Navigating new security threats requires a change in focus

The threat of disinformation on democracies around Europe has been vastly underestimated over the last ten years. Although the EU parliament has made attempts to adapt to these new challenges, it continues to battle Russian propaganda which is ever evolving. Photo: European Parliament (CC) https://www.flickr.com/photos/european_parliament/52519229729

In fact, this article was written only a couple days after the President of France Emmanuel Macron declared that Europe is mortal and it can, as a matter of fact, die, if we do not choose to act against the current threats.

In the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Europe’s security order has collapsed. This has been, however, only an escalation in a ten-year-long conflict and even longer process of Moscow’s rejection of the post–Cold War Euro-Atlantic security order. As Russia sees the EU and NATO’s proximity as a threat to its security interests, their expansion that followed the end of the Cold War has been always viewed with suspicion by the Kremlin.

Complex security landscape

The security situation in Europe has become more complex and volatile over the last two decades, with Russia playing a central role in shaping regional dynamics. The leadership style of Vladimir Putin and Russia’s assertive foreign policy have contributed to heightened tensions and increased uncertainty in the region. However, it is not only the changes in foreign policy alone – such as those that followed when Putin became president once again in 2012 – that have caused these unprecedented challenges in European security. The internet, cyberspace, social media and now generative artificial intelligence have managed to add a completely new dimension to the landscape.

What from the very beginning seemed to be a useful tool in disseminating information, now, in many cases around the world, shows more harm than good. The massive diffusion of technology has, for example, unavoidably reached the irresponsible hands of autocratic players such as those in Beijing or Moscow. These figures use it to interfere in international politics and try to affect major events to retain a subliminal international influence.

The Czech intelligence agency, for example, recently uncovered a Russian-organized network that attempted to influence the European Parliament elections in various European countries. Cash was being handed over to anti-establishment politicians from Germany or Belgium in Prague, while other funds were directed towards the operation of a pro-Russian news website called the Voice of Europe. Estonia also faced a politically-motivated cyber-attack campaign lasting 22 days. In April 2007, a series of cyber-attacks targeted the websites of Estonian institutions, including the Estonian parliament, banks, ministries, newspapers and broadcasters. This was done in connection with the country’s disagreement with Russia over the relocation of a Soviet-era monument, which became a point of tension between the pro-Kremlin and Estonian nationalist movements. An Estonian government official told the BBC then that evidence suggested the attack was indeed orchestrated by the Kremlin.

Yet, Russian influence activities go far beyond the borders of Europe. During the 2016 American presidential election, US intelligence reported that it had evidence that Russian trolls had flooded the US information space with fake news about the election to urge African-American voters to not go to the polls. Multiple sources also say that evidence exists showing that Russia also attempted to persuade the British public to leave the European Union.

Countering interference

Certainly, the threat of disinformation and its destructive effects on democracies all around Europe have been vastly underestimated over the last ten years. Although the EU parliament has made attempts to adapt to these new challenges – for example by passing the European Media Freedom Act, which establishes a legally binding framework for national regulatory authorities that deals with providers that systematically engage in disinformation – it continues to battle Russian propaganda, as it is constantly evolving with new technologies. Today, Russian disinformation has grown to include deep fakes, falsified news footage and fake websites designed to disorient and outrage European voters. The days of clumsy “troll farms” are now long gone as disinformation campaigns are aided by artificial intelligence and localized support. Many governments and specialists too have been warning about the increasing volume and sophistication of Russian disinformation.

As Moscow is not afraid to show its unrelenting hostility toward European democracy, the upcoming election raises concerns amongst members of the European Parliament as they call on the political leadership across the EU to counter Russian interference attempts urgently and vigorously. This has been vocalized many times during plenary sessions and press conferences, especially now with regards to the exposing of the pro-Russian news network Voice of Europe.

 However, this has rarely turned into action and especially in Central and Eastern Europe. As some countries try to clumsily adapt to these new threats, most of them have been demonstrably failing. In the Czech Republic, for example, when the recent government took office, it chose the fight against disinformation as one of its priorities. But as analysis by the Czech Interior Ministry concluded a year ago, it has made no progress. Czechia has not been able to counter disinformation attacks and this is still true today.

When the Czechs uncovered a Russian network that aimed to influence the EU elections directly from Prague, the government of Petr Fiala placed two individuals and one company on the sanctions list. But as usual, it was reacting to damage already done, as for a long time now, these measures have been unable to effectively prevent similar efforts to destabilize the state. New research shows that 58 per cent of Czechs believe disinformation, whilst as many as a third have even succumbed to conspiracies about COVID-19. Government analysis also discusses such low societal resistance and that there are no built-in mechanisms of social and institutional defence against the effects of disinformation.

Experts say that this puts the Fiala government in a similar situation to the previous cabinet of Andrej Babiš, which took the first steps in the fight against disinformation. While it is embracing this issue at least to a very surface-level extent, it is moving slowly and this is hardly enough. Its approach is leading it into what experts refer to as a security delay and speaks of the fact that despite its declared interest in the topic of disinformation, the government has completely different priorities.

