Another populist threat to NATO stability?

Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) holding a press conference in Bucharest in May 2023. Photo: LCV / Shutterstock

The joint European Parliament and local elections in Romania on Saturday, June 9th brought unexpected news as the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR), a right-wing populist and nationalist party which has proved ambiguous on Russia and has rallied against Romania’s military support of Ukraine, fell slightly short of their own lofty projections. However, while this initial setback may seem reassuring, underestimating the significance of these results would be a misstep. AUR received the second highest percentage of votes in the European Parliament elections in Romania and even scored highest amongst the Romanian diaspora in five countries. These are not negligible results, particularly when taken in conjunction with the support received by Diana Șoșoacă’s even more extreme right-wing party, S.O.S Romania. Continued vigilance against AUR’s enduring appeal is crucial. The entrenched support for populist right-wing parties underlines a persistent threat, with implications for both domestic politics and broader NATO stability.

Romania, a linchpin NATO ally, has seen its strategic importance grow significantly since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. As a frontline state and one of only three NATO countries with Black Sea access, Romania’s pivotal role is underscored by the United States’ burgeoning investment. This is most notably seen in the expansion of the Mihail Kogalniceanu Black Sea airbase into one of the largest in Europe. As the threat of Russian aggression and the destabilizing effects of great power competition increase, Romania’s strategic value will only continue to grow. It is particularly important, as NATO works to shore up its Eastern flank, that the Alliance can rely on the support and cooperation of Romania’s leadership. The persistence of AUR has the potential to destabilize not just the country’s political establishment but European and transatlantic alliances as well.

That Romania will be sending far-right politicians, representatives of S.O.S Romania with Șoșoacă among them, to the European Parliament for the first time this year should remain a cause for concern. Not in the least because a disruptive presence like Șoșoacă’s might erode Romania’s image as a trustworthy security partner.

Romanians, particularly wealthier, liberal urbanites, have prided themselves on seemingly evading the global surge of populism that has swept through democracies worldwide. However, the rise and persistence of AUR has challenged this notion over time, highlighting underlying currents of discontent running deep within Romanian society. Indeed, it is precisely because AUR taps into deep-rooted grievances, rather than being a foreign import or a superficial fad, that it poses a potential threat both to the establishment and Romania’s Western allies.

As Romania gears up for further parliamentary and presidential elections this year, AUR will continue to pose a test for the country’s political establishment. In the European Parliament elections, AUR received 14.9 per cent of votes and S.O.S Romania obtained 5 per cent, giving the two anti-establishment right-wing parties a total of 20 per cent. This represents almost half of the votes received by the PSD-PNL coalition (48.6 per cent), with AUR taking a comfortable second place regardless of lower-than-feared results.

Significantly, that the National Liberal Party (PNL) and the Social Democratic Party (PSD), the two biggest, and rival, establishment parties, were cornered into putting forward a joint candidate list in the European Parliament elections likely did not fail to raise eyebrows within the political establishment and further afield in Brussels and Washington. This clear commitment to stability in the face of extremism reveals the gravity of the threat posed by AUR.

AUR has particularly been lambasted for its alleged connections to Moscow. While party President George Simion has denied the allegations, branding Putin a criminal and Russia the biggest threat facing Romania today, suspicions persist. These have been fuelled especially by the vocal Russophilia of figures like the party’s former co-president Claudiu Târziu.

Târziu’s declaration in Iasi on January 24th that Northern Bukovina, in modern day Ukraine, should be returned to Romania as part of a wider campaign to reassemble the historic Principality of Moldova, directly echoes Russia’s own revisionist narrative. To avoid any ambiguity, Târziu’s claim on Ukrainian territory was followed by calls for a closer relationship between Romania and Russia.

Similarly, Șoșoacă has repeatedly made her pro-Russian stance clear, proposing a law for the annexation of multiple Ukrainian territories in April 2023. Șoșoacă’s S.O.S Romania, a right-wing nationalist party described as even more radical than AUR, received 5 per cent of the total vote in the European Parliament elections and the highest percentage of diaspora votes in the UK, Italy, and Germany. This sustained appetite for views that are even more extremist than those of AUR underlines the worryingly broad appeal of the far right in Romania.

Whether AUR receives funds from Russia directly is debatable. Regardless, pigeonholing AUR as an alien entity disregards the fact that the resonance of the right lies in its ability to articulate the grievances of an increasingly disillusioned electorate that feels equally left behind by the post-communist transition and neo-liberal promises.

The revolution of 1989 brought with it a wave of expectations – from the West the ideals of democratic politics and a neoliberal economic order – expectations that, for many ordinary Romanians, have been repeatedly frustrated. Romania has developed substantially since joining NATO and the EU; its GDP has been one of the fastest-growing in the EU since 2010. However, the spoils of Romania’s European integration and economic development have been unequally distributed. The income of the top 20 per cent of the population is 6.5 times higher than that of the bottom 20 per cent, with the rural and old industrial regions of eastern Romania faring the worst. Romania still suffers from the worst wealth inequality in the EU, with 34 per cent of Romanians being at risk of poverty. To underestimate the popular appeal of AUR is to retreat behind familiar political arguments and to ignore the reality of a situation that is now proving fertile ground for right-wing populism.

AUR’s brand of right-wing nationalism has not emerged out of thin air. Rather, it taps into historical precedents, ranging from the far-right Legionary Movement of the interwar period to, perhaps ironically, the communist nationalism of Nicolae Ceausescu, via an Orthodox traditionalism that has persisted throughout. Right-wing conservatism is not foreign to Romania’s political tradition – AUR’s success, however, stems less from any coherent ideology and more from exploiting people’s widespread disillusionment with mainstream politics and persistent wealth and social inequalities.

