The ability to reconcile is a mark of a nation’s maturity
A conversation with Milan Kučan, the first president of Slovenia from 1991 to 2002. Interviewer: Nikodem Szczygłowski
NIKODEM SZCZYGŁOWSKI: In 2004, at the time of the EU’s enlargement, Slovenia was considered one of the most developed countries in the region – much more so than Poland, the Czech Republic or Lithuania. Now, 20 years later, we can see that the achievements of Poland or Lithuania were greater than those of Slovenia. Slovenia was at the highest level when it joined the EU, and it is still at a high level, but Poland or Lithuania have caught up much more and are much closer to Slovenia. What are the reasons for this?
MILAN KUČAN: Slovenia was ahead of all these countries in terms of development parameters at that time. But then, it actually developed more slowly. This was due to the specific features of the economic and privatization reforms in Slovenia, but also a number of other factors. At a certain point, Slovenia actually stopped or paid much less attention to economic development than to internal ideological debates, political divisions and so on.
June 22, 2024 -
Milan Kučan
Nikodem Szczygłowski
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Hot TopicsIssue 4 2024Magazine
Photo courtesy of Milan Kučan
Of course, from an economic point of view, at that time the development gap between Slovenia and, say, Poland or the Czech Republic was significant, but now it has narrowed considerably. This is due to Slovenia’s slower development. It is easier to achieve tangible results at a low level of development than it is to achieve the same tangible result at a higher level with the same development as others. I think that this momentum and the sense of catching up with the European Union has also meant that there has been greater mobilization in these poorer and less developed countries than in Slovenia. Slovenia was relatively successful, relatively developed and relatively satisfied that it had almost reached the European average when it joined, but then it started to lose this advantage.
This happened because we were unable to make good use of the advantages it gave us. This is because Slovenia did not have a well-crystallized development strategy of its own, which is still not entirely clear today. We are a stable democracy with all its attributes, our institutions function similarly to those in other western countries, the state is quite efficient, elections are held democratically, the principle of the separation of powers works, the courts and the media are independent. In short, what we imagine as a democratic state system has been almost fully realized in Slovenia. Whether Slovenia has actually been economically successful in recent years is another question.
Do you see things changing in this regard?
It has to be said that after a period in which we fell into the medium-term development trap, Slovenia has recently been enjoying high growth in our national product again, high living standards and also corporate profits, for example. Almost all the statistics for last year are very optimistic. Slovenia has done well in the EU common market. I think that the benefits of this for Slovenians are obvious, and that is the most important thing. Our country is living the life of a peaceful and stable country. Of course, there are various internal political upheavals that may be incomprehensible to an outside observer. For example, a part of Slovenian politics is still fighting communism, which, after all, has been gone for a long time. This negative conception – like other such visions of struggle – always needs an enemy to act, and this has its historical roots in the 19th century, in the so-called “division of souls”, as this phenomenon was called in Slovenia, or in a kind of cultural struggle, which then intensified enormously during and after the Second World War. This division still has consequences for Slovenian society and, of course, it has an impact on the state of Slovenian democracy. Personally, I do not think that the negative concept can prevail, but it has its defenders. In fact, all such discourses are not based on ideas about how to make Slovenian society more modern and prosperous, but to a large extent on a return to the past.
Does this mean that the conflict between Tito’s partisans and the Home Guard (the anti-partisan collaborationists during the Second World War – editor’s note) is still taking place in Slovenia?
I think this has to do with our view of the future of the country. If that future is not conceptualized, it is much easier to build narratives about the past. The fact is that in Slovenia during the Second World War, part of the population collaborated with the occupier. This cooperation was, of course, not negligible. However, there was also considerable resistance to the German and Italian occupation, and after the war there was an unjustifiable punishment of those who opposed it. It is a crime, but the fact is that there were extrajudicial executions. And that still carries a certain weight in the collective memory of the nation. The problem is that as a mature nation we are still unable to accept our history and part of the political scene wants to bring it back into everyday social and political life. We are no exception in this respect, and other nations in Europe have had similar experiences. The ability to reconcile is a mark of a nation’s maturity and shows that it is able to come to terms with its history. We have lived through it, it is a tragic part of our past, we have to live with it somehow, but we also have to look to the future – I think that is how we should build a narrative.
Many observers believe that the biggest problem in our part of Europe today has become the model of a polarized society based on populism. Populism, however, often operates with different kinds of nostalgia and scepticism. What does Euroscepticism and “Yugonostalgia” mean in Slovenia today?
I think it is a certain ideological formula. Most Slovenians today have no experience of life in Yugoslavia. Either they were children or they were not yet born. But it is true that there is something in the Slovenian collective memory according to which there are areas that were better organized in Yugoslavia than they are today. This is the so-called problem of social inequality, of access to the public sector, i.e. education, health, housing and so on. Indeed, the measures taken by the authorities at that time were done to reduce disparities. In Yugoslavia, and especially in Slovenia, there were hardly any social differences at that time. Or they were so insignificant that they were not crucial for integration into society. Today, when problems arise in a certain area, we think it was much better back then. I usually say that it was simply different. Whether it was better or not is, of course, another question. The question of political rights, pluralism, democracy and so on is a separate question. But there are enough conversations about this which also involve people who have no personal experience of life in Yugoslavia. They are usually operating on the inherited experiences of their parents, who at that time had a guaranteed job. They also had a guarantee that their children would go to school, that they would get an apartment, that they would spend their holidays in resorts that were owned by the trade unions. In short, Yugonostalgia is more of a political phenomenon, with the concept used primarily in broad and wide-ranging internal politics.
