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Ukraine’s victory plan: what is the Ukrainian vision of the end of the war

President Zelenskyy of Ukraine recently announced a “Victory Plan” concerning the country’s ongoing war with Russia. Stressing the need for allies to provide Kyiv with all the necessary tools, the plan outlines ambitions to end the conflict on favourable terms as early as next year.

November 18, 2024 - Anton Naychuk - Articles and Commentary

President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy receiving the President of Slovakia Zuzana Čaputová in Kyiv, May 2024. Photo: Presidential Administration of Ukraine / flickr.com

During the session of the Verkhovna Rada on October 16th, the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy presented his “Victory Plan”, which will become the main tool of Ukrainian diplomacy and complements the country’s overall approach to ending the war. This document should be considered as a consistent continuation of the “Peace Formula”, which was discussed in the framework of previous consultations and international summits. How will it work?

The formula provides a clear vision from Kyiv on the model of peace and specifies Ukraine’s intentions for each individual element of the political settlement – from guaranteeing economic and environmental security to restoring territorial integrity. The plan is a “road map” for how to achieve the goals of the formula, a list of solutions and resources that are needed to ensure the final result and win the war next year. Both documents are basic elements of a single strategy.

Their contents and the president’s speech in the parliament allow us to draw several important conclusions:

First of all, Ukrainian political and military leaders believe that there is the possibility to end the war in 2025, but only through the full implementation of the Victory Plan. Other options – which involve territorial compromises and weak security guarantees – have not been considered by Kyiv. The refusal of Ukraine’s allies to support the plan will not lead to a revision of the goals announced by the Ukrainian leadership but will bring the war into a long-term phase. The president recorded the refusal of Kyiv to look at mid-term decisions or the manifestation of a “flexible position” in strategic issues, which were actively discussed in advance by the international media.

Secondly, Ukraine does not rule out a political and diplomatic settlement but it does not see it as possible under the existing circumstances. The joint approach should be based on “inducing Russia to negotiate through force and coercion”, which is based on the Ukrainian position previously presented in the Peace Formula.

The victory plan consists of five fundamental provisions and three classified annexes, which have already been handed over to strategic partners in a confidential format. The first point is geopolitical. It provides for an urgent invitation of Ukraine to NATO, which should become an influential political signal all while establishing the trajectory of the war’s end and the subsequent security architecture of Eastern Europe. At the same time, Kyiv is sceptical of compromise formulas, such as partial integration into NATO or something similar.

The second point is safety. Ukraine calls on its allies to provide everything necessary for a Ukrainian victory and forcing Russia to make peace. In other words, Volodymyr Zelenskyy expects that for the sake of a faster and fairer end to the war, the US and other partners will abandon half-measures and approaches in the format of “controlled escalation or regulated volumes of military-technical support”. Instead, they will hopefully move on to much more decisive actions.

Among the practical elements of the public document and the president’s speech, the following crucial points should be highlighted:

The timely supplying of the Ukrainian armed forces. We are talking about the transfer of the necessary weapons that will allow Kyiv to inflict defeat on the Russian troops on the battlefield. According to various estimates, Ukraine is preparing a large-scale military reserve consisting of ten to 12 brigades, which can be effectively used in the 2025 campaign. However, they need proper armament.

Investments in the Ukrainian military industry. Conditions need to be created for the financial stimulation of arms production within Ukraine.

Continuing the operation in the Kursk region. The successes achieved in establishing control over Russian territories need to be supported by plans that do not support maintaining them indefinitely. Instead, they should be used to encourage the Russian regime to end the war.

Granting long-awaited permission to use long-range military objects across the operational and strategic depth of Russian territory. These should be able to be used in operations that are largely offensive in nature.

Developing an effective air defence system, with the provision of new systems and ammunition for them.

Strengthening coordination at the level of information exchange, primarily concerning satellite data. This would allow Ukraine to more effectively hit Russian military targets.

Making a decision regarding the impact of Russian missiles or drones over Ukrainian territory by NATO forces. In fact, Ukraine hopes that it will be possible to find a solution that would allow neighbouring countries to help defend themselves against uncontrolled Russian aerial targets by striking them within the defined limits of Ukrainian territory.

The third point involves deterring Russia. This envisages a significant strengthening of Ukraine’s non-lethal military capabilities and the transformation of the country into a powerful military outpost, which will prevent any risk of repeated escalation by Russia.

The basis for the implementation of the third point could be memorandums on cooperation, which were previously signed by the president of Ukraine in a bilateral format with other leaders of NATO countries. They include both military and technical support for Ukraine, as well as the financing of programmes for the development of the military industry on Ukrainian territory. This will provide the Ukrainian economy with opportunities to create a production infrastructure that will meet the needs of the armed forces.

The fourth point is economic. Ukraine has strategic reserves of fertilizers worth tens of trillions of dollars, which will be of fundamental importance to the economy of the future (lithium, titanium, uranium, etc.). Their joint use will provide an effective impetus for the recovery of Ukraine, as well as a resource base for economic growth in the US, the EU and their partners.

Ukraine is interested in reaching agreements on the reliable protection of assets of strategic importance. There is a subjective feeling that the involvement of certain countries in Ukraine’s reconstruction programmes will depend on the level of their integration into the implementation of the Victory Plan.

The fifth point is security after the war. The president of Ukraine emphasizes that after victory, Ukraine will have a strong and experienced army that has undergone real combat operations. As part of coordination with partners, the Ukrainian side is ready to offer the deployment of its own forces on the territories of other NATO countries, including to replace the American military. It is worth remembering that the plan has three secret appendices to the second, third and fourth points, which contain clear details of those weapons and practical military solutions that Kyiv will discuss with its partners.

Thus, Volodymyr Zelenskyy has presented a clear strategic framework concerning how Ukraine sees victory and how it can be achieved. Other options are still off the table. In Kyiv, they are not ready to give up their previous goals and will not surrender to Russia.

After the presidential elections in the US, Ukrainian diplomacy will make more efforts to persuade the incoming Trump administration that supporting of Ukraine is not a burden, but an opportunity. In the case of the US and a Trump administration – to assist it in pursuing American global interests and to counter the anti-western coalition which includes the Russian Federation, Iran and North Korea.

In the case of the EU – this would mean building a new effective security shield and modernizing military capacities to become more influential and capable to secure itself from real threats.

Anton Naychuk is the director of the East European Council, a think tank and public diplomacy club established to research and discuss current political, economic and social processes in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.


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