Montenegro’s fight for EU membership amid Serbian revanchism

Milojko Spajić, Montenegrin Prime Minister (CC) commons.wikimedia.org

Earlier this year, I travelled to Montenegro, meeting with a wide array of political figures from Milo Đukanović, Europe’s longest-serving leader, to former Prime Minister Dritan Abazović. I also spoke with over ten per cent of the Montenegrin parliament, as well as journalists, scholars and western diplomats, including the US ambassador. While the views expressed in this article are my own, they are informed by these discussions. My key takeaway from this trip is that Montenegro stands at a crossroads, teetering between EU integration and a possible regression into Serbia’s orbit. Why should Montenegrins – and the West – care about these developments?

From Europe Now! to Europe Never?

There is no doubt that Montenegrins are eager to join the EU, with nearly eight out of ten citizens in favour of integration. In June 2022, capitalizing on this desire, a new political movement, Europe Now!, was founded by the former finance and economy ministers Milojko “Mickey” Spajić and Jakov Milatović. Their goal was straightforward: to catapult Montenegro into the EU with urgency, as the exclamation mark in their party’s name suggests. However, as time has passed, it seems Europe Now! might be more of an obstacle to Montenegro’s EU path than a champion of it. Earlier this year, the EU gave Montenegro a favourable Interim Benchmark Assessment Report (IBAR), typically a sign of significant progress in governance, the rule of law, human rights and economic reform. Yet, some Montenegrin analysts contend that this positive assessment was driven more by the EU’s desire to show momentum in its enlargement process than by actual reform achievements in Montenegro.

Regardless of the IBAR’s merits, the larger issue is whether Montenegro’s government can now deliver the reforms necessary to qualify for EU membership. The EU will not simply hand over membership as a symbolic gesture. Montenegro needs to prove its worth. At the same time, most Montenegrin parliamentarians I spoke to doubt that the country will join the EU soon, despite their eagerness to be part of the supranational structure. Their scepticism in part stems from the current government’s actions.

Europe Now! initially surged in popularity, winning both the 2023 presidential and parliamentary elections, with Milatović becoming president and Spajić taking on the role as prime minister. Less than a year later, however, Milatović left the party after clashing with Spajić. Losing one of its central figures, Europe Now! has since struggled to maintain its momentum. This was evident in municipal elections across Montenegro, from Budva to Podgorica. Meanwhile, Spajić’s behaviour has only fuelled internal discord; some parliamentarians confided in me that Spajić dismissively refers to his Europe Now! colleagues in parliament as “my idiots”.

Spajić’s nickname, “Mickey”, has taken on a more pejorative twist: some critics refer to him as “Mickey Mouse” behind his back, a jab at his erratic actions, policies and penchant for absurd ideas. During the summer, Spajić reshuffled his cabinet, thereby creating a government that now suffers from a case of elephantiasis. His new cabinet includes seven deputy prime ministers, 25 ministries, and a minister without portfolio. His opponents have accused him of inflating the government in a bid to appease disparate factions. For a country of just over 600,000 people, the bloated government has turned into a source of public mockery, with social media memes showing ministers playing musical chairs, struggling to find seats in government meetings.

Not long after the reshuffle, Spajić conspicuously cancelled his attendance at a critical defence and security council meeting allegedly due to prior commitments. It emerged later that he was vacationing in France, accompanied by a motley crew, including a Pilates instructor, an influencer, a DJ, a model and a cryptocurrency trader. The presence of the crypto trader seemed more than a coincidence. Spajić, it appears, just cannot seem to stray far from the world of digital currencies.

The prime minister has flirted with the idea of turning Montenegro into a crypto utopia, envisioning a nation awash in Bitcoin mining and digital currency. “We do not have our own national currency,” he  lamented in a 2023 HBO documentary. “We use the euro, but we cannot print it. That’s not fair. That’s not cool.” But his crypto dreams carry serious risks. Critics warn that crime syndicates could exploit Montenegro’s crypto-friendly policies to launder money. And there is the environmental toll – crypto mining is notorious for guzzling electricity and water. In 2021, the average Bitcoin transaction consumed 16,000 litres of water, enough to fill a swimming pool.

The crypto dream also has a shadowy past. Spajić has repeatedly downplayed his links to South Korean crypto mogul Do Kwon, founder of Terraform Labs, who is currently facing legal action for financial misconduct. However, according to US court documents, Spajić invested 75,000 US dollars in Terraform Labs before it was officially registered in Singapore in 2018. The company’s eventual collapse wiped out $40 billion from the market, leaving chaos in its wake.

