against a nuclear power. This war, naturally, has an effect on the integration process. For example, just a few days ago, a Supreme Court judge was killed in a drone attack near Kharkiv. Or there are people who worked in the court system and who are now fighting on the front lines. This makes Ukraine’s enlargement a different case than what we have experienced with other states. We have enlargement experience with countries that have come out of conflict, but not with a country that’s fighting an existential war.

What I have just said is a general assessment. There are of course more nuanced positions, also inside the Commission, as to how to approach this issue. We want Ukraine to make substantial progress with implementing reforms but we cannot neglect the fact that it is not Moldova or Albania, meaning it is not a country free from war. This is why I mentioned the example of the Supreme Court judge being killed. When it comes to the proper assessment we have to say that Ukraine has been given candidate country status not only because of the war, although, yes, had there been no full scale war, Ukraine would have not received candidate status on such a short notice. This means that both Ukraine and the EU, which is a pluralistic family, composed of many institutions and member states, are learning how this specific integration process should work.

Also, recognizing that Ukraine’s integration with the EU is a strategic decision, we should consider how this process should be reasonably expedited. We cannot have Ukraine become a permanent candidate country. In my view it is also important for the outcome of this war that this process is, like I said, reasonably expedited, provided that Ukraine delivers what it is expected to deliver. Again, considering that Ukraine is in this process at the time of large scale war against Russia, my personal opinion is that we should prioritize very well what we require of Ukraine now.

Which conditions would you prioritize then?

Those pertaining to the rule of law, which in Ukraine’s case is very important. It was, as you know, one of the driving forces of the 2013-14 Revolution of Dignity. In addition to the strengthening of the rule of law, emphasis should be put on the economy. We want the Ukrainian state to stay resilient and functional. This means that everything that is related to the resilience of the Ukrainian economy and progress in the rule of law is important. But not every reform has to be treated in this very same way. For example, when it comes to such issues as minorities, I think these conditions should be delivered throughout the negotiating process. However, in the EU we have a member state that wants Ukraine to do more than what the Venice Commission at times requires of it in terms of national minorities.

From what I understand Ukraine has already done more than the Venice Commission expects it to do.

On national minorities, that is certainly the assessment too and in its report from June 2024 the European Commission gave the green light to start accession negotiations and shared its view that Ukraine had met all conditions. Summing up, Ukraine, like every other candidate country, needs to meet a number of conditions in order to continue advancing on the accession path. Now it is time for proper screenings and bilateral negotiations. Lastly, I think that we need to strengthen Ukraine militarily to levels we have not done yet. We need to do this to help Ukraine survive.

How can we do that? 

Before I answer this question, let me stress again that reforms require a lot of work as well as a functional civil service system. Ukraine needs thousands of civil servants, who will implement the acquis communautaire in the country. Yet now, at the time of war, we can see that Ukraine has a problem in this regard; some of its civil servants are at the front lines, while others have fled the country. That is why I am saying we need to prioritize and why I also think that in the short term the most immediate action is to provide the maximum military support. Without it, everything else will inevitably suffer.

Can the EU, as a community, provide military support?

In the first stage of the war we did, thanks to the leadership of High Representative Joseph Borrell and other politicians. We provided this support through the European Peace Facility, which was an intergovernmental fund to be used by member states to carry out some military assistance activities with third countries. Keep in mind that this facility is not a part of the EU budget and that is why it’s not subject to the Commission competence or Parliament’s authorization. It’s an intergovernmental fund. Borrell and other politicians were instrumental in using resources from that fund to help support Ukraine, though indirectly. For example, when member states provided weapons to Ukraine and asked the EU for reimbursements, we used resources from that fund. However, we can no longer use this facility because for a year now Hungary has been blocking us from doing that. This means that most of the European aid is provided to Ukraine based on bilateral agreements or through initiatives of coalitions between states. Thus, we can say that these are European initiatives, not EU initiatives. As the EU can no longer assist Ukraine through the European Peace Facility, we are now looking for a “Plan B” that would help us overcome the challenge that has been posed by the Hungarian veto.

