The Five Towers of the Kremlin

The carefully constructed political order that has been overseen by Vladimir Putin since he came to power in 2000 is now in jeopardy, and it is unclear who could emerge as his successor.

Conclusions from the rebellion

The well-organised Wagner mutiny, which appeared to start as early as April 2023, can be compared to the socialist coup d’état in October 1917, with all its demonstrated drawbacks, implications and conclusions. First, Putin quickly became a lame duck and was forced to pursue the political strategy of promoting his favourite successor candidate, Tula Region Governor Aleksey Duymin. At the same time, Putin began to lose his personal business assets that previously were protected and managed by Prigozhin himself via his company “Concord”. The assets include diamond and gold holdings and profits that transcend Russia’s borders and are located in such countries as Mali, Congo, Angola, etc. The Wagner Group received formal legal status as a paramilitary group formation via connections to Gazprom, which was based on the law on special commercial forces created for both Gazprom and Transneft.

In July 2007, Russia’s State Duma passed a bill that would allow the energy companies Gazprom (Russia’s state-owned natural gas monopoly) and Transneft (which controls Russia’s oil pipeline infrastructure) the right to create private, internal armies. The new bill raised concerns internationally and within the Kremlin that such a move would give these companies too much power. In addition to establishing a private army, Gazprom is bolstering the security of its vast pipeline network with unmanned aerial vehicles. Hence, these private corporate security and military groupings have reached numbers of up to 2.5 million servicemen.

The mutiny also demonstrated that the political vertical, which was constructed by Putin, is becoming fragile. The system was wholly based on Putin’s personal political ambitions and his coercive charisma. However, the unsuccessful war in Ukraine and the Prigozhin-led mutiny on June 24th are two important cases that have nullified Putin’s political omnipotence. Before June 24th, the political vertical, which was based on several influential clans’ checks and balances, had been controlled by Putin the same way as during the Soviet period under Leonid Brezhnev, through the politburo or central committee.

The main structures in Putin’s political vertical system are the five key military-political-financial groupings (or clans), which could be referred to as the “Kremlin Five Towers” (associated with the original Kremlin building which had five towers). The Five Towers metaphor demonstrates how the system is organised and is based on open-source information. An illustration is provided below.

The Siloviki tower

The Siloviki is one of the strongest and most influential groupings that probably provided support to Prigozhin’s mutiny, at least behind the scenes. The clan name itself is derived from the Russian word sila (сила), meaning “force”. It refers to Russian politicians and officials who have a background in the security and intelligence agencies, special forces or the military – many of whom were recruited to important political posts under Putin. The clan includes the leaders of various power structures: Nikolai Patrushev, the secretary of the Security Council; Igor Sechin, a former GRU officer and chairman of the Fuel and Energy Committee; Lieutenant General Viktor Ivanov, leader of the Federal Drug Control Service; Sergey Naryshkin, head of foreign intelligence; and former Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov.

Political lobbying for the clan is effectively carried out by the Liberal Democratic Party founded by Vladimir Zhirinovsky and currently chaired by Leonid Slutsky (a former GRU officer). It is believed that Sergei Ivanov – a former head of the presidential administration and former defence minister – is also a member of the clan. Colonel General Viktor Zolotov, commander of the Russian National Guard, was also an influential member of the grouping (presently he has created his own powerful clan as described below).

This clan controls several media holdings, including the TV channel NTV and several newspapers, such as Izvestia. This clan also controls Rosneft, the state-owned oil company with Igor Sechin as its chairman. One of the clan’s main achievements is the aforementioned law regarding the establishment of special services and private protection services for businesses and corporations. Rosneft has a private protection service made up of 3,000 personnel, 600 of which are former workers from the security services.

This clan is the most influential grouping and is ahead of other groupings when it comes to influence. It possesses a conservative ideological concept which can be described as “nationalist corporativism”, involving state control over the whole country’s economy in order to pursue national interests. The clan is considered hawkish and thoroughly interested in increasing their own power. The clan also has its own potential presidential successor: Nikolai Patrushev’s son, Dmitry Patrushev, who is now minister of agriculture. It is interesting that the clan managed to entangle Yevgeny Prigozhin in their affairs. This was probably done via Viktor Bout – an influential member of the clan and in fact “grey cardinal” who met with Prigozhin in Omsk, just a few days before the mutiny. Bout and Prigozhin had common interests in Africa (Angola and Congo) and in the MENA region.

