The myth of the Serbian-Russian friendship

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Serbian emancipation in the 19th century transformed a poor, underpopulated agricultural land into a modern nation by European standards. Historian Leopold von Ranke praised this transformation in his 1829 book, Die Serbische Revolution, which celebrated Serbia’s revolt against Ottoman rule. The country attracted numerous foreigners from more prosperous European nations, who contributed to its modernization across various sectors, including music, architecture, the military and academia. Throughout the 19th century, Serbia, initially autonomous within the Ottoman Empire and gaining independence in 1878, exemplified the process of a former Ottoman province successfully completing a European-style modernization. There was no feudalism, boyars or high culture that excluded common language speakers, and Russian influence in the country was relatively modest during that time.

Soviet distrust

In the 19th century, the Russian tsars favoured Bulgaria over Serbia due to its proximity to their objective of taking Constantinople. At the same time, Serbia was aligned with the Habsburg sphere of influence. The Habsburg empire, along with other European powers, thwarted the Russian-backed Treaty of San Stefano in 1878, preventing the formation of an expanded Bulgaria that would have included much of present-day south Serbia.

By the late 19th century, Russian influence in Serbia grew with the rise of the Radical Party led by Nikola Pašić, a prominent Russophile and influential statesman. Despite the May coup in 1903 and the subsequent dynastic change, Russia was not Serbia’s sole ally. St Petersburg shared this role with France. Following the October Revolution, French influence became the most significant until the late 1930s.

During the interwar period, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was a firm opponent of the Soviet Union, with formal diplomatic relations established only in 1940. However, the attitude towards the Russian White emigration that settled in significant numbers in Belgrade and other towns was markedly positive, contrasting with sentiments toward the Soviets.

By the end of the Second World War, the Yugoslav partisans had become one of the most effective anti-Axis resistance movements, liberating the entirety of Yugoslavia by May 1945 alongside the British and Red armies. Unlike other socialist states, socialist Yugoslavia experienced the departure of the Red Army from its territory in Spring 1945. Joseph Broz Tito, leader of the Yugoslav communists, had gained Stalin’s trust due to the rapid Sovietization of the state. However, in 1948, a major schism occurred with the “Tito-Stalin split”. Stalin imposed an economic blockade on Yugoslavia and deployed Soviet troops to the borders of Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria with Yugoslavia. This led to the purge of Yugoslav communists suspected of being pro-Soviet. The break in relations with Stalin allowed Yugoslav socialism to develop independently of Soviet influence but also fostered a cautious attitude among the main Yugoslav communists toward the Soviet Union.

After Tito died in 1980, the power of communist leaders in the various Yugoslav republics grew, alongside a rise in ethno-nationalism. Slobodan Milošević emerged as the dominant figure among these leaders following the “Antibureaucratic Revolution”, a series of coups in Vojvodina, Kosovo and Montenegro. A key difference between Milošević and other ethno-nationalist politicians in the region was his faith in the Soviet Union and later Russia. Interestingly, Boris Yeltsin, Russia’s first president, was distrustful of Milošević. During the Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s, Russia supported international sanctions against the Milošević regime. In 1992, Moscow endorsed UN Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions and establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague.

In the 1999 Kosovo War, Russia did not assist Milošević’s Yugoslavia though it did express discontent over NATO’s bombing of Serbia. Seeking to establish a foothold in the region, Russia deployed peacekeeping forces to Kosovo after the Kumanovo Agreement in June 1999, doing so without consulting the international community. However, the contingent did not effectively participate in the peacekeeping mission. Still, the 1999 NATO bombing of Serbia became the main argument backing up the thoughts and feelings of anti-western circles, who claimed that the only trusted partner could be found in the Orthodox East.

Following the democratic changes in Serbia and the October Revolution of 2000, which ended Milošević’s rule, Yugoslavia entered a new democratic chapter for the first time since the Axis occupation in 1941. In 2003 it transformed into the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro.

