Georgia’s dream of autocracy

Huge Georgian Dream election posters ahead of the elections in October 2024. Photo: Mirko Kuzmanovic / Shutterstock

Coming to power in 2012, the shadowy leader of Georgian Dream – Georgia’s richest man, Bidzina Ivanishvili – has consolidated power around himself. His regime is kleptocratic, with corruption centralized and personal enrichment the main goal. Running the state effectively as a CEO, Ivanishvili has filled its key institutions with his loyal employees.

Take Thea Tsulukiani, the justice minister since 2012. She oversaw the dismantling of Georgia’s independent judiciary, ensuring the political loyalty of its courts. Switching to the culture ministry in 2020, Tsulukiani purged anyone deemed critical of the government, appointing political loyalists in their stead. In spite of boycotts and protests from filmmakers and authors, the burgeoning cultural sphere in Georgia was effectively silenced.

Georgian Dream does not shy away from jailing rival politicians and critical media figures either. The recently enacted Foreign Agent Law will undoubtedly be used to further repress the opposition. In response to month-long protests against the law, opposition activists and politicians were beaten by masked thugs on the street. Ivanishvili vowed to outlaw virtually all opposition parties if Georgian Dream won the parliamentary elections held this October. The dubious result of the vote should not have come as a surprise. The last elections were already marred by irregularities and coercion, and the independence of the election commission was undermined well in advance of this year’s vote. Ivanishvili was clearly not prepared to relinquish power after carefully accumulating it over the last decade – why would he?

Georgian Dream’s kleptocracy and political oppression is not unique to its rule. It has been a common aspect of every Georgian regime since 1991, including the pro-western and reform-minded government under Mikheil Saakashvili. Georgian Dream was specifically created to oust Saakashvili’s increasingly repressive and unpopular government. For his part, Saakashvili came to power after election fraud by his predecessor led to the 2003 Rose Revolution. Ivanishvili is only the most recent – albeit more effective – iteration. And there is no guarantee that he will be the last.

To maintain its domestic legitimacy in the face of increasing criticism for failures concerning both democratization and European integration, Ivanishvili has looked to Georgia’s strong social conservative attitudes for help. Initially paying lip service to stances from the far-right fringes, Georgian Dream now claim them as their own. Following violent attacks on Tbilisi Pride in 2021 and 2023, Georgian Dream passed a law this September quashing LGBTQ+ rights. Pride events are outlawed, public displays of rainbow flags banned and queer and trans individuals stripped of human rights. Georgian Dream has also proposed recognising Orthodox Christianity as the state religion.

Georgian Dream is trying to turn a western-minded but proud population sour on Euro-Atlantic integration. It argues that, unless it is done its way, integration would lead to the loss of political and cultural sovereignty – and to war. Ivanishvili has blamed an ill-defined cabal of western individuals and organizations not only for stalled EU membership talks. He claims that an elusive Global War Party is out to topple his government and start a new war with Russia. In this way, the “bad blood” between Georgia and its dominating neighbour is blamed on nefarious meddling by the West.

However, Georgian Dream’s autocratic and conservative consolidation should not be seen as simply a pragmatic ploy. As with the right-wing, autocratic backlash in Central and East Europe, perceived western liberal hegemony can drive anti-liberal and anti-western sentiments. When countries that for centuries had been construed as a “backwards” Eastern periphery to an “enlightened” Western Europe wanted to be incorporated into a common identity, the process often felt like a hegemonic imposition of cultures and values. Rather than being treated as equals, they were brushed aside as politically, economically and culturally deficient. In societies with strong cultural and historical identities, this was bound to create a backlash.

Russia, on the other hand – with its strong conservative values and illiberal style of governance – has the very real potential of engendering genuine attraction. And this is not only true in Georgia. A strong affinity for the Russian regime is present among many western right-wing politicians and parties too. For Georgia’s right wing, this affinity is reinforced by a perception of economic connections, historical closeness and shared values. Russia is seen by some as a historic saviour who liberated Christian Georgia from Turkish and Persian despotism. A role, they now hope, Russia can replay against the West.

This is not to say that Russian interference does not exist in Georgia. It undoubtedly does. It might then feel reassuring to explain away Ivanishvili’s political agency as a tool of the Kremlin, and the fraudulent elections as a Russian “special operation”. But even if financial and political ties with the Kremlin exist, that would not automatically make Georgian Dream its puppet. Arguing otherwise gives credence to their own argument that Georgia’s opposition, civil society and critical media organizations are lackeys of the West, seeing they receive financial and political support from the EU and the US.

This simplification also hides some uncomfortable yet crucial truths: autocracy can be an organic and autochthonous force, and not brought about as a result of the Kremlin’s meddling. A closer alignment with Russia can also come about, not because of external pressure, but due to political expediency and a genuine political attraction. Lastly, treating new or prospective members of the Euro-Atlantic club as inherently backward or deficient can induce autocratic backlashes and Russian overtures. This is a key lesson to keep in mind as Moldova, Ukraine and perhaps one day, Georgia, move closer to the West.

Viktor Blichfeldt holds a double MA in Central and East European, Russian and Eurasian Studies and in Caucasus Studies from the Universities of Tartu, Glasgow, and Ilia State University. He holds a BA in International Studies (Russia and Eurasia) from Leiden University. Working with foreign affairs, Blichfeldt’s interests include right-wing populism, autocracy, and security in Eurasia.

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Bidzina Ivanishvili, democratic backslide, Georgia, Georgia-EU relations, Georgia-Russia relations, Georgian Dream, Georgian Orthodox Church, South Caucasus