EU referendum in Moldova. An easy target for Kremlin propagandists?

Photo: Motalb / Shutterstock

Historically speaking, Moldova has fallen prey to several empires. As a consequence, the society is accustomed to the fact that one imperial administration changes with another and thus the government is not to be trusted because it is put in place by foreigners. Society is also divided because different parts of it support one or another geopolitical player. In other words, social cohesion is something unknown to Moldovans, unfortunately. Even in the 30 years of its independence, neither the country’s ruling political class nor its intellectual elites have been able to propose an attractive identity model that would appeal to all citizens, regardless of ethnicity or origin. In recent years, however, more and more experts in Moldovan civil society are inclined to believe that the European integration of the country could be a solution to empower social cohesion.

A referendum and an election

In December 2023, after the European Council decided to open accession negotiations with Moldova, the country’s president, Maia Sandu, launched an initiative to hold a referendum on European integration in autumn 2024, so that the whole country could say clearly which path it would like to choose. As a result, the voice of citizens would be decisive. In the same speech, the president expressed her intention to run for another term as head of state.

Some political analysts have said that in this way Sandu would try to get a higher score in the autumn elections, associating the EU referendum with her presidential candidacy. Surprisingly, at the time of the launch of the EU referendum initiative by Sandu, Article 184 of the Electoral Code of the Republic of Moldova did not allow the holding of parliamentary, presidential or general local elections at the same time as a referendum, but only 60 days before or after. The problem was “resolved” by an amendment proposed by Veronica Rosca, an MP from PAS (Action and Solidarity Party, for which Sandu ran for president). This implied that the Electoral Code could be amended to allow a referendum and a national poll to be held on the same day.

Most representatives of the extra-parliamentary parties, who participated in the consultations on the idea of the referendum, did not agree that it should take place on the same day as the presidential election. After the consultations, they stated that the presidential vote was a competition that would divide the parties, while the European course should instead unite the pro-European parties and become a national idea. Some noted that all European countries that are now EU members held this referendum exactly after the negotiation procedure and that there is no EU member country which has held it prior to the negotiations. The EU Ambassador to Moldova Janis Mazeiks did not rule out the possibility of a new referendum after the conclusion of accession negotiations. Cristina Gerasimov, Moldova’s deputy prime minister for European integration, admitted that EU structures had never recommended or asked Moldova to hold a referendum on European integration. Yet, last February, parliament’s Speaker Igor Grosu said that the referendum on Moldova’s EU vector would be constitutional.

The lack of unity around the idea of an EU referendum outside the pro-European parties is obvious. This cannot help but attract pro-Kremlin “predators” who want to see in their potential victim only weakness. Several pro-Kremlin parties have shown their scepticism and disgust. The leader of the Socialist Party, Igor Dodon, urged citizens not to participate, fearing that if they did they would help validate the referendum, which aims to cede part of Moldova’s sovereignty to Brussels. Speaking in Moscow, the fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor said he and his supporters in Chisinau “will win” in the referendum and pro-European forces “will lose”, assuming that the majority of citizens will vote against European integration in the referendum.

Disinformation campaigns

Pro-Kremlin politicians have an entire disinformation machine behind them created in Russia, which will do everything possible to discourage Moldovans from participating in the referendum. Recently, Politico, in an article about Moldova, wrote that the country is resisting a barrage of disinformation, cyber-attacks and political corruption supported by the Kremlin, and in particular highlighted the growing role of disinformation fuelled by artificial intelligence. Deepfakes will be the new weapon used to destroy the image of pro-European politicians or EU institutions in the rich arsenal of information warfare, but not the main one. Hostile narratives will always lie at the core.

Bogdan Țîrdea, a member of the Moldovan parliament on behalf of the Socialist Party, in a broadcast of “Mezhdu tem” on the Russian TV channel Zvezda suggested: “With the help of the referendum, they will try to change the constitution, insert an article on European integration into the constitution and, as a result, make the corresponding changes in the criminal code. Those parties and those politicians who oppose European integration will either be dissolved or imprisoned.”

