Russian aggression against Ukraine: No peace in sight

Illustration by Andrzej Zaręba

Russian demands kept escalating to the point that Ukraine had to recognize the Russian annexation of four additional Ukrainian regions, which the Russian army had even failed to occupy, as a prerequisite for any further talks. In March 2023 Russian officials claimed that the goals of the “special military operation” in Ukraine could not be achieved by diplomatic means but continued to call for the recognition of their interests. Ukraine does not reject the idea of negotiating with Russia in principle, but says it needs to roll back Russian violations of international law and restore control over its entire territory, including the Crimean Peninsula, before peace talks take place. As Ukraine’s position gains more traction in the world, both sides are bracing for a prolonged confrontation.

The start of the war

Although the world’s attention fully turned to the Russian-Ukrainian war on February 24th 2022 when Russia launched its full-scale invasion, the war had started eight years earlier in February 2014. Putin himself admitted that the plan to annex Crimea was launched on February 22nd 2014, about a month before the farce referendum intended to legitimize the annexation. The Russian military medal for the seizure of Crimea places the starting date of the aggression even earlier – on February 20th 2014 – the exact date when unarmed protesters were being shot by riot police in downtown Kyiv.

With the central Ukrainian government in disarray after a major popular uprising followed by the flight of the country’s president, the takeover of the peninsula was relatively easy. By March 18th 2014, the date when the annexation was sealed by Putin’s decree, Russian soldiers bearing no insignia had managed to capture the peninsula’s government institutions, airports and military units and seal it off from the Ukrainian mainland with checkpoints manned by Russian soldiers and former members of Ukrainian riot police. The peaceful rally on February 26th 2014 by the Crimean parliament in support of Ukraine’s territorial integrity managed to delay the Russian plans but was powerless to stop them.

Emboldened by its success, Russia launched another hybrid operation in the east of Ukraine. Although the events of the early spring of 2014 are often described as a separatist uprising, Russia had a direct role in fomenting and leading it. Based on the evidence provided by the Ukrainian government, the European Court of Human Rights established in its January 25th 2023 ruling that Russian military personnel were present in Donbas from April 2014 and that senior members of the Russian military were present in command positions in the separatist armed groups and entities from the outset. The court also found that from May 11th, all areas in the hands of “separatists” had been under direct Russian control and that the Russian large-scale invasion in the Donbas region began in late summer 2014. By that time, the conflict escalated to the level of intense hostilities and attempts to resolve it by diplomatic means had begun.

The Minsk deal

The Normandy Format was made up of Ukraine, Russia, Germany and France and was launched by their respective heads of state on June 6th 2014, when the leaders met for the 70th anniversary of D-Day in France. The leaders also established the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG) consisting of Ukraine, Russia and the OSCE as a venue to seek a political solution to the conflict. The Minsk Protocol, the key document that was supposed to serve as a roadmap to resolving the conflict, was signed on September 5th 2014 by members of the Trilateral Contact Group and Russian proxies. Two weeks later, it was followed by a memorandum outlining the parameters for implementing the ceasefire.

The 12-point Minsk Protocol stipulated the “immediate bilateral cessation of the use of weapons” and its monitoring by the OSCE. It called for an “interim status of local self-government” (law on special status) for the occupied territories; the release of all hostages and illegally detained persons; the removal of unlawful military formations and military hardware, as well as militants and mercenaries, from the territory of Ukraine; and finally the holding of early local elections.

The very creation of the TCG; the fourth point of the protocol which called for “constant monitoring of the Ukrainian-Russian state border”; as well as the sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation by the United States, the European Union and their allies; indicated that Russia’s role in the crisis was clearly understood. Yet, illogically, the protocol left Crimea out of the equation, despite Russian aggression being behind both the occupation of Crimea and the hostilities in the Donbas.

The political part of the deal hit a roadblock immediately. The claims of the so-called republics rested on Russian propaganda narratives about civil war in Ukraine and the legitimacy of the so-called separatist leaders. In addition, Russia feigned being an intermediary, speaking of peace while supplying arms and military equipment to its proxies and letting the so-called rebels voice more extreme demands and violate agreements.

