Why Baltic security matters

Photo courtesy of Andris Banka

Since then, countries like Germany have taken on increased security burdens in the region, most notably by agreeing to deploy a brigade to Lithuania. Still, on the whole, Baltic leaders perceive the US presence as the strongest deterrent measure. As bluntly acknowledged by Lithuania’s foreign minister: “In the near future, I don’t see Europe being able to defend its territory without the assistance of the United States.”

Currently, Washington’s role in the Baltic security landscape appears to be solid. Rhetorical assurances, regular military exercises and, most crucially, US boots on the ground – albeit in small numbers – all serve as important signs regarding the seriousness with which the lead NATO power treats Europe’s Eastern Flank. Yet, underneath these observable security alliance dynamics, some worrying trends and even cracks are emerging. While the overall support for NATO within the US remains high, it is visibly splitting along party lines. The Republican Party appears increasingly resistant to the notion of US global leadership, questioning whether US taxpayer’s money is well worth the investment in maintaining a robust alliance network. This vision of course is regularly amplified by the Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump, who at one point even suggested that he would encourage Russia to do “whatever the hell they want” with  NATO members who do not honour their financial commitments.

Allied governments naturally have no say in domestic affairs on the other side of the pond. Prudently, however, they should prepare for a White House incumbent who questions the merits of traditional US security partnerships. In this regard, Baltic lawmakers have already begun to lay some groundwork. Aware of Trump’s inclination to view NATO primarily through the lens of dollars and cents, representatives from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have sought to deploy rhetoric aimed at soothing Trump and his political circles.

“Trump is a golfer, so when you pay your fee in the golf club you can play. It doesn’t matter how big is your wallet. When you pay that fee you can go to the golf course,” the Estonian defence minister recently said during the NATO summit in Washington. This was very clearly a Trump-tailored message. Such messaging draws upon the previous playbook during the Trump term, when Baltic lawmakers made sure to convey and emphasize to their US interlocutors that they meet the agreed GDP spending target on defence.

Taking a broader view, however, one must note that certain challenges in the relationship go beyond personalities and the current US political cycle. With the return of great power politics, structural currents keep pulling the United States into different directions – Israel and Taiwan being the best examples of this issue. Against this backdrop, the Baltic republics and other Eastern European nations must be ready to articulate why their security needs ought to be seen as urgent priorities. A growing chorus of voices within the US, for instance, propose that scarce American resources are wasted in Europe as they “eat away” capabilities that will one day be needed in Asia. Scholars and analysts associated with the so-called realist school of thought regularly portray the Baltics as too geographically remote to matter to America’s national interest. Backing such small states, according to this view, means dissipating US treasure for no obvious geopolitical advantage.

The Baltic leaders must address this type of criticism head on. Priority should be given to a message that is moulded rather practically. The discourse surrounding US alliance politics and the need to retain such links have revolved around values, sacred commitments and the liberal international order. No doubt, these are crucial “touchstones” of the US alliance system. However, such broadly defined concepts arguably might not sway people inside the US. Instead, a more practical illumination of how the alliance with the Baltics is linked with the well-being of everyday American citizens should be pursued.

Talking points that stress the fact that the Baltics are the most pro-American voices within the EU, where they have advanced salient US national interests, are important in this regard. The three countries have also staunchly sided with Washington against its main rival China and they serve as valuable intelligence assets for their key ally across the Atlantic. Examples like this might be a better way to market Baltic importance. More practical and less abstract explanations may resonate better with US audiences.

Furthermore, Baltic representatives should also seek to cast a wider informational net in the United States. During the Trump term in office, then NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg purposefully sought to engage viewers of Fox News. It was a masterful move by the Alliance – go to the networks where people can directly hear you. Likewise, the Balts should be open to the idea that they need to reach as many people as possible to convince them that their small states are worth defending. While there are multiple challenges facing NATO today, for the Baltic countries, ensuring the uninterrupted presence of US forces remains a top priority.

This commentary is the result of a special seminar held May 21st 2024, co-organized by New Eastern Europe, LSE IDEAS CSEEP at the Jagiellonian University, and the East European Council. Co-funding is provided by NATO Public Diplomacy.

Andris Banka is a senior researcher at the University of Greifswald in Germany. He holds a PhD in politics and international relations from the University of Birmingham, UK.

Baltic states, Eastern flank, NATO, Russia, Ukraine, United States, War