Putin’s pyrrhic gains in Ukraine

Retirement Ceremony Major General Gordon B. "Skip" Davis Jr.. Photo: Public Domain

VAZHA TAVBERIDZE: Before we go on discussing the principal subject of our interview – The impact of the finally-approved US supplementary package on the Ukrainian front – let me ask you about the man who brought all this about. More than two years on since he started his “special military operation” – what can Vladimir Putin boast? What has he accomplished?

GORDON SKIP DAVIS JR: After two years and a third May 9th victory parade while at war with Ukraine, Putin has little to show for the immense effort and squandered blood and resources expended. Putin can boast he has made minor gains this year in taking more territory of the illegally annexed eastern and southern Ukrainian oblasts. And he can point to significant destruction across Ukraine as well as some recent tactical gains towards Kharkiv. He may even consider this a sign he is winning, but he also knows the current window of opportunity is closing as western support ramps up for the rest of this year. That said, even the minor gains in Ukraine continue to be pyrrhic in nature – hundreds of thousands of casualties and dead, hundreds of thousands of young, productive Russians having emigrated, thousands of modern combat vehicles lost, the Black Sea Fleet practically neutered, billions of lost revenue in trade (only partially offset), greatly reduced access to high technology for commercial and defence industries, growing difficulties in isolating the Russian public from the implications of an unnecessary war, growing domestic health and demographic problems, and more. All of which portend a dismal future for Russia that even support from China, Iran and North Korea (or new oil and gas customers in Asia) will not be able to change as long as Putin continues his aggression against Ukraine.

With the latest US aid package and its expected impact on the battlefield. How big a breathing space are we talking about for Ukraine here? Or maybe it’s something more than just merely breathing space?

Finally, after six months a positive sign from the United States political leadership, both sides, Republicans and Democrats had to vote for this, both houses of Congress to make this happen. Not only did they take what was proposed back in October, but they added a few things on top, about four more billion US dollars in military assistance that was proposed back in October. Obviously it has come a bit late, or rather, very late, with very negative consequences of this delay, but its positive in terms of a political sign and its forward looking: the department of defense, department of state and Ukraine are able to adjust over the coming months what they want to have and when. This aid package also includes policy on the multi-year strategy when it comes to backing and assisting Ukraine, which is a good thing, since more and more people are asking what is the political end state here, what is the long term plan? We’ve heard things like “as long as it takes, as much as it takes” and this is meant to put that into context of what the US realistically thinks Ukraine can do, for how long and how it can help Ukraine do it.

Speaking of this delay, had this aid bill been approved when it was first submitted, about nine months ago, would we be looking at a different situation on the front?

I think it would have been a totally different battlefield situation. We should have provided the things that Ukraine was asking for early on such as long range precision strikes capabilities and attack aircraft. But it took months and months and months for the western governments to arrive at these decisions, everyone has been so concerned about the red lines that Putin has inferred, even overestimating them, that in effect it led to self-deterrence by many western governments.

From a military standpoint, what will Ukraine be able to achieve with the package that the aid includes?

Probably the most important things that Ukraine needs right now are air defence systems and munitions as well as artillery munitions and long range strike munitions. Let’s start with the first: air defence systems. These take time to get there, but they already in the pipeline. The US has pledged 12 NASAMS systems, I think they have given three so far. The rest have to be produced over time, it will take between now and the rest of 2025 to deliver the rest of these systems. So they are not going to get there fast. In terms of Patriots, I do not think the US is going to give any more, but other countries, such as Germany, will probably provide the systems. In terms of air defence munitions, a lot is available now. They come from stocks in Europe, stocks in the US and stocks elsewhere. The US is able to get those to Ukraine within weeks, which is important. We already will see a bigger impact on Ukraine’s air defence capabilities based on this assistance package. Artillery munitions are also extremely important. They were desperately needed months ago while Russians were putting pressure in four or five different places with massive amounts of fire every single day. What I think we will see now is a wrapping up of the supply flow, probably not to where Ukraine needs it this summer, but it’ll get there over time. We are not the only ones providing artillery munition, but we’re trying to get to 100,000–155,000 a month. That’s basically what Ukraine needs as a minimum each month. This is also being provided by the Czech initiative as well as the European Union, so I think we will get what Ukraine needs and it will be much better off in the coming months, so there’ll be less and less pressure on the Ukrainian forces to ration their munition.

The US will also provide cluster bombs – dual-purpose munitions which allow for a broad area attack against forces. It’s very effective against troops in the open, especially mass troops which seems to be the Russian approach. The US will also provide more munitions for HIMARS and ATACMS. I also think that over the next months we will see a significant increase in effectiveness of air defence. It will stop the Russian offense underway currently. I don’t know if it’ll be enough to counter the counter-offensive that Russia is planning and is due to begin in July, according to the Ukrainian intelligence. But I think it will make a difference to stop the progress we have been seeing. In the longer view, this late summer, we should see the F-16s finally deployed, in small numbers, but that can make a difference in air defence.

With Ukraine’s longer range capabilities improved, what does it mean for the fortress of Crimea?

We could see the longer range weaponry being used against maritime targets in the Black Sea as well as in Crimea. Crimea is already under pressure because Ukrainians have done immense, incredible damage to Russia’s Black Sea air defence and command and control infrastructure, and Kyiv will continue to do so. The Russians cannot fly in, they can’t sail in enough support on a regular basis to ensure the defence and the improvement of defence of Crimea. Thus, Crimea’s long term sustainability is already in question. I think Ukraine will continue to increase the pressure to make sure that the Crimean bridge is reduced to rubble and probably the rail and road infrastructure into Crimea is going to be cut over time. Ukraine will likely increase its ability to target the eastern Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, which will make it more and more untenable for Crimea. I think that’s the trend we’ve seen to date and I think that it will continue.

The Georgian version of the interview was published by RFE/RL’s Georgian service

Ret. Major General Gordon B. “Skip” Davis, Jr. is a non-resident senior fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). He was previously NATO’s Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Defense Investment Division. In 2018, he retired from the US Army as a Major General with more than 37 years of service.

Vazha Tavberidze is a Georgian journalist and staff writer with RFE/RL’s Georgian Service. His writing has been published in various Georgian and international media outlets, including The Times, the Spectator, the Daily Beast and New Eastern Europe.

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Kharkiv, military support, Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russian military, Ukraine, Ukraine at war