Serbia-Kosovo relations: old issues and new pressures for an epilogue

Albin Kurti, Kosovo’s prime minister, on the left, meets with Aleksandar Vučić, Serbia’s president, on the right in March 2023. The meeting was facilitated by the European Union and took place in Ohrid, North Macedonia. The issue of normalisation of relations is high on the EU agenda, however expectations on both sides remains a challenge. Photo: European Commission

The public from both Serbia and Kosovo waited anxiously with a touch of legitimate concern for their leaders to address them. The meeting was a certain step forward, but still without a final agreement.

Nikola Burazer, the executive editor at European Western Balkans, stated for New Eastern Europe that the meeting went “exactly as expected”, explaining that “there were no conditions for some major breakthroughs due to there being many unresolved issues.” However, he added that it did represent an “important milestone, as both sides have agreed on the proposal in principle”, further saying that “the road is now clear, despite several obstacles remaining.”

Despite the proposal not being adopted formally, officials from Brussels stated that both sides unofficially accepted the agreement, after the meeting concluded. The relationship between Kosovo and Serbia is one key issue in Europe which must eventually be solved but remains baffling and without a productive agreement for many years. Yet, in order to understand the problem’s complexity, it is crucial to start from the beginning.

Lost hopes

Serbia – or more precisely the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia – lost the war over Kosovo in 1999 and according to United Nations Resolution 1244, Yugoslav forces withdrew from this territory. In 2008, Kosovo proclaimed its independence unilaterally, which resulted in a series of protests in Belgrade, including the burning of the American embassy. The government in Belgrade immediately appealed to the International Court of Justice, demanding it review the legality of the declaration, but in 2010 the court decided that it did not violate international law, nor the UN Security Council resolution adopted 11 years earlier. The first stage of the following dialogues in 2011-12 was referred to as “technical dialogue” and led to many technical agreements addressing the most pressing issues of concern, though most were never fully implemented.

Four years after Kosovo proclaimed independence, the current ruling party in Serbia, the Serbian Progressive Party, came to power with the strong support of the EU and generally western countries. The political gossip at that time was that the reason for providing such backing for former war propagandists was probably some kind of informal promise that relations with Kosovo would be normalised.  And indeed in 2013 the new government took the first steps forward, signing the Brussels Agreement, formally known as the “First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalisation of Relations”. The EU was again the mediator in this process.

Although the recognition of Kosovo as a sovereign state has not been on the table, the agreement was already criticised as an informal recognition of Kosovo’s independence. Certainly, it was the beginning of the process of normalising relations, creating ground for other processes, and compelling Pristina to officially form the Community of Serb Municipalities with delegated authority in such areas as economic development, education, medical care, urban and rural planning, etc. The community was also meant to have its own president, deputy president, parliament and council. However, due to the decision of the Kosovo constitutional court in 2015, the Community of Serb Municipalities has not been formed to this day and remains one of the greatest obstacles for further negotiations, the so-called red line on which Serbia is not ready to relent. On the other hand, the same agreement led to the formal abolishment of Serbian institutions in Kosovo.

The process of normalisation stalled in November 2018 when the Serbian government made it clear that it would block Kosovo from becoming a member state of the United Nations, Interpol and the Council of Europe. After this crisis, Kosovo imposed a 100 per cent tax on all imported Serbian goods, which was only withdrawn in 2020 when both governments agreed to improve economic ties under an agreement brokered by the United States, known as the Washington Agreement. Serbia also agreed to suspend its efforts to encourage other states to either not recognise Kosovo or revoke recognition for one year, while Kosovo agreed not to apply for new membership of international organisations for the same period.

In 2022, the French and German governments drew up a draft proposal which was forwarded and introduced by the EU at the EU-Western Balkans summit in Tirana, last December. In the same month, Serbs from the northern part of Kosovo barricaded the main roads in order to stop Kosovar special police units from entering the territory where the Serb majorities live. Even some shootings occurred but thankfully without any casualties. Some believe that these kinds of incidents were orchestrated by criminal groups close to the Serbian regime, without actual support from the ordinary citizens, but it is important to emphasise that these same groups, which are currently on the US blacklist of sanctions, used to have very close ties to Pristina itself. The barricades were removed with the mediative help of the NATO KFOR peacekeeping mission, as well as US and EU representatives. There was once again some hope that the Community of Serb Municipalities would finally be formed.

The Scholz-Macron proposal

The specifics of the 2023 Franco-German proposal were quite unclear for some time and remained the subject of speculation until the EU finally published them. However, it seems that both parties expected too much from just one meeting, no matter how important it was. The Kosovar public expected Kurti to come back with signed Serbian recognition, which is still quite beyond Serbia’s current diplomatic red lines. On the other hand, Belgrade stated that no further or final agreement can be made without finalising the 2013 obligations from Brussels and forming the aforementioned association for the Serb minority. Kurti, who still refers to the decision of the constitutional court, has still not given any promises that this is going to happen in any form. His official position is that some kind of association could be formed, but with far fewer jurisdictions than the original one, alluding more to traditional and cultural authority, instead of political and economic influence.

Andrej Ivanji, a journalist and editor with the weekly magazine Vreme, and a correspondent for various German media groups based in Belgrade, stated that Vučić alone said that this proposal is an “ultimatum” given to Belgrade and Pristina, “without the possibility to negotiate it”; and that it is effectively “unchangeable”.

