NATO beyond 75: strategic evolution amid global uncertainty

A British Army Challenger II tank moves through a wooded area in Estonia during the 2024 exercise “Bold Fusilier” which aimed at testing the ability of NATO’s Multinational Battlegroup in the region. Photo courtesy of NATO

When on April 4th 1949, 12 states signed a founding treaty in Washington, giving birth to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, an alliance of like-minded states committed to collective defence and mutual protection, few would have expected that this transatlantic pact would endure for so many decades. More than 75 years later, 32 members of this Alliance – including the newest, Finland and Sweden – met in Washington again for the anniversary summit. NATO at 75 could be considered as an anomaly, as alliances are typically short-lived formations that dissolve or become obsolete after serving their original purpose. However, against all the odds and predictions, NATO has defied this tendency and not only survived the end of the Cold War but also, thanks to Russia’s imperial policies and invasion of Ukraine, grown stronger and larger. In the words of Radosław Sikorski, Poland’s foreign minister: “NATO was created to deter an aggressive Russia. Russia is aggressive again. NATO won the first time; it will win the second time too.”

Advancing NATO’s priorities

The NATO Strategic Concept, which the Alliance announced during the summit in Madrid in 2022, serves effectively as a compass for the group, outlining their main objectives and basic tasks. The three core tasks around which contemporary NATO has been built include deterrence and defence; crisis prevention and management; and cooperative security. While the Vilnius summit last year was the next step in implementing NATO’s strategy, the Washington summit provided another occasion to further execute the allies’ plans. It is worth remembering that NATO annual summits are not regular meetings, but important junctures in the Alliance’s decision-making process.

The summit in Washington did not bring revolutionary decisions but rather followed a pattern of significant yet gradual changes. For the last ten years, NATO has been on a transformational path. What seemed like a wake-up call for the Alliance with Russia’s attack on Ukraine’s Crimea peninsula resulted in shifts within NATO to embrace its traditional defensive posture. These were only intensified by the shocks of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Ever since then, NATO has turned its focus towards the most robust defence and deterrence. In Washington, NATO addressed a number of issues and challenges at the heart of Alliance strategy, including dealing with Russia; the future of Ukraine in NATO; the threat of terrorism; and concerns about China’s growing menacing role. Three common threads were present in both pre-summit talks and in the summit’s final declaration: the question of assistance to Ukraine; progress in defence and deterrence; and NATO’s global partners.

During the summit in Washington, the Alliance reaffirmed the need for more robust and rapid changes in NATO’s efforts to meet the new standards required by the current security environment. The emphasis on burden-sharing was also quite clear, as currently two-thirds of members have fulfilled their commitment to spending at least two per cent of their GDP on annual defence spending (before Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014, only three member states met this criteria). Moreover, as NATO continues its transformation to modernize for a new era of collective defence and the possibility of an attack against the Alliance’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, it underlined strengthening deterrence and defence posture. Hence, in Washington, the Alliance pointed out its success in deploying in-place combat-ready forces on NATO’s Eastern Flank, including implementing the “Integrated Air and Missile Defence Rotational Model” across the Euro-Atlantic area.

As air defence remains one of the most vital aspects of defence and deterrence, NATO also announced the “NATO Ballistic Missile Defence Enhanced Operational Capability”. With the delivery of the Aegis Ashore site in Redzikowo, Poland, which complements existing assets in Romania, Spain and Turkey, NATO’s “missile defence shield” has become a comprehensive defence system over the European sky. The summit declaration made it clear, though, that while missile defence could complement the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence, it could not be a substitute for them. In the context of Russia’s continuous nuclear sabre rattling, the message from Washington was clear: as long as the threat of nuclear weapons exists, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.

Deterring Russia, strengthening Ukraine

There is no question that assisting Ukraine in its fight against Russian aggression is a fundamental task for NATO. In this context, the Washington summit began with President Joe Biden announcing that “the United States, Germany, the Netherlands, Romania and Italy will provide Ukraine with equipment for five additional strategic air defence systems.” This move, eagerly anticipated by many, signals that the NATO Washington summit prioritized the pressing challenges to Euro-Atlantic security over celebrating the Alliance’s 75th anniversary. In a joint statement, the US, Germany and Romania announced that each would supply Ukraine with a Patriot missile battery. The Netherlands, in collaboration with other nations, will facilitate an additional battery. Italy will contribute by providing a SAMP-T long-range air defence system.