Thus emerged a narrative that European integration will be imposed in a dictatorial manner. At the same time, Țîrdea, in his Telegram channel, shared more speculation of his about the impact of the referendum on Moldova’s constitution: “After the referendum for European integration, the authorities openly propose to introduce in the constitution the thesis that European treaties and fundamental laws are binding for Moldova. And this will lead to the adoption of a pile of laws that will shock fellow citizens: same-sex marriage, land laws and many other things.” In this case the main narrative is that the EU is promoting the LGBTQ+ movement and the sub-narrative is that Moldovans do not support European integration.

Nothing beats the accusations of Țîrdea more than the constitutions of Ukraine and Georgia. In both cases, the European integration of these countries is mentioned, but even more, they both also discuss Euro-Atlantic integration. In other words, this means future NATO membership. At the same time, neither Ukraine nor Georgia recognize same-sex marriages. There is also little to no evidence of these other laws that would “shock” fellow citizens, as well as the binding nature of various European laws.

Dmitrii Ciubasenco, a journalist who promotes pro-Kremlin rhetoric, is equally concerned about the fate of the Moldovan constitution. He argues that the fact that the EU referendum will be constitutional means that Moldova will have a state ideology, which is contrary to the constitution. This will be followed by the introduction of articles in the criminal code on liability for denying and opposing the course of European integration as a form of violating the constitution.

Here the attempt to scare citizens with possible punishment for their opinions is evident, which again we do not find in any form in neighbouring countries such as Ukraine and Georgia. Moreover, considering the case of Georgia and the introduction of the foreign agent law there, it is visible how fragile the constitution of a pro-European country can be, even with clear changes regarding European integration present in it.

Emotions and fears

Marina Tauber, another MP from the disbanded ȘOR Party, says that Sandu decided to hold this referendum because the Europeans are no longer pouring money into Moldova, as if the government is running around the EU with its hands out. The referendum, according to Tauber, would be aimed at attracting EU money to Moldova, with Sandu fighting not for the country but the EU’s interests. Here we find the hostile narrative that the pro-European government is begging for money from the EU for its own interests.

As we might see however, the European financial support of Moldova is dependent on larger strategies of the EU, which are determined by geopolitical factors and do not depend on the Moldovan government’s possible “blackmail”. The EU’s indicative bilateral allocation to Moldova for the period 2021-24 is 260 million euros (65 million per year). Since the start of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, Moldova has been tackling significant challenges, including large numbers of refugees, inflation, threats to its energy supplies, violations of its airspace, as well as a multitude of hybrid actions such as disinformation and cyber-attacks. The EU has already mobilized 1.2 billion euros to help Moldova in facing these crises since the autumn of 2021.

Gagauzia is another strategic square on the chessboard of the information battle in Moldova, but it is already occupied by pro-Kremlin pawns. Any attempt to liberate it will be easily neutralized by Moscow strategists. In the 2023 local elections the ruling Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) did not have a single pro-European candidate in the Gagauz region. Mihail Vlah, the cousin of former Gagauz Bashkan (governor) Irina Vlah, and now deputy Bashkan of Gagauzia, said in a local TV show that the Gagauz people have no desire to participate in the referendum because Europe does not support the Gagauz, and that European institutions do not communicate with Gagauz local authorities. Such messages are part of the narrative that the EU is a discriminatory, or in some cases even a neo-fascist community. The truth is that in the EU all peoples and ethnic groups live in good understanding and freely respect their traditions. At the very beginning of the EU Treaty it says that EU members are “DESIRING to deepen the solidarity between their peoples while respecting their history, their culture and their traditions”.

In April, the StopFals.md portal reported about a forgery spread especially in the Gagauz region, where flyers were distributed claiming that the referendum on Moldova’s accession to the European Union is illegal and the plebiscite cannot have legal force. According to StopFals.md sources, they were distributed on March 24th, during the visit to the region of the leader of the Party of Communists, Vladimir Voronin, the former president of the country. It should be recalled that on April 16th, the constitutional court gave a positive response to the PAS initiative on the pro-EU referendum, which had previously been approved by the parliament.