“A rejection of such a plan would have led to the termination of the EU integration process and a withdrawal of foreign investments,” Ivanji repeated Vučić’s words from national television. Further, this means a decline in living standards and a drastic increase in unemployment rates.

The Franco-German proposal consists of 11 articles. Despite the fact that the proposal does not mention the word “independence” explicitly, when looking at some articles it becomes obvious that signing it would lead to recognition in the near future. Article two states that “both parties will be guided by the aims and principles laid down in the United Nations Charter, especially those of the sovereign equality of all states, respect for their independence, autonomy, and territorial integrity…” Further in article four it is written that “the parties proceed on the assumption that neither of the two can represent the other in the international sphere or act on its behalf,” as well as that Serbia “will not object to Kosovo’s membership in any international organisation”. The next one obliges both parties to neither “block, nor encourage others to block, the other party’s progress in their respective EU path”.

Burazer, the executive editor at the European Western Balkans, explained that this agreement is based on the “two Germanies agreement from 1972, which immediately gave both states widespread recognition and opened the door to them for joining the UN.” Ivanji explained that independence was de facto established on several points since they are referring to the equality of parties in negotiations. He added that placing a signature on that agreement would oblige Serbia not to block Kosovo from becoming an equal member of international organisations. Vučić said that such a condition means that Serbia is not opposed to Kosovar membership in the UN.

Albin Kurti said after the meeting that he was ready to sign the agreement, but that Vučić refused. Meanwhile Vučić told the public again that allowing Kosovo to take a seat in the UN would be a red line which he is not going to cross. So, according to him, Serbia will not accept the proposal.

Ivanji further notes that “If we are taking Vučić’s words seriously” and if the EU, US, France, Germany and Italy “do not give up their demand that Belgrade and Pristina sign that agreement”, then “Vučić on behalf of Serbia will renounce its EU perspective.”

Vučić’s trustworthiness in his manner of addressing the public is questionable, having in mind his previous statements about this proposal. In the autumn of 2022, his first reaction to the still mysterious proposal started with “it doesn’t exist,” and his explanation was that he did not see it, and that he will not even be taking it into consideration. After some time, Vučić changed his tone, stating that Serbia will accept it, but that nothing will be signed before the creation of the Community of Serb Municipalities in Kosovo.

Noose around the neck

However, Vučić’s pro-western promises given back in 2012 turned into turmoil, with  completely opposite propaganda aimed at the Serbian public, resulting in record low support for the EU integration process. Although the negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina are being treated with a carrot-and-stick approach from Brussels, it seems that Vučić has ruined the opportunity to glorify the talks’ positive effects given his previous anti-European narratives and propaganda. This threatens to cause some kind of political crisis in Serbia, turning the other right-wing parties against him, alongside a significant part of the population which shares the same ideological views.

Even the significant financial resources, scheduled for both sides if the agreement would be signed, as some kind of a prize, will probably not be enough for him to justify himself in the political climate he created in Serbia. Ivanji thinks that Vučić is in an “unenviable situation” due to the fact that he, alone, is responsible for forming the “pro-Russian and anti-western collective feeling in the society”, based on the “Kosovar battle myth”.

Right-wing parties which he effectively created are breathing down his neck and becoming stronger every day. On the other hand, pro-EU opposition parties are hiding, completely lost in the political arena which has little space for them. Ivanji stated that Vučić’s final decision will probably depend on public opinion research and estimations regarding which move will threaten his position less.

Why is Kosovo important?

The flame of war burns in the East and by all indications the war in Ukraine will not be over for quite some time. However, at some point, the time for negotiations will come. There is a reason why the matter of Kosovo is so important for the international environment to deal with as soon as possible. First, the pressure to resolve the status quo is inevitable in order to prevent any kind of potential conflict in the Western Balkans. Second, there shall not be any more open questions in Europe regarding secession, if Serbia directly or indirectly recognises the independence of Kosovo. After all, the Kremlin will not have any other cases to refer to in its own arguments. Lastly, with the resolution of the long-standing issue with Kosovo, Belgrade will have many less reasons to rely on Russia and the Kremlin would progressively lose its stronghold in the Balkan region. In the end, even if the final agreement has not yet been signed, some victories and defeats have been experienced on both sides.

One of Vučić’s victories is the Community of Serb Municipalities. The EU and the US are pressuring Kurti to form it in order to finalise the agreement. The other is the non-existence of the term “independence” in the proposal. On the other hand, within Kosovo, Kurti’s defeat lies in not coming back with a signed agreement and creating a situation in which he will hardly be able to avoid forming the community.

When asked about the EU perspective on Serbia and Kosovo, Burazer, who specialises in the EU integration process in Serbia, explained that reaching an agreement on normalisation is “indeed a prerequisite for joining the EU, or in Kosovo’s case, even getting candidacy status. But that the actual EU perspective”, he argued, “will depend on many different factors”. However, he does believe that “some kind of acceleration of the process might occur as a reward for making steps in normalisation.”

Filip Mirilović graduated in political science and international relations and is currently enrolled in an international security master’s programme. He regularly contributes to Vreme – a weekly magazine based in Belgrade, Serbia. He mostly deals with topics such as security and politics.

EU, Kosovo, Serbia, Serbia-Kosovo relations