On the other hand, there was very strong domestic opposition in Ukraine to the idea of autonomy for the occupied territories. The conflict was seen as international rather than internal and the autonomy advanced Russia’s goals. It was also clear that no peace was possible while Russia kept the hostilities going by supplying mercenaries and arms. Holding a fair election in accordance with Ukrainian law in the territory controlled by Russia also did not appear possible either.

While the talks in Minsk were underway, Russia consolidated its grip on the occupied territories. It started by shutting down alternative information sources and persecuting everybody supportive of Ukraine. Shortly, the Russian rouble became the main currency, schools switched to the Russian curriculum, etc. And while everybody’s attention was focused on Minsk, Russia was replacing the population and building up its military presence in Crimea.

As Petro Poroshenko’s presidency was coming to a close in 2019, no progress had been achieved. The ceasefire did not hold and the contact group and its subgroups kept meeting, but the meetings yielded no results. There were no meetings of the Normandy Format after the October 2016 Berlin Summit, which failed to resolve the political deadlock. Russia, meanwhile, continued to escalate. It imposed an inspection regime in the Kerch Strait for vessels going to and from Ukrainian ports in the Sea of Azov. On November 25th 2018, it used force against Ukrainian navy personnel and vessels on their way from the Black Sea to the Sea of Azov. On April 24th 2019, Putin also issued the decree allowing Ukrainians residing in the areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts under Russian control to obtain Russian citizenship in a simplified manner.

Death of the Minsk “peace process” 

When Volodymyr Zelenskyy became president in May 2019 he started making efforts to resolve the conflict. On July 18th 2019, a comprehensive ceasefire was agreed upon and forces were disengaged in three places. Two prisoner exchanges took place in September and December that year. The Crimean film director Oleh Sentsov and Ukrainian sailors captured in the Kerch Strait on November 25th 2018 were released. The Normandy Format was revived and Zelenskyy met Putin one-on-one on December 9th 2019. It was the first meeting since the 2016 Berlin Summit. French President Emmanuel Macron remarked at the summit’s press conference that the very fact that the meeting had taken place marked progress.

Although Putin said that he was generally happy with the meeting, old differences re-emerged immediately. Zelenskyy said that he and Putin had a different understanding of the border control issue. Zelenskyy also insisted that security had to come before the implementation of any political measures. In a continued attempt to present Russia as an intermediary and the conflict as a civil war, Putin said that “the parties to the conflict” must talk to each other directly because this is the only way conflicts are resolved. In December 2019, however, both proxy states adopted laws on the border unilaterally claiming that their respective territories included the entire Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts. Both hostilities and negotiations continued.

Another set of “Measures to strengthen the ceasefire” was adopted in July 2020. Overall, according to Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba, under Zelenskyy’s presidency, Ukraine held 88 rounds of negotiations with Russia. In the spring of 2021 Russia started massing troops on the Ukrainian border. The crisis dissipated at first but was rekindled in the autumn. Western countries intensified their negotiation efforts. US President Joe Biden held a summit with Putin in June 2021 attempting to resolve the issue. In December 2021 Russia submitted a draft treaty stipulating that NATO should withdraw all forces deployed on Alliance territory since May 1997. It wanted guarantees from the western countries that NATO will not expand eastward anymore, meaning that Ukraine was not going to join NATO. The demands were unacceptable.

The Minsk process and the Normandy Format became irrelevant on February 21st 2022 when Putin signed decrees recognizing the independence of the proxy states, known as the Luhansk People’s Republic and Donetsk People’s Republic. Importantly, the recognition concerned not only the parts of Ukrainian territory occupied by Russia at that time but the entire territory of the Ukrainian Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, including the parts controlled by the Ukrainian government. Yet, Putin continued to talk about negotiations between Ukraine and “the leadership of these republics”. On February 24th Russia then launched a full-scale aggression against Ukraine.