Construction of the myth

The democratic reforms in Serbia were short-lived. Elements of the ancien régime and former allies of Milošević orchestrated the assassination of the reformist Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić. His main political rival, Vojislav Koštunica, who served as president of Yugoslavia from 2000 to 2003, is believed to have protected the conspirators after becoming prime minister in early 2004. Koštunica and his associates gradually reintroduced a key narrative from Milošević’s propaganda: the betrayal of Serbia by former western allies, primarily the US and the UK. This shift was accompanied by a rise in clericalism, historical revisionism and the development of a new myth of eternal friendship with Russia, the largest Orthodox nation.

This narrative was pivotal in allowing the political elite to evade responsibility for the dissolution of Yugoslavia, lost wars and the country’s impoverishment. To sustain this narrative, having a powerful foreign ally like Putin’s Russia became essential for Serbian nationalism. Serbia experienced turbulent times, with Montenegro proclaiming independence in 2006, followed by Kosovo in 2008. At the same time, for Russia, the eastern enlargement of NATO (1999-2004) and the European Union (2004-07) posed threats to its desired influence over former Soviet republics and satellite states. Concurrently, Balkan countries were orienting themselves towards the West by submitting EU and NATO applications, and the Thessaloniki Summit of 2003 confirmed the EU’s commitment to including Western Balkan nations.

Simultaneously, Serbia sought a significant ally to support its non-recognition of Kosovo in the international arena, a role that Russia was eager to fulfil, especially amid rising competition with the US and its European allies. However, Russian backing of Serbian policies in the UN Security Council, particularly concerning Kosovo’s status, came at a price.

In 2008, Serbia’s petroleum industry was sold to the Russian company Gazprom for a fraction of its market value. This transaction was dubbed the “deal of the century” and was supported by Koštunica and other leading politicians, reflecting a political consensus that viewed it as a beneficial move. Boris Tadić, Serbia’s president from 2004 to 2012, expressed confidence in this approach during his 2004 inauguration speech, stating, “Today, our foreign policy priorities are European integration, good neighbourliness and balanced relations with the three centripetal points of world politics: Brussels, Washington and Moscow.” After visiting Beijing in August 2009, he further defined Serbia’s foreign policy within the framework of “four pillars”.

After Boris Tadić replaced Koštunica as Serbia’s leading political figure in 2008, Russian influence continued to grow despite Tadić’s apparent position as a pro-European statesman. Notably, he was one of the few European leaders who did not condemn Russia’s war in Georgia that same year. While Tadić promoted messages of reconciliation in the former Yugoslav region, his policies aligned with ethno-nationalism, subtly supporting Serbian nationalistic politicians and parties, particularly among Serbian minorities in the region. His approach, especially regarding Kosovo, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Republika Srpska), set the stage for the post-2012 era, as the new Serbian political establishment would likely continue to support these same groups.

The political change of 2012 marked the rise of the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) led by Tomislav Nikolić and Aleksandar Vučić, former close associates of Vojislav Šešelj, who had been convicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) of crimes against the Croatian minority in Vojvodina during the Yugoslav Wars. This shift was facilitated by Ivica Dačić, leader of the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), who changed alliances to support the SNS. Dačić has consistently remained one of Russia’s most loyal allies in the region.

Friends forever or pragmatic partners?

The reformist potential and expectations concerning the SNS and SPS gradually diminished despite some positive developments regarding Kosovo and the signing of the Brussels Agreement, which aimed to normalize relations between Serbia and Kosovo under EU auspices. The first war in Ukraine in 2014 marked a period of increased Russian influence not only in Serbia but also in Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

As the EU struggled to present a unified stance in support of Ukraine, some member states began exploring potential rapprochement with Russia already in 2015, seeking to ease economic relations and discuss issues like travel, visas and energy policy. This provided a valuable message to the Serbian political elite, which recognized that expanding Russian influence could serve their interests. In 2014, both Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin visited Belgrade, offering “unconditional support” for Kosovo’s reintegration into Serbia.

