Belarus’s political prisoner dilemma

Illustration by Vadi Fuoco / Shutterstock

Alyaksandr Lukashenka, the dictator of Belarus, has long used political prisoners as a means of leverage and bargaining with the West. His tactic has always involved releasing prisoners in exchange for easing sanctions, securing economic aid, and improving his or the country’s image before presidential elections and key international meetings and discussions. During the 2000s and 2010s, Belarus, once a significant player in the Eastern Partnership programme, managed to balance its relationships with both Russia and the West across economic, geopolitical and cultural dimensions. At that time, the Belarusian dreams of low-cost airlines operating from Minsk Airport and a simplified visa regime with the EU appeared feasible, while the number of political prisoners in the country remained below a hundred.

Currently, the situation is dire and seemingly unsolvable: there are around 1,500 political prisoners in Belarus at the moment, and six have already died in custody. Belarus’s hybrid activities at the EU’s external border; the hijacking of a Ryanair plane; its unprecedented repression and crackdown on Belarusian society; the exodus of an estimated 500,000 to 600,000 people; and its role in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine have all rendered it a non-negotiable entity, treated on par with Russia. As a result, an eighth round of sanctions were imposed in July 2024. The spotlight on Belarus in 2020 has waned, leaving it nearly absent from EU discussions. As Belarus falls off the bloc’s radar and heads toward its 2025 presidential elections, the pressing question now is: what can be done to ensure that political prisoners in Belarus are not dying in silence there while waiting for a new round of bargaining?

Belarusian pattern of exchanging freedom

The most notable cases of Lukashenka’s bargaining over political prisoners are those of Alexander Kazulin and Nikolai Statkevich. Both cases are related to the 2006 and 2010 presidential elections. In 2006, Belarusian voters had four candidates to choose from, including Kazulin, the leader of the Belarusian Social Democratic Party and former Belarusian State University rector.

On July 13th 2006, nearly four months after the election, Kazulin was sentenced to five and a half years in prison for his role in post-election protests. In response, the US and EU imposed travel bans and asset freezes on Belarusian officials involved in electoral fraud and human rights abuses. With Kazulin among many other political prisoners still incarcerated, the US raised the stakes by sanctioning Belneftekhim in November 2007. Three months later, Belarus released six detainees considered prisoners of conscience by the West, though Kazulin remained imprisoned. After the first detainees walked free, Lukashenka openly said that now “is the turn of the European Union to show its good intentions”. However, the US responded by extending sanctions to all state enterprises in Belarus’s petrochemical sector, citing the failure to release Kazulin. Kazulin was finally released in August 2008, and shortly after two more political prisoners were freed from prison. This led to, as the UK ambassador to Minsk stated, “the absence of any internationally recognised political prisoners in Belarus”. Following this, the EU conditionally suspended some sanctions and the US eased restrictions on certain types of engagement and assistance.

An optimistic stance regarding potential reforms quickly faded following the presidential elections held in December 2010 and the subsequent crackdown on Belarusian society. Following the announcement of the election results on December 19th 2010, a large protest broke out in central Minsk. The authorities responded by imposing severe sentences on the protesters and accused organizers, including presidential candidate Nikolai Statkevich, who was sentenced to six years in prison.

To hold the Belarusian government accountable for human rights violations, the EU and the US imposed and intensified sanctions, using Statkevich’s situation to justify the measures. The initial sanctions included travel bans and asset freezes; an arms embargo; the suspension of high-level diplomatic contacts; trade restrictions; export controls; and measures against specific enterprises in the petrochemical sector. Throughout 2011 and beyond, the EU and US continually reassessed sanctions, emphasizing that the release of all political prisoners was a prerequisite for any reduction of the measures. As the 2015 presidential elections approached, economic difficulties stemming from reliance on Russia and the impact of sanctions, along with the need to bolster legitimacy and Belarus’s emerging role as a mediator in the Ukraine-Russia war, made dialogue with the West and potential sanctions relief more plausible. On August 22nd 2015, just months before the elections, Lukashenka unexpectedly ordered the release of Statkevich and several other political prisoners, setting the stage for the EU to temporarily suspend most of its restrictive measures and for the US to reduce its sanctions.

Contrasting eras

Indeed, the state of affairs in Belarus and its global context in 2024 contrast sharply with those of 2008 and 2015, when Kazulin and Statkevich were released and such bargaining seemed like a win-win scenario for both the West and Minsk. Since the beginning of the 2020 presidential campaign, over 50,000 people have been detained on political grounds in Belarus, with more than 3,380 recognized as political prisoners. Although approximately 2,000 prisoners have completed their sentences and been released, prisons continue to fill with new political detainees. The year 2023 marked the highest number of “political” criminal convictions at 1,603.

Only a tiny fraction of political prisoners were released before completing their sentences, and these cases often occurred due to the diplomatic actions of other nations. In October 2020, US Secretary of State Michael Pompeo’s intervention led to the release of Vitaly Shklyarov, an American political strategist with US citizenship, who had been arrested in Belarus shortly before the country’s presidential elections. Israeli President Isaac Herzog’s call in December 2021 secured the release of Maya Reiten, arrested for cannabis possession. Although not a political prisoner, efforts to free Reiten involved personal appeals from the Israeli authorities, highlighting the potential impact of direct diplomatic intervention. In February 2022, Switzerland, through diplomatic channels and the accreditation of its ambassador to Belarus, managed to secure the release of Natallia Hersche, a dual Swiss-Belarusian citizen.