Though AUR offers little in terms of concrete policy, it does have its recurring talking points. Embracing the conservative pillars of “family, nation, Christian faith and liberty”, AUR is a proponent of traditional family values, the reunification of Romania and Moldova, nationalist Euroscepticism, and supporting Romanians living abroad. AUR’s emphasis on conservative values echoes the narratives propagated by Viktor Orbán and Vladimir Putin. Both leaders champion traditional family and Christian values, positioning themselves in stark opposition to what they view as the “degenerate” liberalism of the West. These rhetorical alignments are underscored by Orbán’s amiability towards Russia and his proclivity for disrupting the Western consensus on critical issues such as NATO expansion and sanctions against Moscow. The persistence of AUR threatens to introduce another discordant voice into the mix.

The parallels between AUR’s tactics and those of populist movements worldwide are striking, and AUR’s success cannot be divorced from broader global trends. Populist right-wing parties are on the rise throughout Europe. Similarly to AUR, the Alternative for Germany party received 16 per cent of German votes, coming in second after the coalition between the Christian Democratic Union of Germany and the Christian Social Union in Bavaria (CDU/CSU) which received 30 per cent of the vote. In France, Marine LePen’s National Rally won 33 per cent of the vote, more than double the results of Emmanuel Macron’s Renaissance party which received 15 per cent, forcing the latter to call a snap election.

The spectre of populist Eurosceptic governments is a threat particularly as these have the potential to disrupt transatlantic decision-making processes. This is especially true when they operate from within international bodies such as the European Union or NATO, as is the case with Viktor Orbán’s Hungary, which wielded its veto power to stall Sweden’s NATO bid for 21 months.

Significantly, social media serves as a potent tool, facilitating the globalization of populist discourse as well as populists’ direct engagement with constituents. One of AUR’s most successful strategies has been its bypassing of the mainstream press, opting instead for a direct line to the electorate. George Simion frequently livestreams his rants in parliament and many AUR politicians hold regular Q&A sessions on TikTok. This approach has been particularly successful at tapping into a youth that has been increasingly let down by the country’s education system – PISA found nearly half of Romanian school children to be functionally illiterate. Eighteen to twenty-year-olds now form the largest segment of AUR’s support base.

Of particular concern is AUR’s sustained backing within the diaspora – AUR received the highest percentage of votes in the European Parliamentary elections amongst the Romanian diasporas in five countries, Spain, Belgium, France, Austria, and the United States. S.O.S Romania received the most votes in the UK, Italy, and Germany. Put together AUR and S.O.S won 29 per cent of the diaspora vote, eight percentage points more than the PSD-PNL coalition’s 21.3 per cent.

Disquietingly, AUR has been successful in creating an unexpected coalition that traverses age groups, social backgrounds, and even country boundaries. In the 2020 parliamentary elections, one-in-four Romanians living abroad voted AUR, which was only one year old at the time. Despite many diaspora Romanians being relatively wealthier than their compatriots back home, there are just as many who feel themselves effectively forced into exile due to low wages and a lack of opportunities. They are met with scarcely better conditions abroad.

This fate has led to explosions of nostalgic nationalism, with members of the Romanian diaspora feeling as though they uncomfortably straddle two worlds. Stuck in this limbo – disillusioned with their adopted homelands and the political conditions in their birth country which first pushed them to leave – many have turned to an idealized, patriarchal vision of Romania. AUR has deftly exploited this phenomenon, capitalizing on the diaspora’s feelings of alienation and their deep-seated desire to have their interests represented. 

In a political landscape where allegiance to NATO and the European Union is increasingly scrutinized, AUR and S.O.S Romania claim to be ‘Euro-realists’. While they reluctantly concede that Romania’s interests lie within the EU, they actively oppose what they perceive as the erosion of national sovereignty by an overly centralized EU bureaucracy. This rhetoric mirrors Orbán’s balancing act between EU membership and his controversial engagements with Russia and China under the banner of ‘sovereignty’. It is not a stretch to assume that AUR would take a similar path, effectively becoming a Trojan Horse within the Union.

George Simion’s irredentist rhetoric regarding Moldova has drawn severe criticism, with a former Moldovan Defense Minister accusing him of being a Russian secret service agent. Simion has been banned from Moldova since 2018, a prohibition that was extended following the onset of the Ukraine war. Meanwhile, S.O.S Romania’s official stance contrasts starkly with its leader, Diana Șoșoacă’s, calls for Romania to withdraw from the EU and her unabashed critiques of NATO. Șoșoacă’s claims on Northern Bukovina have also resulted in sanctions from Ukraine.

The persistent support for both AUR and S.O.S Romania should not be overlooked particularly because of the threat the two might pose to the stability of both NATO and the EU. Such parties, and especially their outspoken leaders, act as fifth columns steadily eroding support for transnational organizations and fostering discontent. Their actions not only undermine Romania’s position within alliances such as NATO but also threaten broader regional stability as a result.

Ultimately, acknowledging AUR’s resonance and addressing the underlying grievances driving its support base is still imperative for Romania’s political establishment and civil society. In what proved a successful political move to forestall AUR’s predicted growth, PSD and PNL agreed to a shared candidate list for the European Parliament elections. It is crucial that such commitments to take the threat posed by right-wing populism seriously extend to the parliamentary and presidential elections taking place later this year, and beyond.

If the danger is underestimated as a result of the recent election results, the continued rise of parties such as AUR and S.O.S Romania will persist as a danger not only to the country’s democratic future but also to Romania’s NATO allies and transatlantic decision-making on critical matters of European and Black Sea security – particularly as Romania finds itself on the front line of NATO’s defense against Russian aggression.

Alliance for the Union of Romanians, far-right politics, populism, Romania, Romanian politics