Why equating Ukraine’s future with post-war South Korea is a mistake
Proposals are now being made that the war in Ukraine be frozen in a similar manner to the divide to the Korean peninsula (1953). While this may at first glance have appeal, the two conflicts ultimately have little in common.
July 31, 2024 - Samuel Dempsey - Articles and Commentary
Stephen Kotkin, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, among others, has supported the idea of ending the Russian invasion of Ukraine on similar terms to the Korean War, with a divided country and a new DMZ (Demilitarized Zone). Advocating for a Ukrainian DMZ necessitates ignoring strategic differences and the geopolitical context. It also embodies Cold War thinking in a hot war moment that could lead to further escalation.
Pre-war Korea and Ukraine differ significantly in terms of national identity, democratic status, and the nature of their conflict. The difference in ideological confrontation (communism versus capitalism) versus today’s (autocracy versus democracy) and/or (rules-based order versus. imperial ambitions), the scale of the conventional conflict (UN-U.S.-led intervention versus bi-lateral conflict with only allied security assistance); and, most importantly, the power of the aggressor state, with the USSR far superior to contemporary Russia, all underscore the improbability and undesirability of a DMZ outcome for Ukraine.
Fundamental differences in comparing the conflicts
National Identity
Ukraine has a robust modern national identity, supported by a vast history that would be unlikely to accept a DMZ reality. This is unlike Korea in 1953.
Ukraine has a long independent history from Russia, dating back to the ninth century, when Kyivan Rus’ was formed with the capital city of Kyiv. Moscow would not become a city until the 14th century. More recently, Ukraine has cemented its own sovereign national identity. In 2015, Ukraine passed its decommunization laws against Soviet monuments in Ukraine. In a Wilson Center survey about this legislation, about half of Ukrainians were unsure if rejecting Soviet history meant being a good Ukrainian citizen, but 92 per cent of respondents agreed that being a good citizen of Ukraine meant respecting the different cultures and ethnicities of citizens. At the same time, 96 per cent of respondents agreed that being a good citizen of Ukraine meant loyalty to the country independent of ethnicity, language and culture. Not only did Ukrainians determine their identity independently from Russia, but they did so while recognizing that they did not have to reject diversity in that identity, unlike Russia’s propagated identity in its near abroad.
In 2019, Ukraine made this decision outright by amending its constitution to include the “irreversibility of the European and Euro-Atlantic course of Ukraine” and the “confirmation of the European identity of the Ukrainian people”. An artificial DMZ established in Ukraine ignores the local realities. Whether in the country’s east or west, Ukraine is one united people, separate from Russia.
South and North Korea, on the other hand, were forced to separate prior to the establishment of the DMZ. Prior to Japanese annexation in 1910 and colonial rule until 1945, Korea was unified and independent for nearly 1,000 years, with the exception of indirect rule by the Mongols in the 13th century and a period of civil war in the early tenth century. After Japanese rule, Korea was split into American and Soviet zones through external geopolitics, leading to the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea). These more than 40 years of colonial rule degraded the national identity that once was, leaving the Korean public vulnerable to those on their borders with expansionist aspirations.
Democratic status
The Ukrainian people from inward orientation, have continuously progressed towards democracy in the last few decades, whereas South Korea in the early 20th century faced an externally opposed democratic transition that was slow to take hold among the populace.
Ukraine was one of the quickest to adopt democratic traits following the Soviet collapse. There were peaceful transfers of power within the legislative and executive powers, but there were still periods of democratic backsliding. However, two recent historical moments defined Ukraine’s democratic leanings: the Orange Revolution (2004) and the Revolution of Dignity (or “Euromaidan”) (2014). The Orange Revolution was a mass public protest that occurred in response to the attempted rigging of a presidential election in favour of the country’s prime minister, Viktor Yanukovych. After three rounds of voting, Viktor Yushchenko emerged as the winner.
Ten years later, Yanukovych, now the sitting president, was again the democratic challenge in Ukraine’s way. In collusion with Russia, he backed away from the EU Association Agreement in late 2013 to draw closer to Russia, sparking the Euromaidan protests and his ousting from government.
Despite significant democratic challenges, in large part the result of both Russian conventional and hybrid war, Ukraine has chosen in favour of democracy, with most improving after 2014. Despite fighting a war in the east, the 2014 and 2019 elections produced reform-oriented parliamentarians and new democratic judicial reform institutions, such as the High Anti-Corruption Court and National Anti-Corruption Bureau.