What about the use of Russian assets?

Since May 2024, when the Council decided to allocate the extraordinary revenues (the so-called windfall profits) from these assets to the European Peace Facility, they have been used for military support, including ammunition, and to overall Ukrainian defence. The second tranche (first one, of 1.5 billion euros, delivered in the summer, mostly for financing military support) will be applied next year and thereafter, if we finalize the agreement on the G7 loan, will help Ukraine manage its budgetary needs. In a nutshell, while in February 2022 the EU had no resources officially planned for military support to Ukraine, it not only started acting to help Ukraine by imposing sanctions on the Russian Federation, but also activating the European Peace Facility, which was a very important message that the EU wants Ukraine to win and it’s going to find the financial resources necessary for that. Overall, the European Commission has proposed up to 35 billion euros to help Ukraine in 2025 and beyond, through that loan backed by the windfall profits from Russian Central Bank’s immobilized assets. According to official figures, together the EU member states and the EU as a whole have provided around 44 billion euros of military support since February 2022. That is very substantial, but not yet sufficient. We still need to do more. I don’t think that what we have been delivering is 0.25 per cent of the EU’s GDP. If we could do that, we will be providing 40 billion euros of support militarily per year and not in three years. At the moment we deliver less than half of that per year. So it looks like we are helping Ukraine a lot, but we are not investing in its military and defence as much as Russia does in its own. From the estimates I have been reading I gather that next year Russia is planning to spend over 100 billion euros on its military. That is why the resources we provide are not enough for the sort of war that Ukraine is fighting against Russia. They have been decisive in helping Ukraine withstand, but it’s not enough to help Ukraine prevail and what we actually need is to help Ukraine prevail.

Back to the integration and enlargement timeline. The President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen said that the next enlargement should happen in 2030. How realistic is this goal in your view? Ukraine is not alone in the integration process. There is, of course, Moldova, Georgia as well as some Western Balkan states that are still waiting at Europe’s door.

Georgia, I think we can say openly, has been backsliding. Let’s see what happens after the elections, but in general we do not want to have forever candidates, like Turkey. That’s a worry. When it comes to the actual date of enlargement (new members in), I can see that perhaps it will not take place in this Commission’s cycle, I mean the Commission that is starting now, but maybe this Commission cycle that is starting now will pave the way for enlargement. However, let us remember that member states have their national interests and they play a role too. Like your country, Poland, has national interests and wants to preserve them, especially when there is a prospect of new countries joining the EU. The same can be said about Bulgaria that has blocked North Macedonia’s path. We will see more of that.

Overall, while I feel that the period we are entering now will bring us opportunities, I also fear that there might be some disappointments, mainly due to the new constellations that are forming throughout Europe and in front of our eyes. Think of the migration issue and the political forces that are exploiting it.

It is thus possible that there will be one or two steps forward, and then a step backward. I think we will have to work on reconciling different national interests, knowing that at a certain point we will have to do trade-offs. And let me make it clear: these trade-offs will be faced by both the member states and the countries that are joining the EU.

That is why we will need to try to pave the way for the enlargement to work, but also try to make enlargement workable. And that requires, maybe not a change of the treaty, but a different understanding of the rules. Sometimes we don’t change the rules, but we change our interpretation of them. For example, every country may veto the accession at any step of the process. Thus, to overcome this challenge, we need member states to put European interests above other interests. At times it works, but at times it doesn’t.

Unfortunately, we live in the times of populism, which Russia has been exploiting. I don’t excuse my country and those who are acting against Ukraine in Poland, but I also see that some things, like the farmers’ protests at the border, have been in a way enforced from the outside. I won’t say that they have been implanted by Russia, they are probably homegrown, but I would still argue that the current anti-Ukrainian narrative which is gaining popularity in Poland and which also existed at the time of the protests is not only the work of the Polish people.

