It is time for the EU to initiate a Trans-Caspian Partnership

Terhi Hakala, the European Union Special Representative for Central Asia together with the Foreign Minister of Uzbekistan Bakhtiyor Saidov. Photo: Delegation of the European Union to Uzbekistan

Russia’s war against Ukraine has shattered the post-Cold War European security order once and for all. It led the EU to abandon its previous denial of geopolitical competition and adapt its foreign and security policy to handle the most brutal use of force in Europe since the Second World War. EU representatives have described the development as a “geopolitical awakening”.

While Brussels has articulated a desire to become a geopolitical actor, it has historically exercised its influence through normative power, in which the EU’s common principles and values are promoted and spread through its international commitments. But the evolving international environment is very different to that immediately after the end of the Cold War. Then, the western model of liberal democracy had no viable rivals. Now, the leading autocratic powers of China and Russia are aggressively promoting their own rival political models, international norms and principles in their joint ambition to overturn the existing global order.

In a world of growing strategic competition, the EU needs to make its Eastern policy fit for a geopolitical world. This means rethinking its neighbourhood policy in general and the Eastern Partnership (EaP) in particular. The proposal advanced here is that the EU should consider the merits of replacing the now defunct EaP with a “Trans-Caspian Partnership”. Such a shift would make sense for a combination of political, economic and security reasons.

Why the Eastern Partnership has become obsolete

Following the “Big Bang” enlargement in 2004 and 2007, the EaP was launched in 2009 to build a deeper relationship between the EU and the remaining non-member states in Eastern Europe. As a policy instrument, the EaP set out to promote and intensify political association and deepen economic integration. This saw the EU target Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, as well as the three South Caucasian states of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.

At the time of its inception, the EaP offered a new type of agreement for the EU’s immediate Eastern neighbours. This represented the most concrete framework for dealing with non-members’ prospective integration since the decision in the Maastricht Agreement from 1991 to pursue an enlargement to former communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The EaP provided an opportunity for integration by adopting over two-thirds of the Union’s acquis communautaire for countries electing to sign Association Agreements (AA), as well as negotiate Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTA) with the EU.

Further east, the EU developed an entirely separate Strategy for Central Asia to steer its relations with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The EU, thus, drew a hard line in the Caspian Sea, acknowledging the European aspirations of six countries in Eastern Europe while approaching the Central Asian countries as more distant partners.

Since then, many things have changed. The EaP’s one-size-fits-all character did not stand the test of time. Only half of the countries – Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine – signed AAs and DCFTAs with the EU. The other three states embarked upon different paths in their relations with Brussels. Belarus turned into a Russian satellite state and suspended its participation in the EaP altogether in 2021. Armenia concluded its own custom-made Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with the EU, while Azerbaijan is still negotiating its own distinct bilateral framework, which will be very different from the original AA. Thus, the generic approach envisaged in the EaP has given way to individualized relationships with differing degrees of association with EU norms and regulations.

No longer synonymous with AAs and DCFTAs, the EaP’s future relevance as a policy instrument was called into doubt even before the European Council’s decision in December 2023 to open accession negotiations with Moldova and Ukraine and grant Georgia EU candidate status. The decision marked a new era for the EU’s Eastern policy and only accentuated the diversity among the EaP countries.

Meanwhile, bilateral relations between the EU and the Central Asian states have shifted to a higher gear. An Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EPCA) between Kazakhstan and the EU entered into force in 2020. Kyrgyzstan has followed suit by signing an EPCA in June 2024 and Uzbekistan is next in line. These Central Asian states’ agreements with the EU are different in degree rather than in nature from the tailor-made agreement that the EaP state Armenia signed or the one that Azerbaijan is expected to eventually conclude with Brussels. As such, there is no reason why Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, going forward, should not be treated on par with the EaP countries of Armenia and Azerbaijan. 

The convergence between the South Caucasus and Central Asia

Russia’s revanchist and imperialist actions have forced the political leaders in the states east and west of the Caspian Sea to rethink their relations with Russia and to rebalance their diplomatic alliances and trade relations. In the process, a truly Trans-Caspian dynamic is bringing the South Caucasus and Central Asia closer together.

The two regions are the key links in the east-west transport of energy and goods to Europe – known formally as the Trans-Caspian International Corridor (or informally as the Middle Corridor). Amid growing demands for non-Russian transport routes, a flurry of Trans-Caspian activities has taken place with the aim of enhancing the Middle Corridor’s efficiency. Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Turkey have agreed on a roadmap for the development of the corridor until 2027. They aspire to increase the capacity of the corridor to ten million tons, from the present capacity of around two million.

For this to happen, states along the Middle Corridor need to address several constraints reducing the route’s attractiveness, such as cumbersome transit and trade procedures; bottlenecks at border points and seaports; and insufficient container and vessel fleet capacity to handle large volumes of goods. In January 2024, EU officials took their most powerful stance yet by announcing that European and international investors would commit to invest ten billion euros in a development programme for the Middle Corridor.

