A parallel world of co-existence in Montenegro

Scenic panorama view of the historic town of Perast at famous Bay of Kotor in Montenegro. Photo: canadastock / Shutterstock

For a long time, the Adriatic country attracted Russian and Ukrainian citizens with its passport-by-investment programme, which ran until 2022 and offered the prospect of Montenegrin citizenship if investments were made in Montenegro, already from amounts of 250,000 euros upwards. This programme was mainly used by Russian but also Ukrainian citizens, so that they received a passport with more freedom to travel and the possibility to settle in Montenegro. Russian citizens are said to have bought 19,000 properties in Montenegro alone before the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. Russian investments therefore account for a good quarter of Montenegro’s GDP.

Until the outbreak of the full-scale war in Ukraine in 2022, it was by majority wealthy Russian and Ukrainian citizens that were drawn to the small Adriatic country. On average, every third registered yacht in Montenegro belongs to a Russian national. Russian and Ukrainian immigration to Montenegro was a policy that was consciously chosen and supported by the Montenegrin government. Through this policy it expected a boost in investments from abroad, as well as a growing tourism sector and an increase in human capital.

The fact that the small Adriatic state thus also became home to dubious individuals and promoted money laundering and tax evasion due to extremely low tax rates was not only accepted by Montenegrin politicians but in principle actively encouraged – Montenegro’s economic development relies on this model to a large extent.

Russian and Ukrainian emigration post-2022

Since the start of Russia’s full-scale war in Ukraine in 2022, approximately 30,000 Russian nationals and slightly more than 10,000 Ukrainian nationals have fled to Montenegro, together now making up ten per cent of Montenegro’s overall population of 620,000 citizens. Since 2022 however, it has not been only wealthy Russians and Ukrainians that have come to the country but also ordinary citizens of both countries that fled the horrors of the war, potential military conscription and sanctions. Since February 2022, over 5,000 new Russian-owned businesses were registered in Montenegro, with the majority of them having settled in Budva, Podgorica and Herceg Novi. Montenegro equally opened its doors to Ukrainian refugees wishing to settle in Montenegro, thus making the country a safe harbour for both Ukrainians and Russians.

One day during my several-week long trip through Montenegro, when I was walking along the Adriatic coast and underestimated the distance back to the small coastal town where I was staying, I signalled to a skipper’s boat. The skipper, who kindly gave me a lift on his medium-sized electric boat, was also carrying a large group of children and teenagers. When I entered the boat, I noticed that all of them, without exception, spoke Russian and have just returned from a summer camp organized by their private international school. I asked the young people where exactly they came from. To my surprise, they came from Russia and Ukraine in almost equal numbers, sitting together in a colourful mix, seemingly without any tensions. These and similar images were repeated again and again during my trip. Cars with Russian number plates parked next to those with Ukrainian number plates – no sign of punctured tires. These two images are only a few among many similar impressions and experiences during my time in Montenegro.

At this point, however, it should be mentioned that many of the wealthy Ukrainians who settled in Montenegro before the full-scale invasion very often acquired their wealth in Russia, through Russian business partners and companies or under the old Russia-friendly Viktor Yanukovych regime in Ukraine. This means that many Ukrainians who have lived in Montenegro for a long time are those who often have personal or business relationships with Russia and are therefore less in conflict with the Russian diaspora in Montenegro than those who had to leave their country because of the Russian attack on Ukraine. The political attitudes of Ukrainians who have built up their wealth in or with the help of Russia are often not very different from those of their Russian neighbours in Montenegro. There is greater potential for conflict between the Ukrainians who had to leave their country because of the war and Ukrainians who belong to the new political and economic elites that emerged after the Maidan revolution in 2014 on the one hand, and Russians who are loyal to the government on the other, who park their wealth in Montenegro and enjoy an easy life on the Adriatic coast.

Russian citizens who have left their country since February 2022 and emigrated to Montenegro represent a heterogeneous group. Some left their home country out of political conviction and as a protest against the war, while others simply did to save themselves from military conscription or the economic disadvantages of the sanctions. This part of the Russian diaspora can therefore not be clearly categorized politically. The fact is, however, that there are almost no incidents between the Ukrainian and Russian diaspora in Montenegro and that protest marches or social activism for one country or the other are relatively low.

At the same time, it was also noticeable that – unlike other European countries – there were no flags pledging allegiance to either Ukraine or Russia anywhere in the country in public institutions. Although Montenegro is strongly affected by the war in Ukraine due to immigration and sanctions against Russia, the war only seems to concern the small activist scene.  These impressions are no coincidence in a country whose domestic electorate is heavily polarized when it comes to foreign policy and yet seeks to integrate and reconcile both their Ukrainian as well as Russian residents alike.

Domestic convergence versus foreign policy polarization

The Montenegrin government is keen to ensure that the Russian and Ukrainian diasporas coexist peacefully, as the Montenegrin state greatly benefits economically from the presence of these foreign citizens and simultaneously wants to hold the country together socially and politically. At the same time, however, the country’s population is polarized in terms of foreign policy and characterized by a strong duality, which is mainly divided into pro-European, pro-NATO attitudes on the one hand and pro-Russian attitudes on the other.