Meanwhile, the economic policies of Europe Now! have been met with mixed results. The party has promoted salary increases, which were achieved in part by reducing pension contributions and eliminating healthcare contributions – the latter alone made up four per cent of Montenegro’s GDP. The timing of the latest round of salary hikes, just before the recent Podgorica elections, seemed strategically aimed at bolstering the party’s support. Nonetheless, this financial manoeuvre has raised alarms about its sustainability, with critics warning that future pensions for many Montenegrins are likely to shrink and quality healthcare will become increasingly inaccessible.

The larger concern with Spajić, however, is not just his penchant for reckless policy – it is that he has cozied up to dangerous allies. He has formed political partnerships with political figures who openly support both Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić and Vladimir Putin. These alliances raise troubling questions about where Spajić’s loyalties truly lie, and whether Europe Now! is taking Montenegro closer to Europe or steering it dangerously off course. For a country that once dreamed of Europe Now!, the bitter reality may soon be “Europe Never?”

Serbia’s revanchist regime

When asked about the biggest external threat to Montenegro’s sovereignty and the EU’s integration path, Montenegrins often declare that Russia is the number one threat – not necessarily because they believe it, but because they know it is what westerners expect to hear. Russia’s geopolitical machinations are familiar territory for audiences from Washington to Brussels, where Putin serves as the default bogeyman. The reality on the ground in Montenegro, however, tells a more nuanced story.

When pressed, Montenegrins will ultimately admit that Serbia poses the bigger threat to their country’s future. This is not borne out of some ingrained anti-Serb sentiment – indeed, the historical ties between Montenegro and Serbia run deep. Rather, the issue lies with the Vučić regime itself, and its relentless pursuit of a revanchist agenda. Yet, in both Washington DC and Brussels, policymakers have tended to adopt a Belgrade-centric lens when viewing the Balkans, casting Vučić as a force for regional stability rather than the destabilizing actor he truly is. The Belgrade-centric approach also partly explains why Montenegrins are reluctant to call a spade a spade.

While the Kremlin undoubtedly holds sway in Montenegro, with Russian elites owning about a third of the country’s registered yachts and nearly 40 per cent of its real estate, Serbia wields far more influence. Serbia ranks as Montenegro’s top import and export partner, a position Russia does not hold. Moreover, though Moscow and Belgrade often pursue complementary goals in the Balkans, western analysts frequently mischaracterize the Vučić regime.

Vučić is often portrayed as “Putin’s puppet”, but this overlooks his own agency and unique foreign policy objectives in the Balkans. The Vučić regime wields a more immediate and potent influence over Montenegro, thanks to its deep-rooted connections to Montenegrin politicians, the media, and the Serbian Orthodox Church. Serbia’s reach into Montenegrin society, both overt and covert, far surpasses what Moscow can achieve from afar.

The real threat Vučić poses to Montenegro and the region lies in his regime’s promotion of Srpski svet (Serbian World), an ideology akin to Putin’s “Russian World”. Srpski svet envisions all ethnic Serbs – whether they reside in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo or Montenegro – united under one political roof. It is a direct descendant of the Greater Serbia ideology that fuelled violence in the 1990s, a dangerous form of nationalism that fosters division, exclusion and hatred.

Advocates of Sprski svet also promote “othering” among Montenegrins – where subnational identities are manipulated to create divisions among groups that once coexisted. In Montenegro, this tactic has intensified ethnic distinctions, straining the country’s social fabric. Montenegro is a mosaic of identities, including Montenegrins, Serbs, Albanians, and Bosniaks. Yet, many Montenegrins lead with their ethnic identity rather than a national one, saying, “I’m Serb” or “I’m Albanian”. This contrasts with the civic model seen in countries like the United States, where ethnic heritage is often secondary.

Othering has intensified this polarisation, especially between Montenegrin Serbs and ethnic Montenegrins. Srpski svet propagandists fuel this process with two somewhat contradictory claims: one, that there is no real difference between Serbs and Montenegrins; and two, that Montenegrin Serbs are victims of systemic discrimination. Both ideas ultimately serve the same purpose: to justify the creation of Srpski svet.

Montenegrin opposition leaders fear that Vučić will do everything in his power to prevent Montenegro from joining the EU, especially if it happens before Serbia secures its own membership. Arguably, Vučić officially aspires for EU membership, but only if it can be achieved without political conditions that would curb his power. Moreover, Montenegro’s accession would undermine Serbia’s influence in the region and shatter Vučić’s Srpski svet ambitions. The benefits of EU membership would significantly reduce Serbia’s leverage over Montenegrin institutions, particularly in the realms of politics and organized crime.