Souvenirs and graffiti featuring Serbian and Russian symbols, as well as images of Putin, began appearing in 2014. Two years later, they had become symbols for “anti-imperialistic” nationalist movements and football hooligans. The peak of “Putinomania” occurred during the opening of the Sveti Sava Church in January 2019, where Putin and Vučić were the main guests. After the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, some compared Putin’s popularity in Serbia to that enjoyed by rock stars. This came as a surprise for many Russians who fled their homeland and settled in Belgrade to avoid conscription. Putin remains the most popular foreign politician, which explains why 80 per cent of citizens oppose the introduction of sanctions against Russia

In the years leading up to the COVID-19 pandemic, the myth of friendship between Russia and Serbia was effectively propagated in western media. Foreign journalists often relied on Serbian sources that crafted this narrative, rather than analysing the historical, political and economic ties independently. This myth was supported by the “special connections” among political leaders, church officials, sports clubs and influential figures closely linked to the state apparatus, such as film director Emir Kusturica and poet Matija Bećković. This environment contributed to what some analysts refer to as the “systematic forgetting” of historical facts, creating a narrative that portrayed Russia as Serbia’s most important foreign policy partner and key economic donor. This is despite the EU being the largest provider of financial assistance to Serbia. In 2018, to commemorate the 180th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Serbia and Russia, foreign ministers Ivica Dačić and Sergey Lavrov published a joint article in Rossiyskaya Gazeta and the Serbian Politika, highlighting years of “friendship, trust and cooperation” between the “two fraternal nations”. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia, along with China, employed “vaccine diplomacy” to foster sales of their medical equipment and vaccines. This was also done to fuel mistrust toward western-produced vaccines and medications.

In Serbian media, the Russian aggression against Ukraine in February 2022 was largely portrayed as NATO-provoked, with widespread arguments asserting that Russia was defending Russian-speaking citizens. According to the report by the Center for Research, Transparency and Accountability (CRTA), a Serbian human rights organization, most media coverage tends to be pro-Russian and presents biased reporting. While most European nations condemned the brutality of the Russian invasion, Serbian intellectuals, church officials and celebrities signed petitions against sanctions on Russia. The petition demanded that Serbian officials not join the sanctions imposed by the West, despite Serbia’s obligations to align foreign policy with the EU’s one like other EU candidates from the region. Serbia was the only EU candidate state that did not fulfil this commitment.

Serbian World and its repercussions

The development of the Srpski svet (Serbian World) project, a smaller counterpart to the Russkiy mir (Russian World), exemplifies how Russian ideas have been adapted for local purposes. In 2021, Serbian Interior Minister Aleksandar Vulin, a veteran politician from the Milošević era, was put in charge of promoting this new concept. The Serbian World aims to create a “Ujedinjeni srpski svet” (United Serbian World), advocating for the unification of Serbs in the region to protect their identity, language, culture and history, with Belgrade as the central decision-making capital. As Vulin stated, the long-term goal is political unity among Serbs. However, proponents of this concept neglect to mention that integrating the Western Balkans with the EU would allow for borderless living for Serbs in the region.

The primary (mis)use of the friendship myth serves political agendas, reflecting a continuity of themes from Milošević’s propaganda, and finally constructed in Koštunica’s time. Serbian policymakers employ this narrative for two main purposes. First, they impose certain values through the school curriculum, promote special relations in culture and sports, and foster a clerical society that views the Orthodox churches in Belgrade and Moscow as the only “pure” institutions. This strategy promotes “traditional values and culture” aligned with Putin’s Russia while condemning the liberal West. Historical revisionism contributes significantly to a cult of ethnic self-victimization. Consequently, support for EU integration has declined among Serbian citizens. Opposition parties espousing Euroscepticism and nationalism have emerged, yet paradoxically, the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) remains the most solid European partner. This dynamic has strengthened the phenomenon of “stabilitocracy”, creating fertile ground for illiberal policies that disregard the rule of law and minority rights according to a majoritarian interpretation of democracy.

