The changing narrative of Chinese foreign policy

Illustration by Andrzej Zaręba

It is finally clear that, following that well-known metaphor, the “Russian bear” has, yet again, used its claws and revealed its viciousness and irrationality. However, the question western policymakers now ask themselves is what will the “Chinese dragon” do about it? China tries to project itself as a peace defender and a party willing to mediate between Russia and Ukraine to make the world a more stable and peaceful place. Yet, this seems to be merely a diplomatic façade, behind which China is trying its best to maintain positive relations with Russia (which are greatly beneficial economically) without potentially destroying its already very difficult relations with the EU and United States. On top of that, there are countries in the so-called Global South that are immensely important for China. In order to pursue these interests, China introduced numerous changes in the narrative of its foreign policy. The predominant result is a silent departure from its “Wolf Warrior diplomacy”, which  characterized its foreign policy following Xi Jinping’s rise to power in 2012.

 The changing narrative

In its current foreign policy, China seems to be following the same approach as it does in its internal affairs. This is namely to appease, not just its population but also its international partners. After the COVID-19 pandemic, which started in China and could be perceived as a significant factor leading to growing global distrust towards Beijing, and after a period of harsh zero-COVID policies which affected the Chinese economy, the dragon has lost a great amount of its fire. It has started to act more leniently in its foreign policy, and the narrative therein followed accordingly.

China as a successful power

First and foremost, with China pursuing its ambition of becoming a global superpower, it needs the world to see how successful the “Chinese way” really is. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – a Chinese flagship infrastructure project – was meant to show precisely that. But its slowdown, problems and frequently disappointing outcomes have shown the complete opposite. Since the practical implications of the BRI’s issues work against the interests of China, the narrative must fix that.

Take the example of the US-China summit in Anchorage, Alaska in 2021. This was the first high-level US-China meeting under President Joe Biden, which happened in the middle of the ongoing trade war between those two countries. The list of issues to be discussed during the meeting was overwhelming, yet Yang Jiechi, the director of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Foreign Affairs Commission, opened his speech highlighting Chinese economic success and the country’s achievements in tackling COVID-19 and poverty (all thanks to the Chinese Communist Party, of course). Whenever China knows that the eyes of the world are watching, it will inevitably talk about its numerous successes and highlight the role of the Communist Party in achieving them. In the end, China must show that its non-western way of carrying out politics is a trustworthy one and what better way to show this than by highlighting its own internal achievements.

China as a peaceful power

It goes without saying that today’s world is becoming more insecure. With the Russian aggression in Ukraine, war has come back to Europe, which is something many thought was impossible today. The ongoing conflict between Israel and Palestine only aggravated the pre-existing feeling that the planet is filled with chaos. In these labyrinths of conflicts and ongoing wars, China presents itself as a peaceful power that wants nothing but security and welfare for humanity.

In Chinese rhetoric, the previously mentioned BRI is frequently becoming an instrument through which Beijing can project its peaceful motives onto other international actors. The Third Belt and Road Forum organized in Beijing in 2023 was a great example of that. Even the musical piece that accompanied the international leaders’ entry into the venue was entitled “Peace – a Community with a Shared Future”. In his speech, Xi Jinping explicitly mentioned the BRI’s “spirit of peace and cooperation”, as well as its capability to “deliver a bright future of peace, development, cooperation and mutual benefit for future generations”.

Furthermore, in its willingness to present itself as a peaceful power, China wants to create a feeling that its efforts do not stop only with the words uttered by its leaders. For example, during the G20 meeting in Bali in July 2022, Wang Yi put forward China’s Cooperation Initiative on Global Food Security. It was an eight-point plan in which China presented its ideas and urged the G20, as well as the UN, to recognize and bear its responsibility to “establish a partnership on commodity cooperation”.

One year later, on February 24th 2023, the second anniversary of the onset of Russia‘s full-scale aggression in Ukraine, China released a document titled “China’s position on the political settlement of the Ukraine Crisis”. It is a 12-point plan in which China highlights the most important steps that need to be fulfilled to settle the so-called “crisis” in Ukraine. It would seem that the most important point therein was the one on “resuming peace talks”. China seems to be predominantly a staunch supporter of mediation between Russia and Ukraine. As a matter of fact, it participated in talks organized in Saudi Arabia in August 2023. Now, it is also quite vocal regarding the organization of the high-level conference happening in Switzerland between June 15th and 16th this year. The aim of this meeting will be to discuss the possibility of a peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine.

On the surface, everything adds up and China seems to be heavily interested in peace in Ukraine. However, if we look closely, we will notice that China was one of the countries that abstained from condemning Russian actions in the UN vote in March 2022. It has also refused to refer to Russian actions as “war” and instead talks about the “Ukraine crisis”. It is also a supporter of Russian involvement in the peace talks, especially those in Switzerland.  At this point, we also know that China is using loopholes in western sanctions and is providing Russia with drones, as well as non-lethal equipment. The picture painted by Chinese words and actions is one of a country that says one thing but does something else. This position questions whether China is really the peaceful power that it so desperately wants to be perceived as.

China as a different power

The post-Cold War world has been dominated by the West, as personified by the US and the EU. It goes without saying that numerous countries, such as those in Central and Eastern Europe, have benefitted enormously from this status quo and were great proponents of maintaining it. However, in their self-proclaimed quest to democratize, civilize and free  nations all over the world, western powers clearly had some priorities vis-à-vis particular regions. This in turn created a vacuum in other regions of the world that fell outside of their focus. Such regions can be seen in Africa, Central Asia and Latin America. As Naomi Klein stated, “politics hates a vacuum.” So, inevitably, the countries of those regions became very attractive for non-western actors, mainly Russia and China. Russia has not changed its methods and has been producing societal divisions, spreading disinformation and physically intervening in particular countries.