Negotiations after the start of the full-scale invasion

The negotiations that followed the start of the full-scale invasion had an even shorter lifespan than all previous attempts. The first round took place almost immediately after the start of the assault on February 27th 2022. There was nothing fundamentally new among the 12 points the Russian side brought to the table. The demands were the same as Russia had repeatedly voiced publicly, i.e., “de-nazification”, “de-militarization”, neutrality and the non-alignment of Ukraine, etc. The Ukrainian side sought an immediate ceasefire, an armistice and humanitarian corridors for the evacuation of civilians from destroyed or constantly shelled villages and cities.

On March 3rd Putin, in a telephone conversation with the French president, said that the tasks of the Russian “operation” will be fulfilled in any case, regardless of the results of negotiations. In a clear demonstration that this was an ultimatum, the Kremlin said that “attempts to buy time by prolonging the negotiations will only lead to additional demands on Kyiv appearing in our negotiating position.”

Negotiations soon moved to Turkey, where the first meeting between Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba and his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov took place on March 10th. Kyiv sought a 24-hour ceasefire and a humanitarian corridor from besieged Mariupol according to Kuleba, but Lavrov refused. In addition, Lavrov denied that Russia had attacked Ukraine. Kuleba said Lavrov had brought the same old narratives to the table and that Lavrov’s demands amounted to Ukraine’s full surrender. 

The conditions that Ukraine was ready to accept at the negotiations provided for a refusal to join NATO in exchange for receiving “international security guarantees” and the withdrawal of Russian troops to the February 23rd borders (rather than December 1991). The status of Crimea was supposed to be discussed over the next 15 years and Ukraine pledged not to restore control over the peninsula by military means. Russia received the Ukrainian proposition and said they would consider it. Meanwhile, the Russian assault on Ukraine continued.

On March 25th the Russian defence ministry announced that Russian troops would leave the area around Kyiv and the north of the country as a “goodwill gesture” to support the peace talks. In reality, the Russian war effort in the north of the country had failed and was no longer sustainable due to logistical issues. By the end of the month Ukrainian forces cleared the territory north of Kyiv and uncovered the extent of the Russian atrocities committed in Bucha and neighbouring villages, effectively killing all negotiations prospects.

Many observers had hoped that Russia and Ukraine would hold peace talks after Ukraine liberated Kharkiv Oblast in September 2022, but this did not happen either. Putin moved on and announced partial mobilization on September 21st, held farce referenda in the occupied territories between September 23rd and 27th, and on September 30th annexed four Ukrainian regions: Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson. This even included areas that his army had failed to capture. In response, Ukraine declared that it was impossible to negotiate with Putin and submitted an application for NATO membership. Regardless of this, Russian officials kept calling for negotiations from time to time, saying, however, that Ukraine would have to recognize “realities on the ground” as a prerequisite.

During the November 2022 G20 summit, Zelenskyy unveiled a formalized ten-point peace plan that later became known as the “Zelenskyy Peace Formula”. “I want this aggressive Russian war to end justly and on the basis of the UN Charter and international law,” Zelenskyy stressed. The formula calls for ensuring radiation and nuclear safety; food security; energy security; and the release of all prisoners and deportees, including POWs and Ukrainian children deported to Russia. A non-negotiable point is restoring Ukraine’s territorial integrity and Russia reaffirming it according to the UN Charter; a withdrawal of Russian troops and cessation of hostilities; and the restoration of Ukraine’s state borders with Russia.

The formula also calls for justice, including the establishment of a special tribunal to prosecute Russian war crimes. Prevention of ecocide and protection of the environment, with a focus on demining and restoring water treatment facilities, is another necessary step. It is also necessary to build a new security architecture in the Euro-Atlantic space, including guarantees for Ukraine. And the final step is confirmation of the war’s end, including a document signed by the parties involved in it.

Lavrov characterized Zelenskyy’s speech at the summit as “aggressive”, full of “bellicose rhetoric” and “Russophobic”. Russia rejected the initiative and said it would not withdraw its troops from the Ukrainian territory. The spokesman of the Russian president Dmitry Peskov insisted Ukraine must recognize the “territorial reality”.  He said that new subjects have appeared in the Russian Federation “following referendums that took place in these territories. Without taking these new realities into account, no kind of progress is possible”.

