Collective security and national sovereignty. Hungary’s 25 years in NATO

Photo courtesy of Peter Stepper.

It is important to remember this, particularly when it comes from a nation that takes great pride in its so-called “sovereigntist” foreign policy. It is also necessary to comprehend the motivations behind the statements made by Hungarian decision makers. In this framework, we should start with the protracted historical journey taken by Central European nations, such as Poland and Hungary, to transform into what are referred to as “small states” in international relations theory. Although today Poland – unlike Hungary – is a large state with serious military performance, this was not always the case. An existence as a Central European small state was not unfamiliar to them in the 18th and 19th centuries.

But if you look back to the 16th and 17th centuries, where I would like to start this story, the predecessors of both Poland and Hungary were major great powers and regional actors. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Austro-Hungarian monarchy were basically what we can call “policy makers” and not “policy takers” in the sense of influencing not just their local neighbourhood but regional and wider European politics as well. As a consequence of the 20th century, I must say that we have lost that privilege because of the emergence of firstly Russia, then Germany, and finally the Soviet Union. So, we were always in a position here in Central Europe where there was a constant struggle to merely survive and regain territorial integrity and statehood as we know it.

NATO provides the chance to overcome that and progress forward. In the end, we are in a situation where we do not have to constantly fear for our basic survival and NATO is the main reason for this reality. This is beneficial to us here in Central Europe, particularly because of the American nuclear shield, as well as the general US sense of international and foreign affairs. It is important to mention this here because occasionally Hungarian foreign policy – which is more favourable to Donald Trump than it is to Democrats, for example – is misunderstood. Of course, party politics leads to ideological arguments, but it has nothing to do with our understanding of the American world order in general. However, do not be misled in this regard. Budapest is content with the current state of affairs in the world, with the United States as the hegemonic power. The rule-based international order is still the cornerstone of Hungarian foreign policy, regardless of the various political and ideological controversies that have arisen over the past 25 years.

My second point relates to events which took place in 1989. There was, in fact, a case made for the necessity of NATO following the fall of the Soviet Union. It goes without saying that the initial question was why does NATO even exist? There is a well-known proverb that emphasizes NATO’s political orientation. According to Lord Ismay, it was imperative that we keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in and the Germans down. The key question though, is whether this maxim has changed or is still the same in the wake of the fall of the Soviet Union. And I think it has changed now.

While there may be some truth to the idea that Germany as a unified state presented challenges for France and other major European powers in the past, NATO has evolved into something more akin to a policy institution rather than a so-called politicized organization. Here, there are parallels to the politically charged Cold War era. What was the principal aim of politics then? To defeat the Soviet Union. However, this period of politicization will eventually reappear because of the times we live in. Core tenets of NATO policy, such as the existence of ISIS as a threat or the fact that climate change is an issue, have been universally accepted in recent years. Thus, reaching consensus on such ideas has been relatively simple.

Yet today we are living in a different era for two reasons. First, Hungary is among the many small states attempting to guarantee security. We make an effort to increase defence spending because we think that having a potent military of our own helps to deter our geopolitical rivals, including Russia. Prior to 2010, Hungary’s defence budget accounted for less than one per cent of the country’s GDP. Today, we are on the right path. However, because of that – and this is not limited to Hungary, it affects many other European NATO members as well – if you begin to spend more on defence, it goes without saying that you would want to see your country’s interests represented in any kind of organization, and NATO is no different.

Thus, the final point I want to make is related to the previous one, which is that Hungary prioritizes economic stability above all else. Whether we like it or not, Fidesz has become rather adept at winning elections, and such predictability has been key for the markets. Therefore, political stability and credibility are required for economic stability. And for that reason, following 2010, the Hungarian army began to modernize. The military reserve system is one such example. Hungary boasted the second-best example of increasing reserve forces in Europe, not as large as in the case of Finland, but still to a significant level. Increasing the reserve forces was one of the important topics of discussion even before joining NATO. In 2016, Hungary started a multi-year acquisition programme to procure modern equipment for the land forces and the air force. Last year, approximately 40 per cent of the Hungarian defence budget was related to R&D and innovation, which is double the NATO requirement.

However, there is a crucial difference between the army modernization programmes in several other member states and Hungary. We are not doing it because Washington asks for it, or because of some abstract notion of solidarity. We take this action because we think that reforms in the national defence sector are critical to our own security. Furthermore, it goes without saying that we are talking about a multinational strategy, because we understand NATO works best through effective international cooperation. Hungary might have a bit of a different perspective than others, but this is also one way to contribute to the success of NATO.

This commentary is the result of a special seminar held May 21st 2024, co-organized by New Eastern Europe, LSE IDEAS CSEEP at the Jagiellonian University, and the East European Council. Co-funding is provided by NATO Public Diplomacy.

Péter Stepper is an associate professor at Ludovika University of Public Service and an external fellow of the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs.

Europe, Hungary, NATO, Ukraine, War