The emphasis on air defence support for Ukraine was no accident. The day before the announcement, Russian airstrikes in Ukraine claimed the lives of at least 42 people and injured 190 others, including an attack on the country’s largest children’s hospital. While the support for Ukraine’s air defence comes from NATO individual member states, not from NATO itself, this announcement at the beginning of the summit signalled the Alliance’s commitment to place Ukraine at the front of its current agenda.

Subsequently, NATO’s announcement that it would establish the “NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine” (NSATU) programme was a significant step in aid. NSATU will coordinate the provision of military equipment and training for Ukraine by NATO members and partners. According to the summit declaration, its aim is “to place security assistance to Ukraine on an enduring footing, ensuring enhanced, predictable, and coherent support”. This new format, as it was underlined in the communiqué, will support Ukraine’s self-defence in line with the UN Charter. This signals a substantial change in NATO’s responsibilities. NATO has so far refrained from directly providing lethal assistance to Ukraine, instead allowing individual member countries to take the lead bilaterally and through the US-led Ukraine Defence Contact Group, also known as the Ramstein format. However, since most of the military support for Ukraine has come from individual NATO members anyway, coordinating these efforts under the NATO umbrella makes more sense in terms of logistics and strategy. Consequently, NATO announced plans to establish a training and support facility in Wiesbaden, Germany, staffed with 700 personnel. This new centre will coordinate training and equipment donations to bolster Ukraine’s defence capabilities. In addition, NATO member states announced a pledge of long-term security assistance for Ukraine regarding the provision of military equipment, assistance, and training to support Ukraine in building a force capable of defeating Russian aggression. Alliance members pledged to provide a minimum baseline of funding of 40 billion euros within the next year, and to provide sustainable levels of security assistance for Ukraine to prevail in its defensive war against Russia.

Ukraine, as expected, did not receive an official invitation to join NATO, only a repeated pledge that NATO continues to support the country on “its irreversible path to full Euro-Atlantic integration, including NATO membership”. The Alliance reaffirmed that it would be ready to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join NATO “when Allies agree and conditions are met”. While this definitely did not meet Kyiv’s expectations, the two aforementioned decisions to support Ukraine heralded NATO’s more substantial commitment to assist in dealing with Russia’s war of aggression. Overall, NATO’s primary responsibility is the defence of its members and its own territory. While there is significant support and sympathy for Ukraine, NATO is not positioned to directly engage in combat on Kyiv’s behalf. However, there is a delicate balance to be maintained regarding how NATO can further assist Ukraine’s efforts to win the war without becoming directly involved in a conflict with Russia. This issue is particularly complex because NATO member states hold differing views on the extent to which the Alliance should assist Ukraine.

China’s challenge and the Indo-Pacific partners

In a notable shift, NATO has taken a firmer stance towards China, as reflected in the language of the Washington summit declaration. The Alliance identified the People’s Republic of China as “a decisive enabler of Russia’s war against Ukraine” through its “no limits” partnership and extensive support for Russia’s defence industry. NATO particularly criticized China’s transfers of dual-use materials, including weapons components, equipment, and raw materials that bolster Russia’s defence sector.

This marks a significant change in NATO’s tone, as the Alliance not only acknowledged China’s role in undermining European security but also issued a veiled warning to Beijing. NATO emphasized that China cannot support the largest war in Europe in recent history without facing negative repercussions regarding its interests and reputation. While, predictably, China’s official response to the NATO summit declaration was to dismiss it as “biased, slanderous, and provocative”, it is hard to deny China’s growing influence in Europe. One recent example included joint military exercises with Belarus, held on Monday 8th July. These were held just a few kilometres from the border of Poland and occurred just one day before the Alliance’s summit in Washington.

While NATO maintains that China poses a “systemic challenge to Euro-Atlantic security”, it does not refer to Beijing as a threat. Yet, the language of the summit declaration is quite stronger in relation to China. Even if the word “threat” does not appear directly, NATO members seem to agree publicly that China is hostile to the West. This is a striking departure from perceptions of China in previous years. Consequently, NATO acknowledges that to bolster its own security it needs partnerships not only within the Euro-Atlantic area (such as NATO’s partnership with the EU) but also beyond the transatlantic realm. NATO’s Indo-Pacific partners – Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea – constitute a pillar of this partnership. The Alliance’s relationship with the “Indo-Pacific Four” could help tackle more complex challenges to Euro-Atlantic security that have a global dimension and require cooperation with partners across the globe, including those in Asia.

Even though NATO does not frame these partnerships as anti-Chinese, Beijing clearly perceives them as such. While some critics claim that NATO should stick to the Euro-Atlantic territory in its political and diplomatic activities, others argue that today’s global security system is too complex and too volatile for NATO to ignore other regions. Arguably, building and strengthening a network of partners across the globe has been a pillar of NATO’s strategy for almost two decades. How the Alliance intends to benefit from this network in Asia-Pacific is a different question.