Yet, China’s methods are different. It has entered the aforementioned regions with infrastructural projects and as part of intergovernmental organizations. These are mainly the BRI and BRICS in Africa and Latin America, as well as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Central Asia. These projects and organizations, to this day, provide a platform for China to promote itself as a “different type of power” in those regions.

In a keynote speech at the China-Africa Leaders’ Dialogue titled “Create a Great Future for China and Africa”, Xi Jinping highlighted the BRI’s role in meeting the goals of the African Union’s Agenda 2063, which aims at “transforming Africa into the global powerhouse of the future”. He also stated that China and Africa should cooperate to “practice true multilateralism”. This phrase seems to be a clear blow to the US and EU, which are both actors known for promoting global multilateralism. In Xi’s eyes, this is not true, as western policy supposedly only benefits the US and EU, rather than African states. He continued by stating that China and Africa should “unequivocally oppose vestiges of colonialism and hegemonism in all forms”. The message is clear: China, in contrast to the western countries, is neither a colonial power nor a hegemon, and is willing to become an advocate for African countries in their defence against them. In other words, China wishes to become the self-proclaimed voice of the voiceless, which is something that the US and EU have failed to become.

Similar sentiment is also present in Xi’s speech at the 15th BRICS Summit in 2023. Therein, a focus is put on the fact that China, as opposed to western powers, is not willing to impose any of its ideas or ideology onto its partners. He states that BRICS countries “choose development paths independently, jointly defend right to development, and march in tandem towards modernization” and adds that “BRICS countries invariably advocate and practice independent foreign policies”. This constant repetition of the value of “independence” aims at strengthening the narrative of Chinese respect for its partner states’ ideas regarding their own development, as well as their values.

Lastly, China’s narrative seems to be the boldest among all those coming from the current superpowers. It does not only want to advocate for itself or for particular regions of the world. It goes one step further than anyone else as it wants to become an advocate for the entirety of humanity. During the 23rd Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit in 2023, Xi Jinping advocated for “community with shared future for all mankind”, a concept that was also referred to in numerous different speeches coming both from Xi himself, as well as from other Chinese officials. In the same speech, Xi also, once again, highlighted China’s self-proclaimed promotion of “inclusiveness between civilizations”, as well as its advocacy for “peaceful coexistence and harmonious development of different civilizations”.

It is clear that China wants the world to see that it is “different” to the western superpowers. Its care for humanity as a whole as well as its respect for partners and lack of willingness to impose anything on them are what should convince us that China’s intentions are indeed true. Interestingly, such an approach on the Chinese side could be connected all the way to a Confucian Sino-centric perception of the world, in which “through good government and internal peace and prosperity, China would play a leadership role in the world and serve as a universal paradigm for other nations.” For now, this may sound unrealistic. However, China seems to be taking these words very seriously.

China as a power that does not tell you everything

Beneath all of these beautiful and promising ideas and slogans, there is unfortunately a thick layer of issues that China prefers not to talk about at all. These include Xinjiang and the violation of human rights vis-à-vis the Uyghur community there, as well as constantly rising internal struggles (such as demographic issues, youth unemployment and the ongoing housing crisis). China’s maritime expansion into the South China Sea is also a key problem, alongside its alleged military build-up in the Indo-Pacific and especially concerning Taiwan.

All of these issues are swept under the rug and are virtually non-existent in China’s foreign policy narrative. Yet, they are unravelling as we speak. Especially the military build-up and Taiwan seem to be the most concerning issues for global peace. Lately, Mackenzie Eaglen from the American Enterprise Institute wrote an analysis in which she stated that “after accounting for economic adjustments and estimating reasonable but uncounted expenditures, the buying power of China’s 2022 military budget balloons to an estimated $711 billion – triple Beijing’s claimed top line and nearly equal with the United States’ military budget that same year.” If the data provided by Eaglen were indeed true, it would mean that we should stop asking ourselves if there will be military confrontation between China and the US over Taiwan, but rather when it is going to take place.

One of Xi’s biggest goals is to achieve the “dream of the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” by 2049, which will mark the 100th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China. However, full rejuvenation is not possible without Taiwan. That is why China will not rest and will do its absolute utmost to get its hands on this island. This could mean conflict between China and the US; a conflict that neither of the sides could afford to lose.

Evolution of China’s narrative

For now, China will certainly be eager to primarily present itself as a successful, peaceful and “different” partner. It seems that after a rough period for the Chinese economy, and taking into account the previously mentioned internal issues, Chinese foreign policy will be aiming at maintaining the status quo (vis-à-vis the EU), or at least not aggravating the already difficult situation (vis-à-vis the US). The narrative would then follow suit, and it would frequently touch upon the issues discussed in this article.

However, one has to keep in mind that China’s foreign policy and its narratives are immensely flexible, and they can change over a very brief period, depending on the needs and ideas of the government. Therefore, in case of escalation in Taiwan, the narrative could change into a much more assertive and perhaps even aggressive one. An old Chinese proverb states “把钥匙开一把锁,” which translates as “one key opens one lock.” This could be interpreted as “there is a separate solution for every problem.” The narrative of Chinese foreign policy could follow this idea in the future and undergo transformations whenever new problems would need to be solved.

Konrad Szatters graduated from the University of Silesia and College of Europe in Natolin, Warsaw. Currently, he works as an academic assistant in political science and international relations at the College of Europe in Natolin, where he researches on the Chinese foreign policy, EU-China relations, and the Chinese and European development initiatives. He is mostly interested in the role of narratives and perceptions in those fields.

China, China-Russian relations, Chinese narratives, Europe