On the other hand, there is the idea, illustrated by a popular quote, that in Yugoslavia there was supposedly “no fruit yoghurt”.
Yes, that’s right. That is what one of our MEPs said even though he was only repeating the words of the Croatian president. It was not so bad. I think we did have these yoghurts. But this is a good illustration of what we are talking about. Part of the population has a feeling of dissatisfaction and scepticism. Perhaps, in seeking an answer to this, we should ask ourselves what the original expectations were of the changes that have taken place. For we Slovenes, for example, did not have to include in our expectations that we would be able to, say, travel freely abroad to the West because we were already guaranteed that in Yugoslavia. So the level of our expectations was higher than in Poland. Therefore, these unrealized higher expectations can also be a reason for a certain nostalgia or a certain scepticism. On the other hand, from a political point of view, I believe that the key reason for the spread of such phenomena is the current lack of solidarity in the European Union. In Yugoslavia, despite all the differences that we have talked about, which were really big and which mostly broke up Yugoslavia, there was still a certain solidarity. At the level of “mini societies”, at the level of a republic, at the level of a country. In the European Union, on the contrary, there is talk of solidarity without solidarity. For instance, I have mixed feelings about the refugee crisis. If we are a community, we must share the burden. If we are not prepared, if there is no solidarity between us, then we are no longer a community. This begs the question – to what extent do the values on which European integration is based and for which it was founded still exist? Today, they seem to be much more diluted, watered down, less important, and less omnipresent in our lives. The less cohesion there is, the more the question arises – what unites us? Is the European Union just another European common market? In many areas it works like a common market. When we joined the EU, we had clear requirements that we had to meet. And we have met them, we have closed one chapter after another. I remember speaking to the Polish president at that time, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, and he said to me: “Listen, Milan, Slovenia will be the first country to be fully ready for membership in the union. You fulfil all the conditions, but in reality the door will not open to all until Poland enters.” Poland was important in this context as the largest and most important country in the group. So there was this kind of solidarity. The whole concept of the ten countries that joined the EU in 2004 was designed to say: well, Poland has fulfilled the conditions, so now we are all moving forward together.
Now let’s look at the case of Croatia, which certainly did not meet all the conditions when it was admitted to the community in 2013. Attitudes towards the Serbian minority, the unregulated borders with Slovenia, Bosnia and Serbia. In short, it was a country that had no defined borders and had not even tried to resolve them in an appropriate way, in accordance with the requirements of membership. Romania was an even clearer example and Bulgaria even more so. In short, there was a certain lowering of the requirements, because it was an increase in the European market. I therefore repeat that the European Union has no future if it does not take major steps to strengthen the foundations of values as a binding tie. This is compared to attempts to establish itself only as a common market.
Where do you think Slovenia is today, in 2024? Is it an Alpine country, a Central European country, a country of the former Yugoslavia, a country on the border with the Balkans? Is Slovenia still a bridge to the West for the countries of the former Yugoslavia or vice versa?
I think that Slovenia, because of its location and history, is all of these things at the same time. But of course only if that is what it wants to be. There is no doubt that Slovenia is a Central European country. Although we usually think that we have nothing in common with the Balkans, we are in a way, to a lesser extent, a Balkan country. This question used to be asked more often and in those years there were several interesting conferences, meetings of Central European presidents. What was Central Europe then? It was physically impossible to define it precisely. You could include northern Italy, you could include Silesia separately from Poland, you could include the whole of Poland. György Konrád (a leading Hungarian intellectual – editor’s note) had the best definition in my opinion – it was always about the state of mind of the people living in the area, he said. And although the Central European mentality did exist, as long as the world was divided into blocs, it could not be spoken of. After the fall of the Iron Curtain, this mythical European phenomenon began to reappear. Slovenia is a deeply Central European country, a western country in its structure and in its constitution. It is also linked to the Balkans, so that in a sense it is also a Balkan country, or at least a bridge to the Balkans. At the same time, it is also an Alpine country because it has the Alps and we have many links with the Alpine countries. Together with Hungary, it is also a Pannonian country, because we have part of the Pannonian Plain at home. All this also shows the cultural influences that Slovenian culture has absorbed. In my opinion, this is an advantage of sorts, and if only Slovenian politicians knew how to use it, I mean in the right way, Slovenia could very much strengthen its position as a mediator on many of these issues.
I believe that despite the mistakes we have made, Slovenia has strong legitimacy to talk about respect for human rights, because no one is perfect. Our experience of economic transformation can also be a lesson for others, but we need to have the confidence to share it. Above all, Slovenia is not confident enough, not proud enough of its achievements. I am not just referring to the last 30 years, but let us not forget that we are a small nation living at the crossroads of interests, which has experienced wars and attempts at assimilation. Despite this, the country has preserved its culture, language and identity. In my opinion, we should be much prouder of that than we are.
This interview is a part of a wider conversation on Slovenian contemporary history. Read the full conversation coming soon online.
Milan Kučan was president of the Presidency of socialist Slovenia 1990-1992 and president of the independent Republic of Slovenia 1992-2002.
Nikodem Szczygłowski is a traveller, writer and reporter. He studied Mediterranean Archaeology at the University of Łódź and at CEMI in Prague. He is fluent in Lithuanian and Slovenian.




