The Siloviki tower has much power and could gain leading positions if Putin opts for a form of power transformation akin to Turkmenistan. This would see Putin keep some symbolic role, such as chairman of the State Council or a similar position. The clan also currently controls the interior ministry and has incorporated some representatives of the former liberal clan (which included former President Dmitry Medvedev and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov). The clan generally controls most of the foreign ministry, as well as state and corporate structures like Vnesheconombank and Vneshtorgbank (VTB). Finally, they have influence over Gazprom (Medvedev is chairman of the supervisory board) and control the Russia Today media holding.

 The military tower

The military clan is seemingly led by former Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, and Shoigu, the minister of defence. There was a time when this clan strongly cooperated with the Siloviki , however, presently they are strong competitors when it comes to control over several industrial and financial enterprises. The financial base of the clan is centred on the military-industrial complex and the export of weaponry, which is led by Viktor Chemezov, a close friend of Putin and representative of the former “chekist” clan. In 2015, Russia gained ten billion US dollars through weapons exports.

In addition, separate financing is funnelled through federal programmes and was estimated to total around 1.2 trillion US dollars around 2020. The defence ministry used these resources to invest in high-tech and strategic weapons including the T-50 stealth jet fighter. At the same time, the military clan controls important media holdings such as the TV Channel “Zvezda”. They also lead the GRU, the strategic military intelligence agency, and its approximately ten special purpose brigades.

The clan is itself waging war against sovereign Ukraine and has engaged in various black market businesses such as arms smuggling. This is one key reason why the clan has entered into a confrontation with the Siloviki  and fiercely clashed with the Wagner Group and Prigozhin. The battle between Prigozhin and Shoigu was not only related to personal, family animosity but also enmity surrounding black market business transactions (arms and oil smuggling). The military clan is still loyal to Putin and that is why the president was reluctant to dismiss the clan’s leadership after the deal with Prigozhin. However, the armed forces are now in a difficult situation as demonstrated by the mutiny. The clan could also present (with some possibility) its own successor to the presidency in the form of Dmitry Rogozin.

The “private military” tower

The private military clan is led by various people whose common interactions and interests spark many questions and uncertainty. However, now they seem to be teaming up. Generally speaking, the leadership of this clan is army General Viktor Zolotov, who is the commander in chief of the National Guard, with almost 500,000 combatants under his command. The National Guard is one of the strongest security services and Zolotov is thought to be a “grey cardinal” in the Kremlin Five Tower system. According to some sources, Zolotov has managed to collect more than ten million US dollars from real estate. 

Ramzan Kadyrov, leader of the Chechen Republic, cooperates with both the military and private military clans through his personal guard (around 10,000). His so-called “death squadrons” answer directly to him and carry out “dirty” orders and special clandestine operations (for instance, the deaths of the famous human rights protector Anna Politkovskaya and opposition leader Boris Nemtsov). The structure of the death squadrons is generally unknown but is very hierarchical. They have separate bases, as well as special burial grounds for weaponry and documents and they also have separate bank accounts through which they receive money. These “death squadrons” are supported by military structures and were operating under cover of the special forces, the so-called sever, which were subordinated to the GRU.

The private military clan is also supported by the Minister of Emergency Situations Aleksandr Kurenkov, who during the mutiny flew to Grozny in Chechnya. His ministry actually became the lead for all private military companies engaged in warfare operations in Ukraine, including Prigozhin’s Wagner Group. The ministry oversees more than 300,000 paramilitary servicemen. The ministry was actually founded by Shoigu and was supposed to be an ally to the military clan. As a result, the organisation has thus become quite controversial. This clan was associated with Prigozhin and his private company but after the mutiny it has slowly developed contradicting interests. The clan formally expresses support for Putin and has no potential successor for the presidency.