A Montenegro inside the EU would also contest the Serbian media’s portrayal of the country as a “failed” or “criminal” state. Should Montenegro become an EU member, this narrative would become harder to sustain, and Serbian citizens, who have grown disillusioned with EU accession, might be spurred to reignite their own demands for integration. For Vučić, this could pose a threat to his autocratic grip on power. At present, only four out of ten Serbians favour joining the EU, but Montenegro’s success could rekindle hope and pressure Vučić to shift course.

A dual allegiance?

According to various opposition members, Spajić has increasingly become beholden to right-wing, pro-Serb actors with close ties to the Vučić and Putin regimes – most notably Andrija Mandić (the president of Montenegro’s parliament) and Milan Knežević. Both men have a troubling past. In 2016, shortly before Montenegro joined NATO, Russia attempted to derail the process by allegedly sponsoring a coup attempt involving a network of Russians and Serbs. Mandić and Knežević were accused of being central figures in the plot. While initially convicted for their involvement, a recent ruling by Montenegro’s higher court controversially overturned their convictions.

Although Mandić and Knežević are careful to publicly oppose EU integration, their actions tell a different story. A clear example of this came in response to Serbia’s objection to Montenegro’s endorsement of a UN resolution condemning the Srebrenica genocide. In a bid to appease Vučić, who vehemently opposed the initiative, Mandić and Knežević helped push through a parliamentary resolution focusing on the Croatian concentration camp at Jasenovac during the Second World War, describing it as genocidal. This manoeuvre was seen by many opposition members as not just an attempt to curry favour with Vučić, but as a direct attack on Montenegro’s relationship with Croatia, a key player in its EU accession path.

This balancing act between appeasing pro-Serb actors and moving toward EU membership risks keeping Montenegro in limbo, vulnerable to manipulation. Keeping Montenegro out of the EU would present Serbia with a strategic opening, one that could, in time, revive the old dream of uniting Serbian and Montenegrin territory under a single banner.

A military invasion by Serbia seems far-fetched in a world where Montenegro is a NATO member. Yet, the spectre of a future referendum, one that reconsiders NATO membership or floats the possibility of a new federation, remains a threat. Pro-Serb parties are already promoting the idea that Montenegrins, including those living in Serbia, should be granted dual citizenship. Some Montenegrins worry that, for a nation as small as Montenegro, with barely 600,000 people, such a shift could tip the political scales dramatically. Dual citizenship could, in effect, bolster the voting power of pro-Serb elements, setting the stage for elections or referenda that could compromise Montenegro’s sovereignty and further entrench Serbia’s influence over the country’s future.

Sources of influence

Among the avenues of Serbian influence in Montenegro, the Serbian Orthodox Church, and the media – especially television – stand out as the top platforms. The Serbian Orthodox Church plays a powerful role across the Balkans, operating in Montenegro similarly to how the Russian Orthodox Church once operated in Ukraine. Religious guidance aside, the Serbian Orthodox Church actively pursues political agendas aligned with Belgrade, as was the case with the recent UN Resolution on the Srebrenica Genocide. During the Yugoslav wars, it endorsed nationalist causes, and today, it actively supports the Srpski svet agenda, mobilising against pro-Western political forces and aligning with Serbian and Russian narratives.

Pro-Serb media narratives also dominate the Montenegrin landscape with three of the four broadcasters with national frequencies controlled by Serbian media groups. These outlets, though privately owned, are heavily influenced by Vučić’s regime and promote narratives that align with Belgrade’s strategic interests. More than nine out of ten Montenegrins have access to cable television, making it easy for Serbian channels like TV Pink and TV Happy to reach a wide audience. These channels, known for their entertainment programming as well as their politically charged content, have gained significant popularity in Montenegro.

According to Montenegrin journalists, in recent years, media outlets from Serbia, such as TDI Radio and Radio S, have been increasingly acquiring private and independent radio stations across the region. Notably, they have purchased a significant number of stations in Montenegro, including Radio Montena and Radio Jadran, among others. This growing influence of Serbian-owned media in Montenegro has raised concerns about the consolidation of media ownership and its potential impact on the independence and diversity of local media voices.