By establishing a Trans-Caspian Partnership, the EU would be in a much-enhanced position to support the development of energy and trade infrastructure in the region. Overall, it is in the European interest to promote regional connectivity in order to ensure that the Central Asian states have options and do not become totally dependent on China and Russia for trade and investment. From a European perspective, Turkey’s location makes it a key state to have onboard in the redrawing of international trade routes. Using its alliance with Azerbaijan in the South Caucasus as a gateway, Ankara is beginning to expand its influence to the Turkic-speaking states in Central Asia. A Turkic bloc of cooperation – consisting of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – is rapidly emerging in fields as diverse as security, trade and culture.

In the current era of geopolitical competition, Russia is linking up with China and Iran, forming an axis of revisionist states bent on overturning the principles, rules and institutions of the post-Cold War international system. Unless this axis is countered, it might subjugate a great number of states in the process. It is therefore in the EU’s interest to encourage Turkey as a partial counterweight to the Beijing-Moscow-Tehran axis, as well as support and nurture the growing alignment of the Turkic world. Brussels should encourage this group of states, strategically located east and west of the Caspian Sea, to align closer with the European security architecture.

This is not an unrealistic proposal. The states in the South Caucasus and Central Asia have also converged in their foreign policies. Albeit with different means, they all pursue “multi-vector” foreign policies in their efforts to assert sovereignty while surrounded by various external powers. They do not want to be made to choose sides in the ongoing geopolitical confrontation. But to offset unhealthy dependencies on a nationalistic Russia and a rising China, they want more of a western presence, not less. Hence, the past years have seen increased European engagement bilaterally as well as in regional formats, such as the annual EU-Central Asia summits. While they oppose some aspects of the post-Cold War international system and welcome a multipolar world, this term has a different meaning to these states, which are not anti-western by nature.

Democracy and security in a Trans-Caspian Partnership

Some western sceptics may reject a closer EU partnership with the Central Asian states because of their democratic deficits and human rights transgressions. Yet, like in the South Caucasus, political reforms are more likely to succeed if they can benefit from the systematic assistance of the EU. Meanwhile, civil society is a growing force to be reckoned with even in Central Asia. The younger generations are exposed to the influences of the world to a much greater extent than their parents. As a result, a clear divergence has emerged between the Soviet and “post-Soviet” generations, with this second group more independent of Russian information sources and thinking, and less passive with regards to social and political matters. Youth activists are increasingly engaging in the country’s future, but they do it through other means than traditional non-governmental organizations, which are associated with an older generation. There is thus room to devise novel ways of interacting with and supporting the new generation that is coming to the fore. Such opportunities would be enhanced if they were part of an integrated EU policy platform.

The EaP was never a policy framework devised for wartime situations. It therefore lacks a security component. Instead, the EU is crafting individual security partnerships, most notably a long-term security agreement with Ukraine, but also a new defence and security partnership with Moldova. A new Trans-Caspian Partnership must feature security matters to help these countries defend themselves against various forms of malign foreign influences and interference. Except for Azerbaijan, which has a defence pact with Turkey, the regional states lack real protections for their security. Several of the states are members of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) but because of Moscow’s demonstrated disregard for the sovereignty of former Soviet states, this creates more of a problem than a solution. A revanchist Russian government has long deployed a wide array of tactics and instruments to ensure its strategic dominance over these countries. As Moscow becomes an increasingly unreliable, isolated and fearsome partner, regional policymakers are pushing to diversify their security partnerships.

Assisting the Central Asian states to build functional total defence policies and develop effective early warning and early response capabilities would help strengthen their resilience against military and non-military threats alike. Moreover, the EU should also step up its support for Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan’s joint efforts to further strengthen regional cooperation in Central Asia. This would build security and stability from within the region, thereby decreasing regional states’ vulnerability to manipulation from revisionist powers. Finally, to really gain from Trans-Caspian cooperation, the EU should double down on its contributions to the peace negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. A peace treaty would potentially open an entirely new dynamic in the Caspian region, benefitting security and stability as well as trade and prosperity.

In sum, while the original goals of the EaP have been shattered, the hard line between the South Caucasus and Central Asia is now rapidly dissolving. A truly Trans-Caspian dynamic is emerging, and it is in the strategic interest of the EU to add impetus to this development. Establishing a Trans-Caspian Partnership would be the most effective and coherent way of doing so.

Johan Engvall, PhD, works at the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies (SCEEUS), based at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs. His expertise is on domestic and foreign policy issues in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. His publications have appeared in several academic and policy journals, including Governance, Post-Soviet Affairs, Journal of Democracy, Foreign Policy and The National Interest.

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Central Asia, Eastern Partnership, EU foreign policy, EU-Central Asia, South Caucasus