The ultra-nationalist tower

In comparison to other clans, the ultra-nationalist clan can be considered small and not very strong. It most likely lacks a successor candidate when it comes to the presidency. However, the clan is chaired by two influential tycoons with ultra-nationalist sentiments. The first is Konstantin Malofeev, the Orthodox tycoon and ideologist behind the “Novorossiya” geopolitical project. As a result, he is one of the main architects of the war in Ukraine. Malofeev’s most famous investment was a stake in the state-owned telecommunications giant Rostelecom, estimated to be worth one billion US dollars. Thanks to his holding and friendship with the then Minister of Communications Igor Shchyogolev, Malofeev was considered to be one of the most important people in the Russian telecommunications industry. The profit from his 2013 sale of the aforementioned stake was supposedly used to pay off debts to VTB after a years-long corporate dispute. Since then, no significant investments by Malofeev have been reported in the media. Malofeev controls and sponsors almost all the “separatist” forces and groups in Eastern Ukraine and runs his own private military company called Patriot, which has 10,000 mercenaries.

The second leader of this clan is tycoon Vladimir Yevtushenkov, who runs the System corporation. This group is linked with the military-industrial complex, although formally the company deals in the fishing industry. The clan is supported by the political party “Just Russia” led by Sergey Mironov. It has clandestine support from ultra-leftist and communist-oriented political movements, including the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. The clan also operates as a political lobby group on behalf of many separatist movements in the former Soviet space, including the occupied territories of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Overall, the clan’s broadly authoritarian ideology focuses on reviving the Russian Empire with a monarchy and leans towards theocratic governance for the country.

The cooperative lake tower

The most powerful clan is led personally by Vladimir Putin and made up of his personal guard. The name of the clan comes from a group of summer cottages on a lake near St. Petersburg, where Putin’s neighbours were his former political team members who helped him come to power. The clan is composed of the Rotenberg brothers (Arkady and Boris), the Kovalchuks (Yury and Mikhail, who control all the media holdings supported personally by Putin) and the Timchenkos (Gennady and Oleg, in spite of Gennady confronting Putin over a small, local conflict). The clan also includes Putin’s personal successor to the presidency Aleksey Dyumin, his presidential staff chair Anton Vaino, and the chief of the federal state protection service, Dmitry Kochnev. Putin and his clan personally control key business spheres like the coal, precious metals and gas industries. They also control various military state corporations. The clan has created a wide network, which includes the political and financial corporate elite. The State Council has also brought under Putin’s control two other former political clans – the “Liberals” and “Technocrats”.  Together with the former liberals, the technocrats are intellectual and “technical”, mostly from St. Petersburg and on the side of the “Cooperative Lake Tower”. The most prominent of these figures is Sergei Kiriyenko, the former deputy chief of the presidential staff, an ex-head of Rosatom (Russia’s nuclear agency) and a former prime minister. Another technocrat is Vladislav Surkov, the former head of the government executive office and the main lobbyist and ideologist of the Kremlin. He formulated the ideological concept of “sovereign democracy”, which believes in adjusting democratic values to Russian traditions and not to the principles which exist in the West. Its main motto is “the state is everything.”

This clan has a big impact on regional party leaders and governors on the party lists. They also control the leading party’s faction in the State Council, the whole party nomenclature as well as the “People’s Front” social grouping and “Young Guard” youth movement. The clan controls geopolitical processes in the so-called near abroad and keeps an eye on the situation in the occupied regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It is quite an influential, flexible and strong grouping but still not stable and solid.

In conclusion, it is necessary to mention that the “Kremlin Tower” vertical power system is composed of a modern Soviet-style politburo governing the country. However, this structure is weakening due to a shaky “checks and balances” principle. This situation is largely due to the prolonged reign of Putin in the political vertical, reflecting Russia’s authoritarian regime. To compensate, Putin has become more hawkish, especially since the Prigozhin mutiny, and aggressive in order to divert attention away from internal turmoil towards self-defined external enemies. His personal vow that “Russia has no allies and partners” fully expresses a Soviet-style political culture, in addition to cronyism and kleptocracy. All these ingredients taken together seem to show that Russia is moving towards a new type of political architecture known as the “patrimonial state” – a system of governance in which a single ruler treats the state as his personal property. 

Vakhtang Maisaia is a professor of the Caucasus International University (Georgia) and honorary professor of the Josef Goluchivski Science Applied University in Ostrowiec Świętokrzyski (Poland). 

Kremlin, Power, Russia, Vladimir Putin