The impact of NATO membership on national security: a 25-year retrospective
Estonia’s accession to NATO in 2004 marked a historical moment that solidified the commitment to collective defence and enhanced security against potential threats, particularly from Russia. NATO membership has undeniably served as a cornerstone in shaping the security landscape of Estonia over the past 25 years.
September 16, 2024 - Nele Loorents - Issue 5 2024MagazineNATO @ 75
The evolution of NATO’s deterrence and defence posture, particularly in light of geopolitical shifts and emerging threats, has directly influenced national defence policies, investment priorities, and military readiness. This commentary will explore some of the significant changes that have occurred within Estonia´s national defence architecture, defence investment allocations, and the broader security environment in light of the evolving security situation.
Since regaining independence, Estonia has perceived Russia as an existential threat. This perception was starkly portrayed by Russia’s aggressive manoeuvres in 2008, including cyberattacks on Estonia’s digital infrastructure and the invasion of Georgia. These events underscored the urgent need for a robust defence posture, driving Estonia to re-evaluate its defence and security strategies. The subsequent invasion of Crimea in 2014 and the outbreak of Russia’s full-scale war in Ukraine in 2022 have further reinforced this outlook.
As a response to Russia’s aggressive actions, NATO has been focused on bolstering its deterrence and defence posture over the past decade. The key milestones in this journey include the summits in Wales in 2014, Warsaw in 2016, Madrid in 2022, and Vilnius in 2023. During these meetings of NATO leaders, crucial decisions were made regarding increased defence investments; the establishment of NATO’s Forward Presence in Eastern Europe; the implementation of a new force model; and the adoption of a new generation of regional defence plans. These decisions reflect a collective recognition among NATO allies of the need to regain a strong and responsive defence posture considering evolving threats. However, this is something that still remains mostly just on paper. Thus, the main question is the implementation of everything that has been agreed. Nevertheless, this is not merely the responsibility of NATO as an organization, as it involves a collective effort of all its members. It is up to every ally to contribute and move forward together.
The change in the security environment and the shifts in NATO’s deterrence and defence posture have also substantially influenced Estonia’s national military structure, defence capability development and operational readiness. Over the past two decades, the Estonian government has made significant efforts to increase the defence budget. Since 2015, Tallinn has been committed to spend at least two per cent of GDP on defence with a further increase to at least three per cent throughout the next four years. This financial commitment underscores the understanding that investment in defence is not merely a financial obligation but a critical component of national sovereignty and security.
The increased budget has facilitated substantial investments in various areas, including firepower and ammunition alongside intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. The military has also expanded its wartime structure by significantly increasing the number of active service personnel and active reserves, ultimately raising the wartime readiness total to nearly 43,000 personnel, which is a substantial effort for a nation with a population of 1.3 million. This expansion can be seen as a direct reflection of NATO’s new strategic framework, which emphasizes the need for rapid reinforcement and heightened readiness in the face of potential threats. NATO’s strengthened Forward Presence posture in the Eastern Flank also entails a recognition of the necessity of improved host nation support infrastructure. As part of this effort, the government plans to invest over 300 million euros in the next four years to enhance training facilities and accommodation, ensuring that the military is adequately equipped to respond to threats as they appear.
The recent accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO represents another significant strategic development that further enhances the security architecture in the region. These two countries bring additional military capabilities, resources and strategic depth to the Alliance, fostering a more integrated defence posture in the Baltic Sea region. This regional cooperation is particularly crucial given the evolving threat landscape, which now encompasses a broader spectrum of challenges, including hybrid threats and cyber warfare.
As NATO, and especially the countries in the Eastern Flank, have been lately more exposed to emerging threats, including cyber and hybrid attacks, there is an urgent need to pay closer attention to the complexities of hybrid warfare. Hybrid tactics often blur the lines between traditional military confrontations and non-conventional tactics. Addressing these threats requires a whole-of-government approach and social resilience. Cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns and other hybrid threats can therefore pose a significant challenge to NATO. The case of hybrid attacks exemplifies the critical need for enhanced cooperation between NATO and the European Union. However, this collaboration is vital not only at the organizational level but also in national and multinational formats, where useful frameworks can be developed to address hybrid threats effectively.
Estonia’s proactive engagement with NATO initiatives has also helped foster a national culture of defence which encourages civic responsibility and public awareness regarding national security. Societal engagement and support are crucial for building a resilient populace that can oppose a variety of threats. The ongoing commitment to defence investment, military readiness, and regional collaboration not only fortifies Estonia’s national security but also contributes to the stability of the broader Euro-Atlantic area.
This commentary is the result of a special seminar held May 21st 2024, co-organized by New Eastern Europe, LSE IDEAS CSEEP at the Jagiellonian University, and the East European Council. Co-funding is provided by NATO Public Diplomacy.
Nele Loorents is a research fellow at the International Centre for Defence and Security in Estonia. She previously served as a civil servant at the Estonian Ministry of Defence and has specialized in the fields of defence investments, defence policy and planning.