From defensive fact-checking to proactive promotion of quality media

Photo courtesy of Christophe Lecler

ADAM REICHARDT: We spent the last two days here in Kraków talking about disinformation, Russian disinformation and Russian interference in our societies. I would like to start by asking you about the EU High-Level Expert Group on Disinformation, in which you participated back in 2018, and what you think we have learned since then?

CHRISTOPHE LECLERCQ: I think we have very much improved the analysis of Russian disinformation and other sources of disinformation. We have improved the level of fact-checking and debunking, but we have not made a major impact in terms of the quality of the information space. One of the main reasons is that social media platforms dominate the readership and are sources of influence for most people. We stress the quality of media reporting, but actually its own influence is quite limited. There are ways to improve the situation, which were recommended by this high-level expert group on disinformation, but they have not been properly implemented.

As you mentioned, one of the key challenges is related to social media platforms, not only limiting the information that we see, but also spreading bad information. What more can be done? And what are some things you have been working on since?

There have been efforts by some platforms like Facebook to get rid of the worst social media accounts and some of the platforms which determine what you and I are seeing. It would be possible to influence those algorithms by using not only the current signals that favour “clickability” and the viral potential of posts, but also reflecting quality. These are called trust indicators. They were recommended in the Code of Practice in 2018 that later led to the Code of Conduct, both endorsed by social media platforms. Every yearly report by the European Commission on implementing these codes, however, has shown that it remains to be done. But it would be completely doable. The social media platforms are very good at optimizing the click rate and the advertising revenues they get from social media, but it’s not in their interest to reduce the virality of posts. Basically, fake news tends to be fun and attractive to the audience, therefore maximizing the advertising volume. The platforms could do it if they are pushed from two directions. First, this could come from the policy-makers, and there is now a good legislative framework at the EU level which could be implemented more strictly. And second, companies who do advertising could also push for their ads not to promote disinformation but to promote quality information so they could use these trust indicators also to attribute greater advertising rates and prices compared to other types of content, which means that the platforms could recoup some of the volume they would lose.

I think it’s a very interesting idea. I worry, however, with especially one of the main platforms where information is spread, X, formerly known as Twitter, they would be quite against this, also because Elon Musk, who’s been very outspoken, would claim this is an attack on “free speech”.

My summary of the report of this high-level expert group is to avoid censorship, dilute fake news and promote quality content. We have avoided censorship and this would actually not censor, it would just give less visibility to bad-quality information. As for X, it is not in line with EU regulation and it may well lose its ability to operate in Europe if it doesn’t improve. I guess we are in a very special phase, right with the US presidential election and in November maybe Elon Musk will see the light after that.

But quality information is also a huge challenge in the media environment in general, which is very competitive. We are inundated with information, a lot of which is free. Media outlets have to be quick, to break news (often without fact-checking) and get clicks. How can we improve quality in this environment?

I do not want to focus too much on these trust indicators, but they would also have a positive impact from that viewpoint because editors who choose quality versus the click rate will be encouraged by the numbers as they will get a higher rating. This is actually a reason why some publishers of tabloids were reluctant about trust indicators because they feared they would be ranked less than top quality newspapers, but they would still be much better rated than Russia Today or any kind of unknown sources. So it’s all in relative terms. Another element regarding quality is the importance of harnessing artificial intelligence under the control of editors. For me this is the next huge challenge for the media sector. We have been more or less absorbed by the internet. It has taken years and unfortunately we lost half of the journalists in Europe in this era. Now artificial intelligence is even more of a challenge and of course the media has to use artificial intelligence in order to improve its productivity and its customization, while leaving the parameters in the hands of journalists, of human beings, following a framework and values. To do that, we need to improve the resilience of the media sector. And I’m not thinking just of rule of law and protecting journalists but being able to pay them well. Therefore, the question is how to improve the business models of the media sector.

This topic of business models is very critical because I think media is going through some sort of transformation right now and we have to also pay attention to not allow quality journalism to be victim to the changing models. What are some, if you have any, suggestions on business models that would promote quality media in Europe? Can it be considered a way to fight against disinformation?

I would mention in the spirit of brevity just three things. First of all, the public sector has a role to play. It’s legitimate to have public broadcasters, for example. Secondly, new models can be explored, such as the philanthropy model. There is a general interest in some types of journalism, for example, solutions journalism which is about looking not only at the negatives of what’s happening in our societies.  Thirdly, we always think about business models and revenues. Let’s look at the cost side as well, because if we don’t, it’s the number of journalists that will be reduced. I believe that the media sector in Europe is far too fragmented compared to other service industries. There are too many players. It’s not sustainable and so I think we will have more consolidation.

Basically, there are three possible paths. The first, unfortunately, is to cease operations, which has already happened to many media outlets. The second option is to cooperate, sharing costs and accelerating innovation. This is the spirit behind programmes like Stars4Media, supported by the EU, which my think-do-tank, Europe’s Media Lab, has developed. The third way is to merge, which is why I integrated the policy-focused media outlet Euractiv into the Mediahuis group. I realized that investing the vast amounts required for artificial intelligence and innovation would be beyond my individual capacity. Typically, media concentration is opposed in the name of pluralism, and it’s true that if it occurs at a national level between similar outlets, it often results in one outlet disappearing, cutting the editorial staff in half. However, if it involves cross-border mergers – uniting outlets that are aligned in political orientation, target audience or technology – then it can be a very powerful strategy.