An impossible situation

This short overview of Ukraine and the international community’s attempts to find a peaceful solution to the conflict show that since the very start of its hybrid aggression against Ukraine, Russia has been using a combination of deception, manipulation, lies and coercion in order to achieve Putin’s vision of the European security order. Ukraine’s place in it would be as a little brother and a part of the Russian sphere of influence.

Although Russia has participated in negotiations since the very start of the conflict, its refusal to take responsibility for its actions and its persistent attempts to present the conflict as a civil war prevented a resolution of the crisis. As the war progressed from its hybrid stage to the full-scale invasion, Russia did not change its false propaganda narratives. Its constantly escalating demands were voiced primarily via Putin’s subordinates and proxies. As Ukrainian negotiators indicated, Russia used military escalation to raise the stakes and to make Ukraine agree to otherwise unacceptable conditions at the negotiating table, which in turn led to Ukraine’s refusal to implement them. The escalating demands did not depend on Ukraine’s willingness to comply with the agreement, as evidenced by the decision of the proxies to set the border of the “republics” unilaterally. At the same time, Russia kept blaming Ukraine and the West for the conflict and for their supposed refusal to resolve it. 

The Russian use of negotiations can be best understood from Igor Ryzhov’s book “The Kremlin School of Negotiation. In addition to the five types of and motives for negotiations, described by Fred Charles Iklé, an American sociologist, political scientist and author of books including Every War Must End and How Nations Negotiate, Ryzhov describes two more, which he believes are appropriate for the 21st century. One is negotiations with a view to misleading an opponent: “These are, quite simply, an imitation of the negotiation process. Opponents often enter the negotiation process and deliberately draw it out, safe in the knowledge that time is on their side. In this type of negotiation, every one of your proposals will be met with a “maybe”, a “we’ll need to consult on this” or similar.”

The other one is provocation: “negotiations with a view to showing the other party’s inability to negotiate”. According to Ryzhov, this process has the following stages: 1) initiate negotiations; 2) declare you want to settle the matter constructively; 3) put forward absurd demands; 4) blame the opponent for the breakdown of the negotiations.

The prospects of a peaceful settlement remain grim. Putin has just secured another term in power and Russia continues to fight the war, regularly attacking peaceful Ukrainian cities in the rear. The Russian authorities kidnap Ukrainian children to Russia and give them to foster parents. Occupation authorities pressure residents into getting Russian passports. Putin is getting rid of critics of the war and prepares the country for a long war of attrition. His forces have directly and indirectly escalated pressure on western interests in different parts of the world, trying to weaken western support for Ukraine.

As the defending party, Ukraine is fighting a war of necessity. Its right to self-defence is enshrined in the UN Charter. Kuleba, the foreign minister, has said that Ukraine does not reject the possibility of negotiating with Russia at some later time. However, negotiating with Putin is impossible. One of the reasons is that on March 17th 2023, the ICC issued arrest warrants for the Russian president and his children’s rights commissioner for the “unlawful deportation” of Ukrainian children. Russia, on the other hand, “does not need negotiations to end the war. It simply needs to withdraw all of its forces from Ukraine, unblock Ukrainian ports and stop all attacks on land, in the air and from the sea”.

The West currently supports the Zelenskyy Peace Formula and this is the basis for a just and lasting peace. The formula stipulates the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Ukrainian territory. Yet, as the US State Department has reiterated, there is no evidence that Russia is ready for serious diplomacy. This means that the conflict will have to be settled on the battlefield. And only then serious negotiations may start. So far, nobody can predict when this will happen.

Yulia Kazdobina is the head of the Ukrainian Foundation for Security Studies, a senior fellow with the foreign policy council “Ukrainian Prism” and a visiting fellow at the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies. She is a former advisor to the Ukrainian Ministry of Information Policy.

peace talks, Russia, Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Ukraine