In the Western Balkans, Brussels must side with North Macedonia in its dispute with Bulgaria

The President of the European Council Charles Michel receiving North Macedonian Prime Minister Hristijan Mickoski Photo: Alexandros Michalidis / Shutterstock

North Macedonia’s path to EU membership has become a Sisyphean task. Each time my country makes progress, it is dragged backwards again by historical baggage. This leads to a situation where our European dream risks becoming a geopolitical nightmare for the European Union, as alternatives like BRICS begin to fill the vacuum. The EU must act decisively or face an unravelling influence at the heart of the Balkans.

North Macedonia was the first of the Western Balkan countries to apply for EU membership in 2004. Two decades later, with the separation of Albania and North Macedonia in the EU integration process, the country lags behind three other countries in the region: Serbia, Montenegro and now Albania. Although the European integration process usually means reforms, in the case of North Macedonia, the bilateral problems with its neighbours, first with Greece and now with Bulgaria, took precedence, prolonging the process for decades.

Some polls indicate that pro-EU sentiment in North Macedonia has dropped significantly, from nearly 70 per cent in 2019 to 56 in 2023. This follows the country’s constitutional name change from the Republic of Macedonia to the Republic of North Macedonia, ending a decade-long dispute with Greece, as a prerequisite for Euro-Atlantic integration.

While NATO membership proceeded swiftly, the promised EU accession was once again stalled. France blocked the opening of accession talks in 2019, citing the need for internal EU reforms before admitting new members. Once France lifted its objections, Bulgaria imposed a veto, tying North Macedonia’s EU progress to disputes over language and historical identity, which became formalized in the negotiation framework under the French proposal.

In the meantime, North Macedonia got a new nationalist government. This followed a landslide victory reflecting dissatisfaction among voters with the previous approach to the French agreement and negotiations with the EU and Bulgaria. The new government now calls for a delayed effect regarding any constitutional changes after joining the EU. This is due to a lack of guarantees from Sofia that further demands will not arise during the process.

Тhe constitutional changes were the main topic of discussion during a recent meeting between European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and North Macedonia’s Prime Minister Hristijan Mickoski. However, it remains unclear whether Brussels supports the idea of delayed constitutional amendments, as proposed by the Macedonian government.

In fact, the French proposal, currently in force, effectively makes North Macedonia’s EU accession process depend on Bulgaria’s approval, allowing for the possibility for future vetoes and nationalism from the Bulgarian side. It has explicitly embedded the bilateral issues concerning identity, history and minority rights, without reciprocity, into the formal EU negotiation framework. That has not happened in any other country before. Even if the country makes the necessary constitutional changes, there are no guarantees other vetoes will not arise. This is especially true given the fact that both countries have completely different views on the identity questions.

If the EU wants the region to move forward, the formal accession process and reforms in the country must not be tied to resolving the dispute with Bulgaria. Changes in the framework; guarantees; or delayed implementation of the constitutional changes are all options to be discussed by Brussels, Skopje and Sofia. Bilateral disputes, as they stand now, should not derail the process or impact the broader accession agenda.

If the EU wants to keep the discussion on the table, it must put more pressure on both sides. However, repeating the usual rhetoric, be it directly from Brussels or through official visits in Skopje and Sofia, might not be enough. Positive reinforcement and incentives for funding projects of common interest in the region would be more successful.

As a last resort, if the current government in North Macedonia and the new government in Bulgaria remain firm on their positions on the dispute, the EU will need to assess how significant this dispute is, as it could lead to a loss of influence in a key part of the region.

If the EU sides with Bulgarian demands, the message to North Macedonia will be clear: we are not welcome in the EU for the foreseeable future. However, if the EU prioritizes enlargement and internal reforms over bilateral disputes, there could be alternative mechanisms to apply pressure on Bulgaria too. This would ensure that the broader goal of regional stability and integration is not overshadowed by narrow disagreements.

The blocking of North Macedonia’s EU integration for the current reasons related to the country’s history, language and identity could go on forever. This outcome is clearly not in the EU’s interest. It would create a vacuum for other geopolitical actors, such as Russia and China, or even a shift toward alliances not common for the region like BRICS. The EU has several options that could shape the process. Its leadership might subsequently determine the European future of the region.

Bojan Lazarevski is a political scientist in international and intercultural studies based in North Macedonia. Bojan is also a writing fellow with Young Voices Europe and an activist and researcher.

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Bulgaria, EU enlargement, North Macedonia, Western Balkans