We’ve talked a lot about media and I think it’s very relevant in the context of fighting Russian disinformation, but let’s come back to the Russian disinformation topic and look at some of the other solutions that may be useful for us in Europe to become more resilient. What are some ideas that you have or have been working on?

I would regroup them into two categories. First of all, I’ve learned a lot at this conference organized in Kraków by the Jagiellonian University. And I would say the first category of solutions is in gathering evidence and sharing information, and maybe bundling together more of the various initiatives which exist. I tend to call the world of fact-checking and debunking a cottage industry, but it needs to grow to industrial strength, much like the platforms themselves. This is still what I would call the reactive approach, being on the defence, protecting from Russian disinformation. The other type of approach is perhaps more sensitive but one I think we need to adopt: proactively winning the information warfare battle while obviously not losing our values. There are red lines – it’s not about lying – but the same information can be presented in different ways. We should consider using micro-targeting, as the Russians do, to engage with our different Russian-speaking audiences, both the diaspora and inside the country. We may want to choose the topics carefully.

There are topics which are more in line with the traditional values of Russia and why not use them. We also have people with traditional values in the West who may be better spokespeople to the Russian audiences than extremely progressive audiences. So let’s try to build bridges with the Russians. I’m not talking about the Kremlin, because I would not hope for much change there, but I’m talking about the educated middle class in Moscow and St Petersburg, which is the key to any change in Russia. The diaspora left from those circles, and there are still millions of people in St Petersburg and Moscow, could support or even trigger change in Russia as it has done in the past. There have been revolutions in Russia, why not another one?

There is also exile media, Russian and Belarusian exile media, which has been trying to take this approach to reach the audiences inside the country. Is Europe doing enough to support them in helping them reach such audiences?

I think not. And the question is highly relevant. Legally, they are now EU media because most of them have been established within the EU. But of course, they should also be handled as addressing Russian-speaking audiences, not only domestically but also in Russia itself. So far, if I talk about the EU support programmes, they are too small and they are also divided between domestic EU programmes and foreign EU programmes. I’m in favour of streamlining this because there are great programmes like, for example, the journalism partnership, part of Creative Europe, which should be open to media with roots in Eastern Europe, so beyond the current membership of the EU. I hope this will be done as part of the new mandate with the new European Commission. We have lobbied for having a democracy commissioner in an op-ed published on Project Syndicate. And we are lucky because we will actually get two democracy commissioners, one also in charge of justice and the other one, importantly, in charge of digital sovereignty. One commissioner comes from Finland, therefore a frontline country, and I have great expectations for what she could be triggering in terms of opening such programmes. In addition, I think it would be important to have many more journalists in Brussels covering EU and NATO affairs, both for Eastern European countries, and I’ll define what they could be, and separately for Belarus and also for Russian exile media. Therefore we, Europe’s Media Lab, have developed this programme Maison du Médialab. It is aimed at tripling the number of Brussels correspondents from Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia and Georgia. Tripling sounds like a huge number, but actually it’s starting from a very small base. For example, Moldova has no correspondents in Brussels. It is amazing when you think of the importance of the EU and NATO for them, and Ukraine has only five which is much less than there was from Poland ten years before enlargement. So this is quite doable. Russian exile media should be treated differently, but equally supported. I think there are grounds for having a similar scheme for Russian exile media in Brussels so that they get closer to EU institutions, while still retaining their independence and their separate voice. They may well be patriotic, they may well have different views from Ukrainians, but at least they should report in a fact-based way on what’s going on in the EU and also in NATO.

Is there anything else that you wanted to cover before we finish?

I think it is important to consider not only the mainstream media, big broadcasters and general newspapers which have transformed themselves on the internet. There is also a big role to play for niche media, such as New Eastern Europe, Euractiv, Politico, many others, because they, in turn, inform the mainstream journalists. Very often, the topics which are covered on TV have been covered the day before by mainstream newspapers and a week before by specialized publications. So there is a role to play also for our type of policy media.

This interview took place during the conference titled “Shadows of Truth: Decoding Russia’s Disinformation Campaigns”, which was co-organized by LSE IDEAS CSEEP at the Jagiellonian University and New Eastern Europe.

Christophe Leclercq is a former management consultant and EU official. He is the founder of the EURACTIV media network and the Executive Chair of Europe’s MediaLab (Fondation EURACTIV). He was a member of the 2018 EU “High-Level Expert Group on disinformation”, and is now on the Advisory Council of EDMO (European Digital Media Observatory, managed by EUI in Florence).

Adam Reichardt is the editor in chief of New Eastern Europe and co-host of the Talk Eastern Europe podcast.

disinformation, journalism, media, Russia