The Trump effect?

Among the vital issues for NATO’s future is the evolving role of the US in the Alliance. Since the United States has been reorienting its foreign policy focus to China and the Asia-Pacific region more broadly, some European allies are worried about being left isolated during extremely dangerous times for security. This fear of abandonment seems to have been growing in 2024, a year of presidential elections in the US. One unspoken concern loomed large over the Washington summit: what if Donald Trump wins the upcoming election and returns to the presidency? While NATO, for clear diplomatic reasons, avoids taking positions on political candidates within its member states – considering such matters as internal affairs – this issue was not officially discussed during the summit. Nevertheless, the apprehension among many NATO members is palpable.

Their concerns are well-founded, given Trump’s previous tenure during which he expressed scepticism about NATO’s relevance to US security interests. He not only criticized European allies for not contributing more to defence spending but also infamously suggested that he would encourage Russia to do “whatever the hell it wants” to them. In addition, Trump’s position on Ukraine and continued support for Kyiv’s defence has been questionable at best, if not outright negative. The former president is said to have privately stated that he could end Russia’s war in Ukraine by pressuring the country to give up some territory. For Ukraine and many European members of NATO such remarks herald a potential geopolitical disaster. This is why the spectre of Trump loomed large over the Washington summit.

Additionally, his unpredictable approach to foreign policy has encouraged NATO member states to brace themselves for every possible scenario. Europe is facing the gravest security crisis since the end of the Second World War. An unpredictable US partner, ready to withdraw its troops from Europe and its support for Ukraine, is the last thing the old continent needs. Perhaps the only silver lining in this situation is that a possible Trump second term might motivate and mobilize some European NATO members to spend more on defence and prepare themselves to rely less on the US. To build a Trump-proof Alliance, many in Western Europe need to change their attitude, which remains stuck in the Cold War mentality of over-relying on the US’s security umbrella.

Future challenges

Russia and its devastating war against Ukraine still ranks number one on NATO’s list of concerns. There is no peace on the European continent as long as a nuclear power wages a war of aggression against a sovereign state, creating the most volatile security situation in Europe since the end of the Second World War. Hence, there is no surprise that NATO in 2024 repeated its previous statements that Russia remains “the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security”. This is also reflected in the Washington summit declaration as Russia is mentioned there 44 times, while NATO stresses that Moscow bears full responsibility for the war against Ukraine, including violations of international law, war crimes and attacks on critical infrastructure.

Along with NATO, the EU is also facing hard realities and new challenges. Some of them have a global dimension, like a multilayered geopolitical competition and a shift towards a “world of blocs” in which states increasingly less friendly to the West will be forming their own partnerships. Some challenges are regional, like international terrorism and transnational criminal organizations. These should not be underestimated as NATO faces the threat from the East. Others, like Russia’s war against Ukraine, originated in Europe, directly affecting Euro-Atlantic security yet also having the potential for global repercussions.

The return of a major war in Europe could have devastating results not only for the whole continent but also for its well-established institutions like NATO and the EU. Here might lie an additional challenge to the transatlantic Alliance’s long-lasting success in the future: societal resilience and the ability to adapt to a changing security landscape. So far, and for way too long, it seemed that most Europeans have lived in a fairy tale world convinced that war happens somewhere else, away from wealthy European societies.

Now, in the face of Russia’s bloody war against Ukraine, it is still extremely difficult for some to wake up from this comfortable model of life to bear the burden of deterring the adversary. NATO seems to understand the stakes and political consequences of the Russian war for transatlantic security. The decisions taken in Madrid, Vilnius and Washington reflected this logic as NATO consequently follows its strategy adopted in 2022. The Alliance – at least at the policymakers’ level – recognizes that “what happens in Ukraine does not stay in Ukraine.” The question is whether NATO member states’ societies are ready to accept this and act upon it in the long-term perspective.

This commentary is the result of a special seminar held May 21st 2024, co-organized by New Eastern Europe, LSE IDEAS CSEEP at the Jagiellonian University, and the East European Council. Co-funding is provided by NATO Public Diplomacy.

Wojciech Michnik is a 2023-24 Fulbright-NATO Security Studies Fellow. He is also an assistant professor at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow (Poland) and the Transatlantic Project Coordinator of the Central and South-East Europe Programme at LSE IDEAS at Jagiellonian University. He is a contributing editor with New Eastern Europe.

2024 NATO Summit, Eastern flank, NATO, Poland, Russia, Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Ukraine