Mihai Avasiloaie, the editor in chief at StopFals.md, highlights the extensive misinformation campaign against the EU integration referendum, noting that it is fuelled by both local and pro-Russian forces. “There is an attempt to demonize the idea of integration into the European Union through falsehoods, manipulations, and speculations that primarily target people’s emotions and fears,” Avasiloaie states. Common disinformation narratives include claims that EU integration will devastate Moldova’s economy, drastically increase utility costs, force the legalization of same-sex marriages and lead to an influx of immigrants. These ideas are being promoted by various local political entities and pro-Russian media, aiming to reduce the referendum’s support and diminish the popularity of EU integration among Moldovan citizens.

Evolving hybrid tactics

As Moldova approaches the pivotal referendum on European Union integration, numerous European politicians have visited the country to show their support and solidarity. Among them was Paweł Kowal, chair of the Polish parliament’s foreign affairs committee and a former member of the European Parliament. I had the opportunity to speak with Kowal about the disinformation campaigns surrounding the referendum and the broader implications for Moldova’s future. Kowal draws parallels between the disinformation tactics used in Moldova and those used in other former Soviet and post-Warsaw Pact countries. He observes that many believe they are resistant to Russian disinformation due to their historical understanding of Russian propaganda.

However, Kowal warns that the tactics have evolved: “For example, in the case of Moldova, they will use arguments against European integration by linking it to the war factor. They will try to associate the war with the current president of Moldova and the European integration, which is a completely new tactic.” He also notes that religious arguments and the portrayal of Soviet/Russian traditions as spiritual and religious are now part of the disinformation arsenal, alongside the narrative of a perpetually crisis-ridden West.

Andrei Curăraru, a security expert from the WatchDog.MD think tank, discusses the national-level narratives being used to undermine the EU referendum. He points out that opposition forces are framing the referendum as an anti-ruling party vote rather than a pro-European one. “The ruling party’s score and ratings are falling, and this may also influence the referendum results,” Curăraru notes, adding that support for EU integration currently exceeds support for the ruling party.

Curăraru also addresses scepticism about the EU’s intentions, with opponents claiming Moldova will never fully integrate and will only be exploited for its resources. He counters this by highlighting the EU’s offers, such as gradual integration and the immediate attraction of direct investment into Moldova.

In the Gagauzia region, the disinformation efforts are complemented by hybrid warfare tactics, such as corruption. “For example, we have seen promises of cheaper natural gas offered preferentially to the region, export preferences to Russia, especially in the agricultural sector, and the offer of aid through MIR cards for socially vulnerable people, estimated at 25,000 in the region,” Curăraru explains. Additionally, narratives around ethnic conflict and discrimination against Russian speakers are being amplified. This includes reactionary responses to legal actions involving Irina Vlah, which are framed to provoke nationalist sentiments and depict widespread ethnic conflict.

On June 13th, the governments of the United States, along with Canada and the United Kingdom, warned of attempts by the Kremlin and its agents to influence the outcome of the 2024 autumn presidential election in Moldova, which will be held on the same day as the referendum. In a joint statement, the three governments claim that destabilization is being prepared in the context of this autumn’s election, including disinformation, criminal and covert activities, and corruption to undermine the sovereignty and democratic processes in Moldova.

Thus, the pro-Kremlin forces are taking both the presidential elections and the EU referendum very seriously. The question of whether this will be an easy target remains open, and the answer depends on the actions of the government and civil society, which if they work together, and not selfishly on the part of the ruling party, can bring some fruitful results for the European course of a very fragile and developing country.

This article was written in the framework of the Ratiu Forum Journalism Mentorship Programme under the guidance of Adam Reichardt, as a professional mentor.

Mihail Nesteriuc is currently studying journalism and fine arts at the State University of Moldova. He is actively involved in multiple initiatives including JEF Moldova, Citizens for Europe, Youth.md, Young European Ambassadors and European Democracy Youth Network (EDYN).

EU integration, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine