Lukashenka does not want a war with NATO. Russia’s influence will not last forever

President Alyaksandr Lukashenka in Minsk on May 9th 2019. Photo: Shutterstock

PAULINA SIEGIEŃ: We are having this conversation around the time when Belarusians are celebrating Freedom Day, which commemorates the 106th anniversary of the declaration of independence by the Belarusian Democratic Republic. This holiday can only be celebrated abroad these days. Many Belarusian citizens ready to consciously involve themselves in the democratic process in the country have been forced into emigration, just like the political leaders of the 2020 protests. But time goes by and people in Belarus continue living their lives. Could it be that the agenda of the Belarusian forces outside begin to differ from the agenda of those remaining in the country?

ARTYOM SHRAIBMAN: It seems to me that what you describe as a risk that may occur in the future is actually something that has already happened. The Belarusian emigre forces don’t have any political tools or approaches to influence the situation inside the country. It is not a problem for the coming days but rather something that we have been facing for one or two years. The agenda of those forces have stopped corresponding with the daily lives of most Belarusians a while back. There will always be some kind of hard core of people for whom the democratic and national agenda will remain important. Regardless of what the political emigration will do, there will still be people who celebrate the Freedom Day, commemorate the Belarusian Democratic Republic and honour the white-red-white flag. It is not a majority of society – these people were never a majority. The protests in 2020 needed to leave the confines of this ideological camp in order to garner the support of most citizens and become nationwide. In this sense, the fact that most people today have completely moved away from this policy, from this agenda, under the influence of repression, apathy, lack of faith in victory, is a natural process. The fact that the democratic forces in exile don’t have many capabilities to reach these apolitical people that aren’t too fuzzed about checking the oppositions calendar and their holidays is not a surprise. Especially if we consider they are faced with an absence of any political movement within in the country. That the opposition abroad could somehow remain a central factor in the internal politics of the country. Most people just don’t see a point in continuously highlighting what Belarusian emigre politicians are doing, unless they feel a strong ideological motivation. Many people think this way in Belarus, but its not a majority. So, I agree with you wholly that the reality here and reality there is splintering

We hear about new forms of repression in Belarus quite regularly. That they are of a continuous nature. This could be the apprehension of people at the border who are returning or just want to visit back home. But we also hear about authorities raiding whole towns mass arresting people for some unspecified wrongdoings. This is all in addition to the tragic situation of political prisoners. We have absolutely no information about several of them. Sometimes news reaches us, and we learn of another death of a politically convicted prisoner in Belarusian penitentiaries. The regime keeps hunting and sentencing participants of the protests in 2020 and 2021. Although most people who were there are no longer a threat to the regime after the protests were brutally suppressed. Despite this, terror reigns in Belarus. What is the point of upholding such a repressive policy by the regime?

That’s correct. It is an attempt to punish the participants of the protests or those somehow disloyal between 2020-2021. These repressive measures are not threats, but revenge. The regime is convinced that everyone that participated in the movement, even barely, must be punished. Additionally, there is this internal dynamic, where the apparatus responsible must show it is proactive and at work. Entire units have been formed that are solely focused on political repression. They must prove their effectivity. Having previously punished the leaders of the protests and the most active participants forcing them into exile or prison doesn’t mean that they can let go. They look for new victims of what you correctly called “terror”. When they have punished all of those who protested in person, they come for their families and relatives. If there are no longer any anti-regime bloggers in the country, they go after those that haven’t sufficiently supported the authorities. After all, the regime believes they should have. The repressions continue according to their own internal logic and don’t always come as a result of Alyaksandr Lukashenka demanding anyone’s arrest. It is a new modus operandi, a new state of the regime itself. If there is no direct order from the top to stop this machine, new groups will be sought out for repression. This is no longer about putting people that threaten the regime into prison. No, it is just a machine that works. And just like a machine, it doesn’t ponder about why it works.

I am under the impression that there is a conviction, or maybe even feeling, that nothing happens in Belarusian political life. After all, what can even take place under such a regime. The media have ignored the Belarusian parliamentary elections in February, probably thinking they don’t mean or change anything. Even if so, there could be something interesting in these elections that would let us know about the current state of the political system in Belarus?

Elections are always an interesting measure of the condition of the Belarusian regime and its priorities. On its example we could see that the sterility of the political landscape was a priority. The regime decided not to experiment with any decorative elements that could be regarded as an expression of pluralism. The electoral campaign was conducted entirely according to Soviet or Chinese standards. There was no room for any uncontrolled criticism. There simply weren’t any candidates that could possibly criticize the authorities, no matter how minuscule. That is the most important conclusion from these elections. Of course, there were no mechanisms in place to observe them, have a fair vote count, or see any activity surrounding the election that would come out on the streets.  The Belarusian Parliament is an unlawful body. But it is still quite interesting to look at who was elected there. This parliament has more propagandists than it did earlier. Clearly, the regime wants the parliament to engage more with the society, that it is louder than during previous terms. Or maybe the regime just wants it to be more active in its propaganda defending their interests. Up until now the parliament has been totally invisible. So, it remains to be seen if this change is successful or not.

Another interesting fact stemming from these elections is that the Belaya Rus party didn’t achieve a majority in the parliament. It received 50 mandates out of 110. That is many more than other regime parties, but not a majority. This shows that Lukashenka doesn’t trust this party the way Putin trusts United Russia for instance. Lukashenka is not ready to make any party a bulwark of his authority. He isn’t even ready for a political party to take the lead in this castrated political landscape. Belaya Rus surely expected more mandates.

Belaya Rus came into existence in 2007, and over the years it became a kind of an association supporting Lukashenka’s regime numbering almost 200 thousand members. A year ago, it transformed into a political party. What does Lukashenka still need it for?

I don’t think that Lukashenka really needs it. Before the elections he wanted to clear the political field and destroy all the opposition parties, among them some of the decorative pro-regime parties. Clearly, he decided that the emptiness had to be filled with something. Three barely breathing, practically fictitious, political parties were left. This is why they came up with a new party for the authorities according to the Russian model. That way, there was a clear leader inside the parliament. At the same time, Lukashenka is trying to avoid lending Belaya Rus enough power to act on its own or feel any autonomy. He wants to retain the subjectivity of power in his administration. This is why Belaya Rus received a dominant role in parliament, without the absolute majority. I think there could be another stage to the project if the party doesn’t create any problems. Lukashenka will observe how this system functions and then maybe follow it up with another step, but this is too far in the future to speculate on.

This means that Lukashenka is shaping Belaya Rus into a party and potential political force, even if that is not his intention?

The fact that Lukashenka still hasn’t remodeled the political system means that he really doesn’t need this party at the moment. We still have a majoritarian vote in contrast to both Russia and Poland’s proportional one. The authoritarian system allows for a majoritarian vote where the voters elect specific people and not lists. Many people in the Belarusian elites would want a vote on party lists or a mixed system, but Lukashenka did not agree. He is not ready to transform his regime into the partocracy that made up the Soviet Union, today’s China or North Korea. Parties of power are still ruling Kazakhstan or Turkmenistan, but not Belarus. Lukashenka doesn’t believe that he needs such a mechanism to administrate. But he has taken the first steps by reshaping Belaya Rus into a party. I believe Lukashenka sees the necessity for the future authorities to have certain supportive institutions around, to not focus all the administration in one person. This is a Lukashenka strategy to minimize the risk for the system in case that one person who comes after isn’t capable enough. This is why we are seeing a very slow, even sluggish, attempt at building collective institutions. I’m not entirely sure if Lukashenka will be able to finalize this project in his lifetime, as we can see he is very careful.

Another issue that has entered the general discussion is the conviction that Belarus has lost its sovereignty. It has been accepted that Lukashenka has no possibility to manoeuvre, that he has become an obedient vassal of Putin and an accomplice to his crimes. Belarusians themselves often say that their country is occupied by Russia. How do you view Belarusian sovereignty? Is there anything that could change in this regard in the short and long-term?

This Belarusian autonomy, as I would prefer to call it, could be discussed at great lengths. It is true that Lukashenka’s autonomy has become smaller in recent years. This process is still ongoing. Among its symptoms are the relocation of nuclear warheads to Belarus, the involvement of the country in the war against Ukraine and directing the entire logistics of the export towards Russia. You could also add how Russia has swallowed the Belarusian information space to that list. This has narrowed the field for any manoeuvre. Even if Lukashenka woke up with another leg one day and wanted to re-establish relations with the West – all of these ties that have been formed in recent years would successfully prevent him from doing so. Moscow has a lot of tools at its disposal to shut down any Belarusian move towards the West. This is not only about military presence. A much more connecting factor could be the economy that closely connects Belarus with Russia. The second issue is that the only logistical door for Belarusian trade runs through their eastern neighbour. Therefore, we see that the Belarusian autonomy has been squeezed, even if the country formally still retains a degree of sovereignty. These proportions could change during another political situation, like a crisis in Russia.

Many of the concessions Lukashenka made in Russa’s favour are reversible. All these alliances – be it the Union State or Collective Security Treaty Organization – none of them are forever. This is illustrated well by Armenia. When the geopolitical situation changes, when the regional situation changes, when the war will be in the past, then I believe that Lukashenka (or what follows), will be able to retrieve some of that freedom to manoeuvre for Belarus. Maybe it won’t happen in a dramatic fashion, but in a gradual process. I believe that will come to pass. Regardless of Lukashenka, there haven’t been any unbreakable bonds created with Russia, bonds that would last for centuries, stronger than those Poland had with the Soviet Union during Communism.  The USSR weakened. So did Poland, Eastern Germany, Czechoslovakia and Romania. Hungary acted independently quite quickly. Belarus is in a similar situation. It is a satellite state that has kept its formal sovereignty and its attributes. It has also retained a public opinion separate from the Russian one, combined with a society that is conscious of its national interests. This is what sets Belarusians apart from Russians. I believe that all of this is a basis for which full sovereignty and autonomy could be reestablished in the long-term perspective. But this is all for the long-haul, not for tomorrow.

This question about Belarusian autonomy and Lukashenka’s possibility for any manoeuvre is significant for us as there is much talk of a further escalation of the war. That it would turn into a conflict between Russia and NATO. If the Belarusian army didn’t join the Russian invasion of Ukraine, it would probably mean that Lukashenka, despite the aggressive rhetoric, would be equally inclined to go to war with the neighbours from the North Atlantic Treaty?

That’s right. I don’t think Lukashenka would be interested in any military provocations or direct aggression against NATO countries. Lukashenka is very similar to Putin in his anti-Western worldview. He absolutely possesses a Soviet mentality in this regard. But he is different from Putin in not wanting to die for Russkiy Mir (Russian world). He is not a Russian imperialist. This is why this war about the expansion of the Russian empire isn’t his own. Taking into account that Belarus is a frontier country, it would mean that in a full-scale confrontation between Russia and NATO the country’s military and civilian objects, most likely, would be the first to be targeted. This is why Lukashenka will oppose being drawn into such provocations as long as he can. I don’t know how long it could last. But right now, we don’t see that Putin pressures him with regards to involving the Belarusian army in the war. If the Kremlin began to increase the pressure, I would expect Lukashenka to push back. But for how long, I don’t know. But Lukashenka himself isn’t interested in having the war on his territory or in its vicinity. That is why I think that the interests of Putin and Lukashenka could actually diverge at some point.

Lukashenka did agree to placing nuclear warheads in Belarusian territory. How does that change Belarus’ situation with regards to a potential war?

The risk has been raised significantly in this context. I am sure that most western intelligence agencies are fully aware of where these weapons and means of distribution, like Iskanders and bombers, are located. In case of a nuclear escalation, preventive, or non-preventive NATO strikes will be directed at these targets. NATO and the US will find it easier to hit Belarus than Russia, as it will be seen as a different degree of escalation. Targeting Russian territory would be equal to declaring war on Russia. Hitting Belarusian territory leaves room for Russia to withdraw. Attacking Belarus is something different than a Russian town or military base in Russian territory. Unfortunately for Belarus, in such a context – with Russian nuclear weapons, Russian military equipment – it becomes a big, fat, visible target seen from afar. Any scenario of confrontation between Russia and NATO leaves Belarus under fire. Lukashenka is fully aware of this.

This article was first published in Polish by NEW.org.pl

Artyom Shraibman is an independent Belarusian political scientist and analyst. He is a fellow at the Carnegie Centre in Berlin.

Paulina Siegień is an ethnographer, russicist and journalist. She is an editor at NEW and contributes to Newsweek and Krytyka Polityczna. She received the Conrad prize and a nomination to the Ambasador Nowej Europy prize for her book Miasto Bajka. Wiele historii Kaliningradu

“We suport the Belarusian Awakening’24” is a project co-financed by Solidarity Fund PL within the framework of Polish development cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland in the amount of PLN 230,000.

This publication expresses the views of the author only and cannot be identified with the official position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland.

Alyaksandr Lukashenka, belarus, Belarus-Russia relations, Belarusian protests 2020, NATO, Russian interference, Union State