Another notable case is that of Archbishop Tadeusz Kondrusiewicz, head of the Roman Catholic Church in Belarus, who was allowed to return to the country in December after being denied entry in August 2020. His return was made possible following a meeting between a Vatican envoy and Lukashenka in Minsk just before Christmas Eve.

Though most of these releases occurred before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the release of Sofia Sapega, a Russian national, is an exception. This is because it happened in June 2023, 15 months after the invasion, thanks to a personal request from the Governor of Primorsky Krai.

Warsaw and Vilnius

While expected to bring clarity and set an agenda for addressing issues related to Belarus and its political prisoners on the international stage, the Belarusian democratic movement and civil society in exile, led by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, have struggled to do so. They are divided not only geographically between Vilnius and Warsaw but also strategically on the issue of political prisoners — whether to do everything possible to secure their release, including the already established practice of bargaining with Lukashenka, or to continue pressuring the regime by opposing any “trading” of prisoners and advocating for additional sanctions to force the regime to release them one day.

The coexistence of such starkly opposing viewpoints within Belarus’s democratic forces hampers effective internal dialogue and creates a need for the issue of prisoner release to be ignored. The West perceives this internal struggle to formulate and promote a unified strategy as detrimental, and, unable to invest the time needed to unravel the complexities of the political prisoner issue, is hesitant to engage with Lukashenka, who holds the keys to the prisons.

The August 1st exchange partly reflects western partners’ insufficient motivations to negotiate the release of Belarusian political prisoners. While the exchange included German citizen Rico Krieger, who was sentenced to death in Belarus and later granted amnesty by Lukashenka, no Belarusian political prisoners were released. Despite the presence of several foreign nationals in Belarusian prisons — including Polish, Lithuanian and Latvian citizens, as well as Belarusians linked to western countries like Maria Kalesnikava to Germany — and the potential for including Belarusian political prisoners, the democratic forces were not informed by their western colleagues about the prisoner exchange, unlike their Russian counterparts.

Wake-up call

In all the cases described above, as well as in the release of five political prisoners with Ukrainian citizenship from Belarusian prisons in June this year, the priority was to facilitate their liberation without any complicated preconditions to sit down at the negotiating table. In the case of the August 1st exchange, even the artificially created death penalty sentence for Rico Krieger by Belarusian authorities as a means to pressure Germany into releasing the Russian state assassin Vadim Krasikov; or the death of Alexei Navalny in the Russian Arctic, who was supposed to be released as part of this exchange; did not impede the achievement of this exceptionally intricate multinational agreement. Western leaders and negotiators exhibited patience, unity, humility and firmness, resulting in Putin making concessions (with Moscow releasing twice as many people as the West). This was previously deemed impossible. It is now essential to focus on Russia’s western neighbour, Belarus, and to show the same degree of unity, determination, humanism and recognition of the priceless value of human life.

Signals from Minsk that could be interpreted as invitations to the negotiating table have appeared multiple times in 2024, with their frequency and clarity increasing recently. On July 2nd 2024, Lukashenka signed the “Amnesty Law in Connection with the 80th Anniversary of Belarus’s Liberation from Nazi Invaders”. Like previous amnesty laws, it excluded political prisoners. Despite this, 18 political prisoners were released, including the 67-year-old cancer-stricken politician and 2010 presidential candidate Ryhor Kastusyou. Meanwhile, human rights organizations reported that political prisoners nationwide are being compelled to write pleas for clemency. This development may be linked to recent statements by Supreme Court Chairman Valentin Sukalo, who noted that further clemency measures are under consideration for those convicted in the 2020 protests. Lukashenka will personally make these decisions. This is unprecedented, as clemency for these individuals had previously seemed impossible.

In late July 2024, the Polish RadioZet reported that Poland and Belarus were negotiating the release of Andrzej Poczobut, with Warsaw considering significant measures such as closing its border crossings with Belarus. These entry points are crucial for Minsk. In addressing why Belarusian political prisoners were not part of the August 1st exchange, Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski mentioned that “efforts to release other political prisoners, including Andrzej Poczobut, are being conducted through different channels.”

While such statements provide some optimism for a major release of political prisoners in Belarus with western involvement, they should also serve as a wake-up call for western countries including Lithuania, Latvia, Germany and Norway. Lukashenka has made it clear that he will not engage with the democratic forces in exile under any circumstances, regardless of their unified or divided strategy on political prisoners. Thus, western countries need to take the lead, set up their own communication channels with Belarus, and work to ensure these prisoners are not forgotten. Despite not guaranteeing a bridge between Lukashenka and the democratic forces with the West as an intermediary, the probability that diplomatic efforts will yield better and quicker results is much higher than simply waiting for Lukashenka to start the bargaining himself.

The main takeaway from the August 1st exchange is that when both sides are willing to negotiate, previously unimaginable outcomes become possible, granting freedom to political prisoners who had lost hope of ever being released. However, not everyone may survive until such agreements are finalized, and it is certain that at least six political prisoners in Belarus will not benefit from them. Priority must be given to prevent this number from increasing, as there is nothing more important than saving human lives.

Vitali Matyshau is a Belarusian civic activist associated with an NGO focused on advocacy, supporting Belarusian political prisoners and their relatives. His academic focus lies primarily in the security of the Eastern European region and Georgia. He is pursuing a master’s degree in International Relations at NMBU, Norway.

“We suport the Belarusian Awakening’24” is a project co-financed by Solidarity Fund PL within the framework of Polish development cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland in the amount of PLN 230,000.

This publication expresses the views of the author only and cannot be identified with the official position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland.

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Alyaksandr Lukashenka, belarus, Belarus protests, political prisoners, prisoner exchange, Sviatlana Tsikhanouksaya