Politics over substance

The question that now remains is what can actually be done to fight this without attacking free speech, which has been a keystone argument for many government officials in the Czech Republic. This also works as an excuse given the fact that they have done close to nothing when it comes to countering disinformation.

The Russian activities in the Czech Republic, however, have gone far beyond the information space. In 2014, Russian spies carried out attacks which resulted in the explosion of two government-run ammunition warehouses and killed two Czech citizens. A police investigation confirmed that Russian intelligence members were responsible for the blasts. Yet, there continues to be hope, as contrary to its populist predecessor, we are still talking about a liberal pro-western government that understands that maintaining security in our own land is a top priority. There is fear, however, concerning what will come next, as a Babiš-Fiala rematch will take place in just a little over a year. It is no secret that the leader of the currently strongest political party in Czechia has sympathies with Kremlin-backed leaders.

Before the presidential election took place in Slovakia, Babiš not only personally supported the candidate Peter Pellegrini but continued to show affection for the autocratic governing style of both Viktor Orbán and Robert Fico. He admires them for how they have both managed to return to power in Hungary and Slovakia after years in opposition. This is, after all, a moment he himself longs for and that is why we should ask the question if re-elected would he be blinded by a desire for revenge like Robert Fico, or would he choose an Orbán-like pragmatic approach?

In both situations, the security of Czechia would be at risk. But there is even more at stake. Looking at the example of the Fico government’s so-called “reforms” in Slovakia, which are undermining democracy and rule of law; reinforcing divisions in Central Europe and weakening transatlantic relations; the country is undermining the image of the region. Overall, these states – with the exception of Hungary – have provided comprehensive assistance to Ukraine. Now, if Ukraine loses the support it needs, only if just from a small European country or two, it can put the entirety of Europe at risk.

Thus, let us consider a possible series of events. Russia, powered by the imperialistic desire of the Kremlin, manufactures targeted disinformation. With the power of social media and generative AI, this problem spreads, especially if it is planted into societies with already pro-Russian sentiment. Again, this is best seen regarding the example of Slovakia. Populist governments and leaders then use the opportunity to gain power and with a little help of a good marketing strategy, they eventually end up winning the elections. If those leaders then, after taking office, continue to act upon their pro-Russian sympathies, like when the Slovak foreign minister met with Putin’s right-hand man Sergei Lavrov in Turkey over a month ago, it presents a serious problem for Europe and the EU. This has been already demonstrated in the example of Hungary, as it regularly boycotts EU efforts to help Ukraine.

However, the biggest event that will alter the course of European security is coming this November. There is nervousness in Brussels and in other European capitals as to how a potential Trump presidency could change US calculus. There are two separate concerns to bear in mind. One is whether the US will support Ukraine. If not, the European Union would have to spend twice as much money and it would have to buy weapons from America. The other question is if the next era of Trump’s presidency would make the United States pull military support for Europe, which is a much larger issue. That would require not just money but the complete change of a mindset in Europe that has been in place since 1945.

By trying to adapt to these further threats of conflict, a recent analysis revealed that countries all around Europe have been supplying themselves with more arms. The Russian invasion has fundamentally changed the view of armaments in Europe as well. This shift in threat perception is reflected in the growing share of GDP going to military spending, with NATO’s target of two per cent increasingly seen as a stepping stone rather than a limit. NATO’s target was met by 11 of its 31 members last year, the most since the end of the Cold War. But will that be enough if we do not fight the conflict on all fronts, including in the digital space?

Lessons from the region

Ultimately, the European security landscape is ever-evolving and increasingly complex. The EU and member states face hybrid threats and cyberspace and social media have become the new battlegrounds for state and non-state groups. There is also growing concern about the potential use of chemical and other conventional weapons. At this point, western strategy must be better adjusted to these new threats by actively countering malign players and creating better information resilience.

The tools for this have been discussed many times. Czechia, for example, might stand out as somewhat ignorant of the problem. However, it still has plenty of opportunities to change that. Other countries in the region have shown that it is possible. The Baltic states are heavily involved in the fight against Russian propaganda and are often seen by experts as a positive example of how the state can act against manipulation. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were part of the Soviet Union until 1990 and Moscow has tried to prevent their return to independence militarily. They share a long border with Russia and see it as a security threat. Lithuania identifies the spread of disinformation as one of the biggest risks. It believes that such threats could lead to far worse things such as open conflict. Since 2017, it has faced 55,000 cyber-attacks and tens of thousands of instances of disinformation. Citizens, the state and the military are all involved in defence. Latvia follows a similar approach and has enshrined information defence in its national security document. It strengthens the country’s strategic communications, increases media literacy and supports public and independent media. Latvia has people working for various ministries who have the ability to identify disinformation campaigns.

This is where the Czech Republic could learn a lesson. The first step to effectively countering disinformation is to be able to recognize it. This is because in the absence of a firm and coherent deterrence strategy, Russia will continue to pose threatening challenges, and these will not stop.

Anna Dohnalová is a journalist with the leading Czech daily Aktuálně.cz focusing on disinformation and war in Ukraine. She is also a project assistant for the Regional Security Programme at the Prague Security Studies Institute.

Czechia, EU integration, EU membership, security