After the start of the war on February 24th 2022, the then president, Milo Đukanović, and former deputy prime minister, Dritan Abazovic, immediately condemned the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine. However, then Prime Minister Zdravko Krivokapić and the then parliamentary speaker, Aleksa Bečić, were hesitant to condemn the aggression, or they did not condemn it as clearly as many western observers and Ukrainian politicians would have liked. There were similar reactions from representatives of civil society, a large part of the media, intellectuals and the majority of the Montenegrin public. Despite the condemnation of the war of aggression, a part of the political elite and society remained cautious in their assessment or even positioning regarding the war. There were also repeated public justifications or partial justifications of the war against Ukraine.

This political reticence also reflects the impression I had during my field trip through Montenegro. In conversations with Montenegrins, ranging from cab drivers to restaurant owners and local politicians, I repeatedly encountered a lack of or reserved condemnation of the Russian war against Ukraine. While these informal conversations are certainly not representative of the entire Montenegrin population, they are still striking to someone coming from a country where the public display of Ukrainian flags as a sign of solidarity has become common.

The reasons for this restraint or even partial justification of the war are manifold. Russia and Montenegro share close historical ties. Over the centuries, the Russian and Montenegrin aristocratic families repeatedly intermarried. The still revered and remembered Prince and King of Montenegro Nikola I Petrović Njegoš sought close ties with Russia and was even described by the Russian Tsar Alexander III as the only true friend of Russia back at the time. In addition to historical ties, Montenegro and Russia are closely linked by linguistic similarities and a common Orthodox religion. In particular, the Orthodox Church in Montenegro repeatedly shows social and political proximity to Russia.

As in neighbouring Serbia, Russian news outlets also play a major role in pro-Russian attitudes in the country. In Montenegro, Russian-owned media outlets such as RT or Sputnik were only closed a few months after the start of the war in Ukraine, but before that they had a significant influence on the political climate in the country. Ultimately, the wealthy Russian diaspora itself also contributed to pro-Russian sentiment in Montenegro through its money and influence. In principle, their contribution to Montenegro’s economic upturn means that they are anything but unwelcome residents.

Montenegro is also home to a large Serbian population, which is traditionally more Russia-friendly than the Montenegrins. This is mainly due to the Serbian trauma of the NATO bombings of the Serbian capital Belgrade, which were not covered by international law nor through the United Nations Security Council. Russian support for Serbia regarding Serbian claims to Kosovo, as well as Russia’s veto at the United Nations against Kosovo’s independence, have led to widespread Russophilia in Serbia. This is also true among Serbs in neighbouring countries, including Montenegro.

All these factors and circumstances indicate a certain closeness when it comes to large parts of Montenegro’s population and Russia, or at least there is no decisive rejection. Most Ukrainians living in Montenegro are probably also aware of these circumstances. Either they themselves have a certain personal, political or business proximity to Russia or they have come to terms with the fact that they now live in a country where many Russians also live and seem to accept this fact to a large extent.

Political response to Russia’s war in Ukraine

For its part, the Montenegrin government currently consists of a rather pro-European and pro-NATO government that has joined the West’s sanctions against Russia. However, it is also worth noting that the Montenegrin government did so rather hesitantly and with some delay. As already mentioned, Montenegrin politics has reacted in a divided manner to the Russian war against Ukraine, which is symptomatic of Montenegro’s current attitude towards Russia. The rather pro-European Montenegrin government is aligning itself with the West’s political stance towards Russia, but is doing so more hesitantly and indecisively than other European states, as the social cohesion between Montenegrins, Russians, Serbs and Ukrainians in the country is supposed to remain as undamaged as possible. This foreign policy balancing act is also intended to satisfy as many voters in the country as possible, most of whom have a very polarized view of the conflict in Ukraine.

Many of the sanctions that Montenegro is now complying with against Russia are also being circumvented via Serbia. Many sanctioned goods from Russia can be imported into Montenegro via Serbia, and after direct flights between Montenegro and Russia were cancelled, the majority of Russians in Montenegro now enter the country with AirSerbia or Russian airlines via Serbia.

In the small coastal state of Montenegro, a large number of nationalities converge, all representing their own interests and creating certain economic dependencies. Montenegro’s cultural, religious and historical links with Russia lead to a certain affinity with Russia among some Montenegrins, which is usually even greater among the Serbs in the country. Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, the Russian and Ukrainian diasporas in Montenegro have been very diverse and therefore represent differing interests. Due to the heterogeneity of the approximately 620,000 people living in Montenegro, who are politically very polarized, Montenegrin politics is trying to pursue a careful approach which currently includes a pro-European policy, but which also allows for a closeness to Russia behind the scenes. As a result, Montenegro will probably remain one of the few places in Europe where the Ukrainian and Russian diasporas live together peacefully for the most part, celebrate the same holidays, attend the same schools or work together. It remains to be seen whether this fragile social convergence will withstand future geopolitical events.

Svenja Petersen is a political economist and scholar of Eastern Europe with degrees from Sciences Po Paris, the London School of Economics (LSE) and the College of Europe in Natolin. She currently works in international development cooperation.

Montenegro, Russia, Ukraine