As the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to the division of the Korean peninsula at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in 1945, the first signs of attempts at a democratic transition occurred within South Korea. Given the recent capitulation of Japanese colonial rule following 35 years, Korea had little democratic foundations and a among political elites. The artificial division of the country at the 38th parallel exacerbated these conditions, frustrating the US’s commanding general in Korea, General John R. Hodge, who, without understanding Korea’s culture or grievances, struggled to seed its democratic future.
A post-colonized Korea, split in two in a bipolar hegemonic world, shares little in governing and populous orientation with the independent, sovereign and democratic Ukraine of today.
Nature of the conflict
The Korean War was at the forefront of the Cold War, with complete western involvement against Soviet, Chinese and North Korean forces. This conflict resulted in millions of casualties in Korea, as well as the complete destruction of infrastructure. In contrast, the conflict in Ukraine has been more limited, with the West yet to exhaust all avenues for countering aggression. Ukraine fights its war alone, supported only by financing, sanctions and diplomatic pressure.
Furthermore, the DMZ was only feasible with full conventional US military support. This included boots on the ground in the conflict and a long-term post-conflict military presence. Ukraine would need the same support from NATO, but the Alliance is not in the same position as the UN and US in 1953. Approaching the NATO summit in Washington DC, there has been little talk of binding NATO or the West to Ukraine’s resistance against Russia. The only exception has been French President Macron’s call to not limit the possibility of deploying NATO forces in Ukraine. As such, the scale of resources and strategies has not yet been exhausted to entertain the idea of a DMZ in Ukraine, as it was in Korea.
The difference in ideological confrontation and context
The Korean War was a proxy of the Cold War, a battle between the communist and capitalist models, a great experiment in determining the success of each model on mirroring nations and populations. Whereas Putin’s war in Ukraine is the battle of an expansionist imperial autocratic regime in a democratic nation, which in turn is fighting to uphold the rules-based order that has defined this century, built off the work accomplished by NATO and the United Nations since 1945.
Accepting or promoting the idea of a DMZ in Ukraine ignores Putin’s declared aspirations to revive the legacy of Peter the Great in today’s Russia. It, in turn, ignores the power differential between NATO and today’s Russia and the bipolar world of the 1950s. Russia today has the economic power of Spain or the US state of Texas. In all domains – land, air, sea and cyber – NATO has roughly five times the force capability. Accepting a settlement to divide an unwilling democratic population with a more limited rogue nation will only cause further reverberations of disorder for the next century.
Two very distinct conflicts
The Korean War and the Russian invasion of Ukraine are two very different conflicts in different contexts. Applying lessons from one to the other requires simplification to the extent of nullifying the facts of reality. Advocating for a Ukrainian DMZ signals a return to Cold War thinking and/or the recognition that we never left it. Therefore, it may appear that the US never won the first time around. The Korean War’s conclusion entrenched the Cold War divide, solidified Korea’s division into two ideologically opposed states, and escalated the arms race. Such outcomes are undesirable in Ukraine and surely undesirable on the European continent at the borders of NATO and the EU.
While South Korea became a western democratic power, North Korea has also maintained its own stature. It has now fuelled Russia’s invasion of Ukraine by manufacturing an enormous quantity of artillery for Moscow. Aiming for a Ukrainian DMZ not only ignores the players’ different geopolitical contexts and realities, but it also returns to a Cold War mindset, which in the best case, only delays and emboldens further aggression.
Stephen Kotkin posits that if you asked the South Koreans today, knowing now that they are a thriving economy and democracy in Asia, if they would have opposed the 38th parallel divide, believing they would be content in their response, I would ask him to instead position that question for the 26 million North Koreans, who now live under tyrannical rule in desperate conditions. I would further ask him to ask how the Ukrainians feel about that divide, knowing that the DPRK now facilitates Russia’s invasion. I would also ask him to pose that question to the families split arbitrarily by this divide in Korea, once one people, now divided forever. I am sure that in seeking those answers, Kotkin’s DMZ advocacy would fall under some doubt. Korea’s DMZ was not the result of it being a favorable solution, but because all other options were exhausted.
Samuel Dempsey is a geopolitical researcher and analyst at ITSS Verona and European Horizons, a defence consulting associate to Dr. Can Kasapoglu, and an incoming Presidential Management Fellow in the Department of State. He works on transatlantic defense and security issues through an interdisciplinary and economic perspective. He holds an M.A. in Geopolitics and Strategic Studies from the Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Spain and a B.A. in Journalism and Communications from Anglo American University Prague, Czech Republic.
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