Well that’s why things might get complicated and there may be no enlargement with the next Commission. But what I think the next Commission can do is help keep enlargement on the agenda and help enlargement advance, with every step of the process. This will require great leadership skills also from the member states and a will to work towards a consensus and make it happen.

We don’t talk enough about the benefits of the enlargement. I don’t think we should think that Ukraine is a cost. I think we should keep in mind that Ukraine has now one of the most powerful armies in Europe and its society has a lot of stamina, despite the huge losses it has encountered. As such it can contribute to Europe. I hope we will work to shift this narrative from one that focuses on the cost of the enlargement to one that also emphasizes the opportunities it can bring. However, as you said there are these forces that will emphasize the opposite…

Since these forces are probably pushed or sponsored by Russia, what is the current EU policy towards Russia?

Our main policy towards Russia first and foremost means no high-level bilateral contacts. This will be continued, unless Russia stops the aggression in Ukraine and pays reparations. These are our red lines. Our policy towards Russia thus derives from our assessment of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. It also calls for diversification from Russian gas and energy sources, which a couple of member states, Hungary and Slovakia, have deviated from. But overall, we have made great progress in that regard. Most of the oil exports are no longer in place. The situation with the natural gas may not be the same yet, but imports have decreased dramatically.

What we don’t have yet in place is a future Russia policy. Before the full-scale invasion, we had some principles, we wanted to work with Russian civil society. We still have these principles and plans to work with Russian civil society, but also at this moment the fundamentals of our policy towards Russia are based on our policy towards Ukraine. This means support towards Ukraine and its defence against Russian aggression. Unfortunately, a few member states don’t want to pursue such a policy and want to go back to business as usual. We are seeing it especially in the activities of the Hungarian government. Perhaps at some point other member states will also get keen on that, but the question is what’s our vision for the long term? This is where we don’t have a discussion yet in the EU. At this moment this discussion may still be premature. In my view, when there is a war against Ukraine, our policy towards Russia needs to be based on maximum pressure on the Kremlin, sanctions and the weakening of Russia’s military industry.

Is peace going to return to the European continent?

I don’t think that peace in Europe is possible with Putin and his regime. I think at best we will have what I call a cold peace. Or a “cold war” but written with small letters, not capital letters. And even that will depend on what we will do and what Russia will do. At the moment, peace is not something that Russia wants. Russia now wants conflict. I would not say that the Kremlin wants to have an open total war in Europe. But it definitely wants to undermine our systems, political and economic.

In this way, Russia is already at war with us. It is a hybrid war, which is waged against our systems, populations, political parties and so on. This does not mean that we will go to war with Russia, but we have to understand that in the Kremlin’s view Russia is at war against us.

So no peace in Europe with Putin in power, yes? 

Yes. I don’t think we can have a real peace with Putin in power. At best we can have some kind of a cold war and tensions. As well as more sabotage and violence.

Why do you think that?

 In my view, the survival of the regime is contingent on the war in Ukraine and that is why the Kremlin won’t let go. That is why it is very important to support Ukraine to our maximum capacity. We Europeans need to invest massively in the military industry, rearm ourselves and invest in deterrence. Only this will work with Russia. Weakness is something that Russia exploits. It will use it to undermine us, to attack our societies, our politicians. That is why, I don’t think that real peace is possible with Putin in power.

Francisco de Borja Lasheras currently works on Ukraine at the Cabinet of the EU High Representative Josep Borrell. He was special advisor for Ukraine at the European External Action Service and also a non-resident senior fellow with the Transatlantic Defense and Security programme at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).

Iwona Reichardt is the deputy editor in chief of New Eastern Europe and a member of the board of the Jan Nowak-Jeziorański College of Eastern Europe in Wrocław.

Europe, European integration, European Union, Russia, Ukraine, War