The second purpose of this narrative is to bolster nationalism in regional policies, which, while interconnected with the first, also targets citizens in neighbouring countries, particularly Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina. This has resulted in Belgrade’s increased influence through politicians dependent on Serbian support. The actions of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Montenegro have empowered pro-Serbian and pro-Russian “reformist” parties that have been part of the government since autumn 2020. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, support for Milorad Dodik, the political leader of the Republika Srpska entity (currently under US sanctions), contributes to the further destabilization of the country.

Perpetuating the myth

The Serbian-Russian friendship is a politically constructed myth that emerged during the Milošević era but gained prominence after changes in Russia and the strengthening of Putin’s position. For Russia, the EU’s “Big Bang” enlargement, along with new NATO members from eastern and southeastern parts of Europe, signalled an opportunity for action to secure the Russian sphere of influence. Serbia, with its anti-NATO and anti-western sentiments, caused mainly by the 1999 bombings and the activities of the Hague Tribunal, became a useful partner, opening a window for renewed influence in the region.

The myth was embraced by Boris Tadić and his circle, and later was further developed by Aleksandar Vučić. As a result, it has significantly fostered anti-EU sentiments among Serbian citizens while bolstering nationalism and Russian influence in the region. The prevailing reasoning in Serbia is that the West cannot be trusted and that strong ties with Russia are the only guarantee for preserving the country’s territorial integrity and avoiding the recognition of Kosovo on the international stage. The myth emphasizes strategic relations between Serbia and Russia in foreign policy and economy. Interestingly, the data do not seem to confirm this claim, as Russia is not even among Serbia’s top five largest trade partners. The 2023 reports demonstrate that EU-Serbia trade in goods accounted for 60 per cent of Serbian trade in total. Moreover, the EU is the largest donor in the Republic of Serbia.

Conversely, Russia views its relationship with Serbia as a means to reassert influence in the Balkans, counter NATO expansion, and project power within a geopolitically significant region. An example of this extended Russian influence is the 2016 attempted coup in Montenegro, where Russian military intelligence (GRU), with the assistance of Serbian partners and local pro-Serbian political leaders, sought to violently overthrow the government during parliamentary elections. The Montenegrin security services arrested 20 Serbian nationals suspected of plotting to impede the election of a pro-NATO government, just as Montenegro was set to join the Alliance the following year.

While many Serbian citizens perceive the friendship with Russia as beneficial, experts caution that gradual and indirect changes, primarily in the cultural and value spheres, are often overlooked. This myth narrows Serbian identity and fosters anti-modernization tendencies, rendering society less inclusive and undermining public trust in institutions and European neighbours.

In his speeches, Vučić advocates for a “four-pillar” foreign policy that seeks to balance relations between the West, Russia, China and also the Arab states. One of the examples of this multi-focus foreign policy is the recent revelations by the Financial Times. The newspaper reported on an 800-million-euro export of Serbian grenades to Ukraine (via EU member states). This news, confirmed by Vučić, did not provoke a strong reaction from Russia. Analysts note that Serbia’s ammunition exports to Ukraine are not driven by a genuine commitment to supporting Ukrainians against Russian aggression but are primarily motivated by economic and political self-interest aimed at alleviating western pressure. The revenue from these transactions, like other EU funds, is likely to reinforce the existing autocratic regime, which is modelled after Russia. Ultimately, while the narrative of eternal friendship resonates with Serbian society, the relationship is fundamentally pragmatic, driven by strategic interests rather than genuine friendship and loyalty.

Natasza Styczyńska is a political scientist and assistant professor at the Institute of European Studies at the Jagiellonian University in Kraków. Her academic interests include transformation processes and identity issues in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as party politics, nationalism, populism and Euroscepticism in the CEE region and the Balkans.

Russia, Russian war in Ukraine, Serbia, Western Balkans