In addition to promoting narratives to justify Srpski svet, these media outlets also frequently promote anti-EU and anti-NATO rhetoric, often amplified by Russian propaganda outlets like RT and Sputnik, which operate out of Serbia. Consequently, many Montenegrins’ perceptions of their country’s place in the world are shaped by these narratives. As the Nigerian novelist Chinua Achebe once said, “Until the lions have their own historians, the history of the hunt will always glorify the hunter.” For Montenegro, the risk is clear: the longer its media landscape is dominated by Serbian outlets, the more difficult it will be to foster a national identity distinct from Belgrade’s sphere of influence.

As Montenegro moves closer to EU membership, it is likely that anti-EU and anti-NATO rhetoric will only intensify, making it increasingly difficult for the country to stay on course.

Embracing diversity and the EU

Montenegrins frequently express a longing for decisive leadership, reminiscent of figures like Tito during the Yugoslav era. However, ultimately, what Montenegro needs is not necessarily a strong charismatic leader but a robust, united coalition of political parties whose primary goal is EU integration.

For the coalition, every decision, every reform, must be strategically aligned to push the country closer to Europe. This coalition should prioritize reforms that bolster democratic institutions, promote transparency, and counteract anti-EU narratives that have gained traction from Serbian and Russian influences. By presenting a united front, the coalition can not only enhance the legitimacy of its initiatives, but also foster greater public trust among Montenegrins, who are eager for a strong vision of their future.

Beyond the structural reforms needed for EU integration, such a coalition must also focus on its internal cohesion. The notion of “othering” certain groups within the country, particularly with regard to ethnic and political divisions, needs to be confronted. Instead of falling victim to divisive narratives, Montenegro could draw inspiration from the “Rainbow Nation” concept championed by Nelson Mandela and Archbishop Desmond Tutu in post-apartheid South Africa.

The essence of this concept lies in celebrating diversity, where the different identities within a nation are seen as its strength, much like a rainbow is composed of different colours that together form something beautiful. For Montenegro, embracing this idea could foster national unity and present a powerful counter-narrative to the divisive rhetoric promoted by the Vučić regime. It would also set a positive example for other Balkan nations struggling with similar issues of identity and sovereignty.

The critical role of EU and US support

Amidst all these challenges, EU and US support for Montenegro has never been more critical. Montenegro is at a pivotal crossroads. While it has made significant progress toward EU integration, the internal and external forces working to undermine its progress cannot be underestimated. If pro-Serb, pro-Russian factions are allowed to prevail, the country’s EU membership could be derailed, with far-reaching consequences not only for Montenegro, but for the entire Western Balkans.

The EU and US must make it clear that Montenegro’s future lies in the West and that tangible rewards await if the country remains on its current path. At the same time, the transatlantic community needs to deliver the right mix of political, economic and strategic support to keep the momentum going. This includes bolstering independent media in Montenegro, countering Serbian narratives, and encouraging judicial and political reforms that bring the country closer to EU membership.

There is an important precedent that Montenegro and its western allies should consider: the experiences of the Baltic states. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, though small in population like Montenegro, have faced similar challenges in dealing with Russian influence – especially in the realms of media and political manipulation. Yet, through concerted efforts, these countries have managed to create relatively resilient democratic institutions and robust media environments, despite the constant threat from their much larger neighbour to the East.

The Baltics offer a clear lesson for Montenegro: with the right combination of internal resolve and external support, small states can stand up to outside influence and thrive within the EU and NATO frameworks. For Montenegro, partnering with the Baltic states to explore their media reforms and strategies for countering foreign influence could be a critical step toward safeguarding its own path to EU membership. A key figure in this endeavour could be Kaja Kallas, the incoming EU foreign policy chief, known for her staunch stance against authoritarianism and external manipulation.

If Montenegro is allowed to slip back into Serbia’s orbit, it would represent a major geopolitical setback for both NATO and the EU. A reorientation toward Belgrade would not only halt Montenegro’s EU integration but would also raise the spectre of Montenegro exiting NATO. Such a development would leave a strategic vacuum along the Adriatic, one that Serbia and, by extension, Russia, would eagerly exploit.

For the EU, there is also a broader regional implication. Successfully integrating Montenegro into the EU would send a clear message to other Western Balkan countries that the path to membership remains real and achievable. This would offer a counter-narrative to the growing sense of Euroscepticism that is fuelled by pro-Russian and pro-Serb actors across the region.

Leon Hartwell is a visiting fellow at the European Leadership Network (ELN) in London, a senior associate at LSE IDEAS, London School of Economics (LSE), and a non-resident senior fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) in Washington DC.

EU integration, Montenegro, Serbia, Western Balkans